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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
 
A Kingdom Divided:  New Media, the Fragmentation of Evangelical Cultural Values, and U.S. 
Politics 
Religious movements are a powerful force in politics, but there is no research that analyzes the 
relationship between new communication technologies and Christian political mobilization in the United 
States. In addressing this deficit, this thesis has three interrelated aims. First, beginning from an analysis 
of social capital, civic engagement and mobilization, it provides a historical overview of the U.S. 
evangelical community and its rise as a dominant cultural and political force. It argues that changing 
social norms provided the conditions for a strong reactionary religious movement to take root, while the 
social effects of broadcast media helped to concentrate evangelical energies on issues such as abortion, 
homosexuality, and school prayer. Second, this thesis develops an understanding of the impact of the 
Internet upon evangelical organizations based on original research and fieldwork. It demonstrates that in 
contrast to the effects of broadcast media, which served largely to unify evangelical cultural attitudes, the 
Internet is instead a source of significant theological fragmentation and political pluralization. By serving 
as a conduit through which dissident religious elements are better able to connect, organize, and mobilize, 
the Internet is revealed to be a powerful tool for movements such as ―creation care‖ and the ―emerging 
church,‖ which in years past have been unable to gather significant cultural strength due to the limitations 
of prevailing communication infrastructures. Collectively, these movements have emerged as a source of 
considerable unrest and internal religious division. Finally, this thesis discusses the political and electoral 
implications of a fragmented evangelical community and the ways in which the U.S. Democratic Party 
may capitalize on these developments. 
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Plato‘s Phaedrus recounts a visit by the god Theuth, the inventor of numbers, arithmetic, 
geometry and writing, to King Thamus of Naucratis.  During the visit Theuth described to the 
King each of his inventions, and as he did the King passed judgment, expressing his approval or 
disapproval.  When he got to the invention of writing, Theuth declared, ―here is an 
accomplishment, my lord the King, which will improve both the wisdom and the memory of the 
Egyptians.‖1  To which Thamus replied: 
 
Most ingenious Theuth, one man has the ability to beget arts, but the ability to 
judge of their usefulness or harmfulness to their users belongs to another; and 
now you, who are the father of letters, have been led by your affection to ascribe 
to them a power the opposite of that which they really possess. For this invention 
will produce forgetfulness in the minds of those who learn to use it, because they 
will not practice their memory. Their trust in writing, produced by external 
characters which are no part of themselves, will discourage the use of their own 
memory within them. You have invented an elixir not of memory, but of 
reminding; and you offer your pupils the appearance of wisdom, not true wisdom, 
for they will read many things without instruction and will therefore seem to 
know many things, when they are for the most part ignorant and hard to get along 
with, since they are not wise, but only appear wise.
2
 
 
  It is tempting to fault King Thamus as overly critical in his appraisal of Theuth‘s 
invention.  However the King deserves some measure of praise for having the foresight and 
                                                 
1
 Phaedrus dialogue on rhetoric and writing (274b-277a). 
2
 Ibid. 
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wisdom to perceive how the introduction of the written word, which in itself is a tool to record 
and recall, would diminish memory and undermine the era‘s dominant method of 
communication, namely oral recollection which he holds in much higher regard.  Whether or not 
oral recollection is indeed superior to the written word is a moot point.  However, it is certain 
that throughout history, humanity has made numerous innovations, which, for better and for 
worse, have dramatically altered our historical trajectories in ways that could not have been 
predicted.   
 When a new communication technology is first introduced, its most profound social effects 
are often not immediately understood.   Neil Postman gives the example of the clock to illustrate 
this. Invented by Benedictine monks between the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the clock 
revolutionized the way we both perceive and record time.  Postman notes: 
 
The impetus behind the invention was to provide a more or less precise regularity 
to the routines of the monasteries, which required, among other things, seven 
periods of devotion during the course of the day.  The bells of the monastery were 
to be rung to signal canonical hours, and the mechanical clock was the technology 
that could provide precision to these rituals of devotion.  And indeed it did.  But 
what the monks did not foresee was that the clock is a means not merely of 
keeping track of the hours but also of synchronizing and controlling the action of 
men.  And thus, by the middle of the fourteenth century, the clock had moved 
outside the walls of the monastery, and brought a new and precious regularity to 
the life of the workman and the merchant.
3
 
 
                                                 
3
 Neil Postman, Technopoly:  The Surrender of Culture to Technology (New York:  Vintage Books, 1993), 14. 
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  For Postman, the clock is a prime example of what he calls the ―ecological‖ nature of 
technology.
 4
 While the clock succeeded in bringing about greater regularity to religious routines, 
it also became integral to the scheduling of our daily lives.  In an ironic twist, invented to bring 
about greater religious devotion, the clock‘s most lasting social impact has been the 
reorganization of trade and commerce, the accumulation of wealth, and the worship of Mammon, 
rather than the God of Abraham.  The printing press is another example of a technology that is 
hugely important not because it either adds or subtracts from society, but rather because it 
changes it altogether.  For instance, following the invention of the printing press in Europe, 
Europe became much more than Europe with movable type, or Europe without the scribes.  
Instead, the introduction of printing press helped spread Luther‘s rebellion against the Catholic 
Church and is widely credited as contributing to the conditions necessary for theProtestant 
Reformation.
5
 
  Today, society finds itself in the midst of another technological revolution.  Recent 
advances in computer sciences have dramatically altered the way we live our lives, communicate 
with one another, and understand the world around us. As we increasingly move toward an 
environment of instant and near infinite information, it is less crucial for individuals to ―know, 
memorize, or recall information and more important for them to be able to find, sort, analyze, 
share, discuss, critique, and create information and knowledge.‖6 As a result of this change, 
schools are finding it less important to teach students how to be knowledgeable and are instead 
focusing on making students knowledge-able—that is, able to ―actively examine, question and 
                                                 
4
 Ibid., 18. 
5
 See for instance, Elizabeth Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1979). 
6
 Michael Wesch, Podcast: Michael Wesch on the New Media Environment, March 24, 2011.  Found online at:  
<http://www.educause.edu/blog/gbayne/PodcastMichaelWeschontheNewMed/226117>  (Accessed May 15, 2011). 
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even re-create the (increasingly digital) structures that shape our world.‖7  This shift in 
pedagogical focus is but another renegotiation of the way we relate to one another and it entails 
disruptive changes to our economic, social and political structures. 
 Media has had, and continues to have, a tremendous influence in shaping American values 
and in defining the American character.  One historical example of this is the heavy reliance of 
the early American patriots on local newspapers and printed pamphlets to help spread their 
message of liberty and convince others to join the cause for national independence.  For instance 
in the first three months of its publication, Thomas Paine‘s Common Sense, a 79-page pamphlet 
offering plain arguments for American succession, sold more than 120,000 copies in the colonies 
alone and helped solidify public support for the Revolution. 
  In the 235 years since the signing of the Declaration of Independence, America has 
changed in remarkable ways.  For instance, during this time the American Republic has grown 
from being little more than a scattered collection of loosely affiliated state governments to a 
modern day empire (albeit one in decline).  Yet despite America‘s many changes over the years, 
religion has remained an indelible source of identity for millions of Americans.  As the Pew 
Research Center notes: 
 
Religion is much more important to Americans than to people living in other 
wealthy nations. Six-in-ten (59%) people in the U.S. say religion plays a very 
important role in their lives. This is roughly twice the percentage of self-avowed 
religious people in Canada (30%), and an even higher proportion when compared 
                                                 
7
 Ibid. 
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with Japan and Western Europe. Americans‘ views are closer to people in 
developing nations than to the publics of developed nations.
8
 
 
In any given month, some 63% of American adults will attend worship at a Christian church, 
while 67% will utilize some form of Christian media, such as listening to Christian radio, 
watching a televangelist on T.V. or reading a Christian book.  That equates to roughly 132 
million American adults attending church each month, and 141 million interacting with Christian 
media.
9
  The Barna Group further notes that an increasing number of Americans are ―using the 
Internet for faith exploration and communications.‖10   
 Yet despite the fact that religious movements and organizations remain a powerful force in 
American politics, relatively little work has analyzed the relationship between the new media 
environment and evangelical political activity.  This academic deficit is perplexing, particularly 
when one considers the vast amount of research exploring the relationship between broadcast 
media and the rise of the Christian Right.  It is also troubling given the immense influence the 
Christian Right continues to wield within the Republican Party.  Through the concepts of social 
capital, civic engagement and mobilization, this thesis addresses this deficit by tracing the impact 
of the new media environment on American evangelicals and their continued engagement with 
the political process.  This thesis similarly identifies broadcast media, such as radio and 
television, as platforms with high entrance costs and ones conducive to the unification of 
political principles.  By contrast, the Internet, as a many-to-many medium with its relatively low 
                                                 
8
 Pew Forum Staff Writer, ―U.S. Stands Alone In Its Embrace of Religion Among Wealthy Nations,‖ Pew Forum on 
Religion and Public Life, December 19, 2002.  Found online at:  <http://pewglobal.org/2002/12/19/among-wealthy-
nations/>  (Accessed May 20, 2011). 
9
 Barna Group Staff Writer, ―Christian Mass Media Reach More Adults With the Christian Message Than Do 
Churches,‖ The Barna Group, July 2, 2002.  Found online at:  <http://www.barna.org/barna-update/article/5-barna-
update/77-christian-mass-media-reach-more-adults-with-the-christian-message-than-do-churches>  (Accessed May 
22, 2011).   
10
 Ibid. 
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cost of entry, has created a plural media environment, which as we shall later see, has helped 
diversify the American religious marketplace.  Additionally still, while evangelical Christianity 
often appears homogenous in nature, in actuality, it is a rich and diverse religious tradition.  One 
reason for this perception of uniformity is due to the fact that broadcast media has enabled a 
small group of religious leaders to fix down important religious messages and meanings, while 
simultaneously emphasizing shared cultural values, which among other things includes the 
protection of ―unborn life‖ and the defense of so-called traditional marriage.  In doing so, 
broadcast media has played an important role in enabling those with control of this medium to 
advance a narrowly defined conservative agenda.  Moreover, in emphasizing issues with broad 
cultural support, televangelists, radio preachers and other evangelical leaders have largely 
succeeded in elevating the broader evangelical community above the fray of smaller theological 
squabbles and minor scriptural disputes, and have instead intensified evangelical activities 
towards the political arena. By contrast, the Internet lowers the threshold for engagement and 
amplifies the voices of the many.  It subverts centralized control of information and messaging 
and instead affords for greater de-centralized ownership of material and content, and facilitates 
multifaceted engagement.  Thus, while broadcast media is uniquely suited to fix meaning and aid 
in the monopolization of knowledge and messaging, the Internet instead enables a diverse set of 
actors to challenge prevailing ideas and values, leading to ever-greater pluralization.  As 
evangelicals increasingly turn to the Internet for purposes of religious devotion, guidance and 
education, the amalgamating effects of the broadcast age are weakened, resulting in growing 
theological fragmentation.  In particular, growing support for evangelical environmentalism (or 
creation care as it is commonly known) and the emerging church movement (social justice 
evangelicalism) have proven to be sources of considerable religious unrest within the evangelical 
19 
 
community.  This thesis focuses on these specific movements as through an examination of them 
and those organizations affiliating with them, much can be learned about how the confluence of 
new media technologies and American evangelicals is reshaping religious and political 
landscapes in America. Moreover, in elevating issues such as environmental protection and 
economic inequality, the creation care and emerging church movements are reorienting religious 
dialogues away from the so-called ―culture war‖ issues of the 80s and 90s, and in so doing, are 
creating new political realities and tensions.
11
 
As these movements continue to gather strength, new social possibilities will continue to 
be actualized.  In particular, the spread of the emerging church movement is renewing religious 
interest in the social gospel, while successfully promoting an alternative understanding of what it 
means to be a Christian.  In this it serves as a critical counterweight to the long-held religious 
hegemony of the Christian Right and thus rejuvenates the American religious marketplace. 
Similarly, evangelical environmentalism is forcing many elected Republicans to reconsider past 
environmental positions, while providing Democrats with a unique opportunity to make political 
inroads among a core Republican demographic.  In an effort to capitalize on these recent 
evangelical developments, Democrats are increasingly courting evangelical voters through a 
combination of faith outreach and the running of socially moderate candidates.   This strategy 
has won some elections but some Democrats wonder, at what price?  These Democrats view this 
strategy as undermining core political values, in particular, the party‘s historic support of 
                                                 
11
 The term ―culture war‖ is a metaphor often used to describe the political and social tensions between conservative 
and progressive Americans. While the term itself has long been used in one form or another, it entered the American 
popular lexicon in the 1990s and has received considerable lip service since 1992 when Pat Buchanan declared at 
the Republican National Convention that, ―there is a religious war going on in our country for the soul of America. 
It is a cultural war, as critical to the kind of nation we will one day be as was the Cold War itself.‖  For a complete 
transcript of Buchanan‘s speech, see Patrick J. Buchanan, ―Address to the Republican National Convention,‖ 
American Rhetoric, August 17, 1992.  Found online at:  
<http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/patrickbuchanan1992rnc.htm>  (Accessed July 9, 2011). 
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abortion rights.  This thesis confronts such concerns and shows how they ignore important 
institutional factors, such as agenda control, which can act as a crucial defense for reproductive 
choice.   
Changes in communication technology have historically had a great impact on religious 
bodies, and the new media environment is no exception.  With its ability to bring far-flung yet 
like-minded individuals together, the Internet is fostering an environment in which new and 
alternative forms of religious activity can better flourish.  With it comes a shifting cultural 
landscape, the impact of which is reverberating throughout the political process.  Identifying the 
effects of this impact is crucial to understanding the ever fluid American political scene and will 
enable policy makers and political activists alike to make better-informed decisions. But before 
we get too far ahead of ourselves, some definitions are in order. 
 
What is the New Media Environment? 
 
As Clay Shirky states, prior to this most recent media revolution (the new media 
environment), ―there are only four periods in the last 500 years were media has changed enough 
to qualify for the label of ‗revolution.‘‖12  These periods include:  The invention of the printing 
press, the advent of two-way communication and conversational media, first with the telegraph, 
then with the telephone, the introduction of recorded media other than print, such as 
photography, sound (records), movie reels, and finally, the broadcast age.  Today, however, we 
are living through what Shirky argues is the ―the largest increase in expressive capability in 
                                                 
12
 Clay Shriky, ―Clay Shirky:  How social media can make history,‖ TED Talks, June 2009.  Found online at:  
<http://www.ted.com/talks/clay_shirky_how_cellphones_twitter_facebook_can_make_history.html>  (Accessed 
March 10, 2012). 
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human history.‖13  To validate this point, Shirky notes a curious asymmetry of the older media 
regimes.  Namely, ―the media that is good at creating conversation is no good at creating groups, 
and the media that is good at creating groups, is no good at creating conversation.‖14  The 
Internet, however, is the first medium in human history that ―has native support for groups and 
conversations at the same time.‖15  A key component of this process is digitalization.  For 
instance, ―as all media gets digitized, the Internet also becomes the mode of carriage for all other 
media.  Phone calls migrate to the Internet, magazines migrate to the Internet, movies migrate to 
the Internet, and that means that every medium is right next-door to every other medium.‖16  
Another way to think of this process is that as media increasingly finds a home online, media is 
becoming less just a source of information, and increasingly more a network for coordination.  
To better illustrate this point, it is worth recalling the work of Marshall McLuhan.  In describing 
the media environment of the day, McLuhan famously used the term ―media ecology,‖ writing 
that such ecology is the:  
 
…arranging [of] various media to help each other so they won't cancel each other 
out, to buttress one medium with another. You might say, for example, that radio 
is a bigger help to literacy than television, but television might be a very 
wonderful aid to teaching languages. And so you can do some things on some 
media that you cannot do on others. And, therefore, if you watch the whole field, 
you can prevent this waste that comes by one canceling the other out.
17
 
                                                 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Stephanie McLuhan and David Staines eds., Understanding Me:  Lectures and Interviews by Marshall McLuhan, 
(Cambridge:  MIT Press, 2004), 271. 
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However, when we speak of the new media environment today, what we are referring to 
is the consolidation of media ecology into one easily accessible and navigable platform: The 
World Wide Web.  In this ecology, ―what matters here isn‘t technical capital, it‘s social 
capital.‖18  This is so, as these new media tools, ―don‘t get socially interesting until they get 
technologically boring,‖19 a process that lowers entrance barriers and widespread adoption.  As 
Shirkly aptly notes, ―it isn‘t when the shiny new tools show up that their uses start permeating 
through society, it‘s when everybody is able to take them for granted.‖20  And because of this, 
media is now more ―socially capable,‖ to the point where ―innovation can happen anywhere that 
people can take for granted the idea that we are all in this together.‖21   As a result, what we are 
seeing in this new media environment is a landscape where ―innovation is happening everywhere 
and moving from one spot to another[,]‖22 where distinctions between media consumers and 
media producers is not so much blurred as non-existent. 
 
Who is an Evangelical? 
 
When an individual identifies him or herself as a Catholic, there is little doubt as to what 
they mean.  In all likelihood, they are referring to a specific Christian denomination whose 
believers are led by the Pope and the Holy See.  By contrast, when someone says they are 
‗evangelical‘, they are not affiliating themselves with any particular denomination or formal 
creed. Over the years, significant scholarly work has attempted to answer the question:  What is 
                                                 
18
 Shirky, 2009. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Ibid. 
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an evangelical?  From a historical perspective, the evangelical movement can trace its roots to 
the works of such radical preachers as John Wycliffe (1330-1384) and Jan Hus (1372-1415), as 
well as other pre-reformation theologians such as Peter Waldo (1140-1218) and Girolamo 
Savonarola (1452-1498).  However, the shape of modern evangelicalism is more appropriately 
attributed to the work of leaders of the Protestant Reformation.
23
 
According to the Institute for the Study of American Evangelicals at Wheaton College, 
the term ‗evangelical‘ is itself ―a wide-reaching definitional ‗canopy‘ that covers a diverse 
number of Protestant groups.‖24  Noted religious scholar David Bebbington holds that the 
evangelical adheres to four core tenets.  These include Crucientrism, whereby particular focus is 
placed on the doctrine of substitutional atonement; Biblicism, in which the Bible is placed at the 
center of corporate worship; Conversionism, a belief which asserts the need for each individual 
to convert to Christianity in order to achieve eternal salvation; and finally Activism, in which 
evangelicals openly and actively proclaim the Lord‘s ―Good News.‖25 Alister McGrath adds 
another widely accepted tenet, namely Christocentrism, which holds that God‘s eternal ―Word‖ 
became human in the flesh of Jesus Christ who went on to reveal God to all humanity.
26
  
Collectively, these five tenets are widely regarded as the defining beliefs of the evangelical 
Christian. 
In the United States, political scientists have come to view evangelicals as an important 
voting bloc in their own right.  Occasionally referred to as the ―evangelical bloc,‖ or the 
―evangelical voting bloc,‖ this segment of the population is more commonly identified as the 
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―Christian Right.‖  Culturally speaking, the Christian Right is a political movement of 
conservative, mostly evangelical Christians and Christian organizations, which despite various 
denominational differences, have coalesced around certain political issues, such as opposition to 
abortion and gay rights, the teaching of evolution in public schools, and, more generally, the 
perceived secularization of American society.  Throughout this thesis, the terms ―Christian 
Right,‖ ―evangelical bloc,‖ and ―evangelical voting bloc,‖ are often used when referring to the 
political activities of the conservative evangelical community. 
On a final note, the word ―evangelical‖ is often preceded in popular and scholarly 
literature by the word ―white,‖ as while many African-Americans are technically evangelical, 
their political voting habits are quite different than the rest of the evangelical bloc.  As such, 
when this thesis uses the term evangelical it is referring more generally to white evangelicals.
27
 
 
What is the Evangelical Community? 
 
While the above section provides a workable, as well as technical, understanding of who 
is an evangelical, little has thus far been said of another equally important term which appears 
frequently throughout this thesis:  the evangelical community.  As we shall see in chapter 3, 
evangelicals are a theologically diverse collective encompassing countless denominations, many 
thousands of congregations, and nearly one out of every five Americans.
28
  To lump such a vast 
array of believers and religious practitioners into such a broad community begs much larger 
questions, namely what is a community, and what is meant by the use of the term, ―the 
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evangelical community?‖  To answer these questions, we would do well to turn briefly to 
literature not typically associated with the study of religion and social capital.  
Since its publication in 1983, Benedict Anderson‘s Imagined Communities has become 
required reading in the study of nationalism.
29
  In it, Anderson conceives of the nation as a 
socially fabricated or ―imagined‖ community.  As Anderson notes, ―all communities larger than 
primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined,‖ as according 
to Anderson, ―communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity-genuineness, but by the 
style in which they are imagined.‖30  As such, it is impossible for nations, or for that matter, any 
sizable gathering of people to be what Anderson calls ―true‖ communities.  Instead, members of 
these larger social collectives are a part of an imagined community, as while they will only ever 
have a personal relationship with but a few members of this community, they nonetheless hold a 
strong emotional affinity for their fellow members.  As such they engage in a number of 
activities, from war to sporting events for the perceived benefit of this community.  Anderson‘s 
formulation of community is particularly relevant to this study, as he explicitly links the rise of 
imagined communities, such as the nation, to advances in communications technology.  The rise 
of the newspaper and the arrival of other print commodities, such as the novel, or what Anderson 
calls ―print-capitalism,‖ helped disseminate languages nationally, spread political ideologies 
across broad swaths of land, and allowed previously unconnected people to be a part of a shared 
experience and have a collective identity.
31
   
The American evangelical community is constituted much in the same way as the 
imagined communities discussed by Anderson.  As we shall see in the coming chapters, 
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American evangelicals often perceive themselves as an ―other,‖ a divinely ordained community 
battling the corrosive forces of sin and secularization.  In this regard, evangelicals have set 
themselves apart from the rest of society, while much of American society has in-turn come to 
view evangelicals as something different from themselves.  Similarly, when we consider the role 
print-capitalism played in the formation of national identity, we see many striking similarities.  
While chapter 3 will discuss the role of media and the formation of the evangelical identity in 
much greater depth, briefly, the advent of broadcast media figured significantly in the formation 
of the ―imagined‖ evangelical community.  For instance, Simon Coleman writes that such 
technology served as a powerful tool in resolving tensions among early evangelicals, namely 
because it aided televangelists and radio preachers in focusing their audiences attention on issues 
that enjoyed broad evangelical support, while exposing these very same viewers to shared 
religious experiences which cut across denominational differences.  As Colman notes: 
  
Videos fix the Word in physical, predictable, repeatable form yet also reproduce 
the appearance of inspired spontaneity.  They provide a new way, complementary 
to that of sacred texts, of storing, transporting and scrutinizing language, but 
unlike writing retain a record of the original ‗event‘ of verbal creation in time and 
space.  The sacred words of the sermon and the service keep their place within the 
flux of evangelical experience while also offering the distant viewer or listener the 
opportunity to vicariously sample such experience.
32
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Coleman continues, arguing that such personal experience becomes a marketable ―collective 
representation.‖33  With these forces in play, an evangelical economy has been constructed over 
the last 30 years (much the same way earlier printers and publishers created ‗print-capitalism‘), 
and as a result, broadly shared faith experiences regularly occur while a narrowly defined 
evangelical religious identity is constructed.  Thus, when this thesis speaks of the evangelical 
community, it is referring to a loosely affiliated ―imagined community‖ of believers and 
congregations, that while diverse in their traditions, have nonetheless come to share many core 
values, and adopt for themselves a sacredly-charged language as well as a strong sense of 
comradery, and purpose. 
 
What is the Christian Right? 
 
This thesis takes deliberate efforts to distinguish between the Christian Right and 
evangelicals, as while the Christian Right is comprised overwhelmingly of evangelicals, not all 
evangelicals are members of the Christian Right.  While the above section covering the core 
tenets of evangelical Christianity has offered a definition of evangelical Christianity; this section 
instead focuses on what constitutes the Christian Right.  The broadest distinction between the 
two groups is in terms of political activity.  While evangelicals are certainly politically active and 
vote based on their political preferences (preferences that are often informed by their relious 
views), evangelicals do not necessarily seek to rigidly impose their religious values on society at-
large.  By contrast, however, the Christian Right is comprised of active Christian organizations 
and Christian social movements that believe theology should drive American public policy.  As 
Abraham Foxman, National Director of the Anti-Defamation League notes, the Christian Right 
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looks ―to ‗Christianize‘ all aspects of American life, from the halls of government to the 
libraries, to the movies, to recording studios, to the playing fields and local rooms of professional 
collegiate and amateur sport, from the military to SpongeBob SquarePants.‖34  In short, what the 
Christian Right looks to achieve is the transformation of the American Republic into an 
American Theocracy.  
As Chapter 3 will discuss in much greater detail, the Christian Right, or the ―New 
Christian Right‖ as it is sometimes called,35 arose in the 1970s in response to what many 
conservative Christians perceived to be the secularization of American society.  At that time, the 
Christian Right was largely viewed as a non-partician religious movement, though by the 1980 
presidential election, it was becoming increasingly clear that both the Democratic Party and the 
Carter administration were anything but dependable allies.  Instead Christian Right leaders 
turned to Ronald Reagan and the Republican Party, who in recognizing the vast influence such 
leaders held over the growing ranks of America‘s evangelical community, eagerly embraced the 
movement and adopted their agenda.   
Historically, the Christian Right has been largely dependent upon the presence of a strong 
and vocal leadership.  Such a need was greatly aided by advent of broadcast technologies, which 
played a crucial role in raising the national profiles of several religious leaders, and similarly 
helped in unifying the cultural and political values of evangelical Christians more broadly.  
While Catholic groups such as the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Liberties and the 
Catholic Conference of Bishops are apart of America‘s Christian Right, relations between 
evangelicals and the Catholics have often been tenuous, and at times, down-right hostile.  For 
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instance, although conservative Catholics and conservative evangelicals share many core values, 
such as the protection of so-called ―traditional marriage‖ and the abolition of reproductive rights, 
many Catholics are suspicious of evangelical efforts to reinsert state sponsored prayer in the 
public schools out of fears that such prayer would take a more protestant slant.  Moreover, the 
Catholic Church and many evangelical leaders differ on several important issues such as capital 
punishment, and the role government should play in alleviating poverty and promoting other 
issues more typically aligned with the social gospel.  These differences, combined with the 
conservative electoral propensity of American evangelicals, and the continued political 
alignment of many everyday Catholic parishioners with the Democratic Party, have allowed 
evangelicals to have a far greater influence in shaping the political agenda of Christian Right. 
Finally, many scholars and social observers will regularly refer to the ―Religious Right‖ 
when in fact they are referencing the Christian Right.  To be clear, the term ―Religious Right‖ 
refers to politically active organizations and movements rooted in fundamentalist and 
conservative religious doctrine, irrespective of religious creed.  In this regard, the Religious 
Right is a much larger categorical canopy under which the Christian Right falls.  Much like the 
Christian Right, members of the Religious Right similarly look to impose their religious 
ideologies and theological doctrines upon society.  While various Religious Right groups and 
movements exist within the United States, their overall numbers outside of the Christian Right 
are sufficiently small as to make them political insignificant.
36
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What is Creation Care? 
 
 Evangelical environmentalism, or creation care, is a movement of evangelical Christians 
who view environmental stewardship as a biblical mandate.  Supporters argue that God‘s 
commandment instructing Adam and Eve to ―keep‖ the Garden of Eden applies to Christians 
even today.
37
  They also believe that environmental degradation is adversely affecting the poor 
and developing world, which evangelicals view as the ―least among them.‖38  In February of 
2006, 86 leaders of the evangelical community, including Rick Warren and Jim Wallis, signed 
the Evangelical Climate Initiative‘s Call to Action.  It reads in part: 
 
As American evangelical Christian leaders, we recognize both our opportunity 
and our responsibility to offer a biblically based moral witness that can help shape 
public policy in the most powerful nation on earth, and therefore contribute to the 
well-being of the entire world. Whether we will enter the public square and offer 
our witness there is no longer an open question. We are in that square, and we will 
not withdraw. 
 
We are proud of the evangelical community‘s long-standing commitment to the 
sanctity of human life. But we also offer moral witness in many venues and on 
                                                                                                                                                             
gladly exploited this widely held eschatological belief, as American support for Israel (irrespective of the motivation 
behind this support) is crucial to security of the Israeli state. 
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many issues. 
 
Over the last several years many of us have engaged in study, reflection, and 
prayer related to the issue of climate change (often called ―global warming‖). For 
most of us, until recently this has not been treated as a pressing issue or major 
priority.  Indeed, many of us have required considerable convincing before 
becoming persuaded that climate change is a real problem and that it ought to 
matter to us as Christians. But now we have seen and heard enough.
39
 
 
Within the evangelical environmental movement several creation care organizations exist.  Of 
these, four organizations have been selected for closer examination.  They are: 
 
The Evangelical Environmental Network (EEN)—Founded in 1993 as a ministry of Evangelicals 
for Social Action, the EEN is the largest creation care organization in existence today.  Its high 
public visibility, along with its prominent national leadership, both past and present, and its 
successful advocacy of past environmental issues, has made it the target of numerous 
conservative religious leaders and groups.  One of the more vocal opponents of the EEN is Tony 
Perkins, President of the Family Research Council, one of the nation‘s largest evangelical 
pressure groups.  Although the EEN often frames its environmental message in pro-life terms, 
Perkins remains unimpressed.  ―Unfortunately,‖ as Perkins notes, ―a number of religious leaders 
have joined the alarmist crusade and are attempting to make the environment the most 
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important issue in the church.‖40  This Perkins argues in not unlike ―the young prophet who ran 
to King David before he heard the message [See 2 Samuel 18:22–28]. They have zeal and a 
desire to change things, but they do not have the message the church needs at this time.‖41  
Similarly, Bishop Harry Jackson, Jr., co-author of Personal Faith, Public Policy with Perkins 
writes, ―a million abortions are performed in the United States every year...[but] can EEN cite 
even one instance where it expressed outrage or even concern about these deaths? Can it cite one 
instance when it criticized abortionists, or supported calls to reduce federal funding from 
abortion clinics...?‖42  Irrespective of these criticisms, the EEN is genuinely concerned about 
protecting the quality of life, both born and unborn.  On the front page of their website, for 
instance, the EEN has a picture of sleeping infant wrapped in a plush blanket under a banner 
which reads ―The Menace of Mercury.‖  By click on the banner link, visitors are immediately 
taken to a webpage entitled ―Mercury and the Unborn‖ and are greeted by the below 
advertisement: 
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Figure 1.1 
Creation Care Framed as a Sanctity of Life Issue 
 
  
*  Screen shot of EEN webpage framing creation care as a pro-life issue.  Found online at: 
<http://www.creationcare.org/mercury/> (Accessed February 5, 2012). 
 
Below are numerous videos where visitors learn about the damning effects of mercury on the 
unborn, and below visitors a provided with a key mission statement of the EEN: 
 
As a pro-life, creation-care organization, protecting and enhancing life is at the 
heart of what we do. A key dimension of this is protecting human health, and 
that's why we want to stop the mercury poisoning of the unborn. 
 
One in six babies, over 700,000 each year, are born with harmful levels of 
mercury in their blood, and coal-burning power plants are the largest source of 
domestic mercury pollution. 
34 
 
 
Jesus said, "Let the little children come to me, and do not hinder them, for the 
kingdom of heaven belongs to such as these." 
 
We believe this is an urgent and escalating moral crisis which calls for immediate 
action! 
 
PROTECT LIFE 
 
Christians are called to protect life, and for us that includes the unborn. Jesus 
taught us to love our neighbours and treat others as we would want to be treated. 
Protecting the unborn and children from mercury poisoning and air pollutions in 
keeping with Jesus' commands. It is time to stop the mercury poisoning of the 
unborn. 
 
LONG OVERDUE 
 
The unborn were provided legal protection from toxic pollution like mercury in 
1990. We've had two decades of bi-partisan foot-dragging, with the courts finally 
ordering the federal government to enforce the law and protect the unborn.
43
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 As the nation‘s largest and arguably wealthiest creation care group, the EEN has invested 
millions of dollars in various ad campaigns and have extensive grassroots outreach effort which 
aims to cultivate support at the congregational level.  And while many creation care groups have 
since joined the EEN in its call for greater environmental protection, the EEN remains one of the 
most divisive organizations in the evangelical community. 
 
Flourish—Founded in 2008 by former EEN members Rusty Pritchard and Jim Jewel, Flourish 
promotes itself as a ―connector‖ within the creation care movement.  The organization sees itself 
as facilitating conversations and partnerships between parties who might not otherwise come 
together, such as the scientific and religious communities.  As a general rule, Flourish does not 
take positions on issues perceived to be divisive, such as humanity‘s role in the warming of the 
earth.  Instead, Flourish looks for ways to integrate creation care into church life and everyday 
living.  In seeking to avoid polarizing issues, its hope is to raise the profile of environmental 
ministries with evangelical churches, and encourage lay parishioners to think more deeply about 
the way their lives impact their communities and environment. 
 
Renewal: Students Caring for Creation—Throughout its relatively short history, Renewal has 
been a remarkably active organization.  Founded in 2008 by a group of college student and 
recent graduates, Renewal focuses its energies primarily on cultivating support on college 
campuses, by raising awareness and activism among this population.  Past activities have 
included the nation-wide ―Green Awakening Tour,‖ a letter writing campaign to the White 
House, national days of prayer and national days of service.  Many of its original founders have 
gone on to publish authors, radio and television commentators, and one, Ben Lowe, a graduate 
36 
 
from the prestigious evangelical Wheaton College, ran for Congress in Illinois 6
th
 Congressional 
District, in which Wheaton is located.  While Lowe won the Democratic Primary, he ultimately 
failed in his bid to unseat the incumbent, though his campaign succeeded in bringing 
considerable attention to both Renewal and the Creation Care movement.  More recently, 
Renewal has strengthened its partnership with Restoring Eden, another creation care 
organization, and co-sponsors several campus events with that organization. 
 
Restoring Eden—As a growing network committed to grassroots advocacy, Restoring Eden has 
garnered a reputation for its public lobbying efforts.  Much of its work focuses on supporting 
marginalized groups such as ―small island nations that are disappearing due to climate change, 
the people of Appalachia being impacted by mountain top removal, [or] the unborn children 
impacted by pollution from coal plants.‖44  Long known for its creative marketing strategies and 
innovative form of political activism, Restoring Eden has flourished under the leadership of Peter 
Illyn, who holds degrees in both divinity and ad campaigning.  One of Illyn‘s greatest strengths 
appears to be his willingness to take head-on conventional evangelical attitudes in ways that 
appeal directly to evangelical youth and young adults, as evident by the below bumper sticker:   
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Figure 1.2 
A Popular Bumper Sticker by Restoring Eden 
  
 
*  Restoring Eden bumber sticker can be found online at:  <http://restoringeden.org/resources/Merchandisefolder>  
 
 Another way in which Restoring Eden looks to bolster their claims that God wants evangelicals 
to care for the environment is by regularly citing scripture.  Considering that evangelicals believe 
the Bible to be the ultimate arbitrary of what is right, just and moral, using scripture to highlight 
God‘s greener side seems like a no-brainer.  As we shall see, however, scriptural citation remains 
a practice surprisingly underutilized within the broader creation care movement, this despite the 
fact that the Bible has many eco-friendly verses.  For their part, Restoring Eden views the Bible‘s 
many environmentally friendly verses as a persuasive argument that can be used to win over 
skeptical evangelicals.  Evidence of this belief has led this organization to cite scripture 
abundantly on its websites and traditional printed material such as pamphlets and brochures.  
And in following their more unorthodox marketing approach, Restoring Eden is even spreading 
the Good Word with bumper stickers: 
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Figure 1.3 
Restoring Eden Bumper Sticker Citing Scripture in the Promotion of Creation Care 
 
 
*  Restoring Eden bumber sticker can be found online at:  <http://restoringeden.org/resources/Merchandisefolder>  
 
And while some might view the use of bumper stickers as lighthearted, perhaps even childish, 
bumper stickers remain a popular means of expressing one‘s views and advancing causes close 
to one‘s heart. 
Founded initially as a response to the GOPs repeated environmental attacks, Restoring 
Eden is today one of the nation‘s most prominent evangelical environmental organizations.  Its 
more aggressive forms of environmental activism coupled with its unorthodox methods of 
proselytizing is in many ways a reflection of the prevailing counter-cultural attitudes of the 
Pacific Northwest, from where Restoring Eden is headquarters.  In addition to the many seminars 
and conferences Restoring Eden either runs or participates in, it is also active in lobbying 
political leaders, organizing direct protest actions, and hosts a number of nature appreciation 
programs, such as camping retreats, which Restoring Eden believes helps to focus the soul on 
creation. 
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What is the Emerging Church Movement? 
 
 The emerging church is a religious movement, or ―conversation‖ as some involved prefer 
to call it, which seeks a radical re-conceptualization, or perhaps more accurately, re-grounding, 
of the Christian message.  Movement leaders, such as Brian McLaren, Tony Jones and Phyllis 
Tickle are determined to keep the movement little more than a loose association of individuals 
who want to explore and discuss the Christian faith, Christian theology, and Christian praxis in 
the post-modern world.
45
  In its present form, the emerging church is largely a movement 
reacting against the dominant expression of the evangelical tradition.  It is for this reason that the 
movement is often referred to as ―post-evangelical.‖  As Andrew Perriman notes: 
 
This reaction has been driven largely, I think, by dissatisfaction with evangelical 
church culture at various levels—a dissatisfaction that has often been explained in 
terms of a perceived shift in the wider culture from modernism to postmodernism: 
from objectivism to relativism, from certainty to doubt, from singularity to 
plurality, from story to stories. Emerging church is an attempt to replot Christian 
faith on this new cultural and intellectual terrain.
46
 
 
Another area of departure from the larger evangelical tradition is the emerging church‘s 
willingness to ―pursue a wider engagement with the public sphere.‖47  Not only is the emerging 
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church happy to engage a broader spectrum of religious practices, including Catholic and 
Orthodox traditions, but it also promotes social activism on issues that have historically not been 
associated with evangelicals, such as economic and social justice.
48
  Unlike evangelical 
environmentalism, few formal organizations exist within the emerging church; however, of those 
that do, the most prominent is undoubtedly Emergent Village, though Evangelicals for Social 
Action (ESA) are similarly active on the social gospel front.   
 
Emergent Village—Like the broader emerging church movement, Emergent Village is a largely 
decentralized venture and consists primarily of individual cohorts.  Cohorts are locally based 
groups that meet in a wide-variety of places, such as coffee houses, bars, restaurants and even 
private homes, to freely engage in theological discussion.  Due to its decentralized nature and the 
diversity of its members, Emergent Village has at times struggled to define what exactly 
Emergent Village is.  With no set doctrine or organizational creed, Emergent Village, or more 
precisely, its affiliated cohorts are, as its website proclaims, ―a meeting place for friends who 
wish they could hang out together more often.‖  More recently, Emergent Village has succeeded 
in codifying four core values, which they call their ―Order and Rule.‖  These values are have 
been listed below, as well as a brief explanation which appears on their website: 
 
1.  A commitment to God in the way of Jesus: 
We are committed to doing justice, loving kindness, and walking humbly with God. 
In the words of Jesus, we seek to live by the Great Commandment: loving God and 
loving our neighbors – including those who might be considered ―the least of these‖ 
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or enemies. We understand the gospel to be centered in Jesus and his message of the 
Kingdom of God, a message offering reconciliation with God, humanity, creation, 
and self. 
We are committed to a ―generous orthodoxy‖ in faith and practice – affirming the 
historic Christian faith and the biblical injunction to love one another even when we 
disagree. We embrace many historic spiritual practices, including prayer, meditation, 
contemplation, study, solitude, silence, service, and fellowship, believing that healthy 
theology cannot be separated from healthy spirituality. 
2. A commitment to the Church in all its forms: 
We are committed to honor and serve the church in all its forms – Orthodox, Roman 
Catholic, Protestant, Pentecostal, Anabaptist. We practice ―deep ecclesiology‖ – 
rather than favoring some forms of the church and critiquing or rejecting others, we 
see that every form of the church has both weaknesses and strengths, both liabilities 
and potential.  
We believe the rampant injustice and sin in our world requires the sincere, 
collaborative, and whole-hearted response of all Christians in all denominations, from 
the most historic and hierarchical, through the mid-range of local and congregational 
churches, to the most spontaneous and informal expressions. We affirm both the 
value of strengthening, renewing, and transitioning existing churches and 
organizations, and the need for planting, resourcing, and coaching new ones of many 
kinds.  
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We seek to be irenic and inclusive of all our Christian sisters and brothers, rather than 
elitist and critical. We own the many failures of the church as our failures, which 
humbles us and calls us to repentance, and we also celebrate the many heroes and 
virtues of the church, which inspires us and gives us hope. 
3. A commitment to God‘s World: 
We practice our faith missionally – that is, we do not isolate ourselves from this 
world, but rather, we follow Christ into the world.  
We seek to fulfill the mission of God in our generations, and then to pass the baton 
faithfully to the next generations as well.  
We believe the church exists for the benefit and blessing of the world at large; we 
seek therefore not to be blessed to the exclusion of everyone else, but rather for the 
benefit of everyone else. 
We see the earth and all it contains as God‘s beloved creation, and so we join God in 
seeking its good, its healing, and its blessing. 
4. And finally, a commitment to one another: 
In order to strengthen our shared faith and resolve, and in order to encourage and 
learn from one another in our diversity through respectful, sacred conversation, we 
value time and interaction with other friends who share this rule and its practices.  
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We identify ourselves as members of this growing, global, generative, and non-
exclusive friendship.  
We welcome others into this friendship as well.  
We bring whatever resources we can to enrich this shared faith and resolve.
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 In recent years, the emerging church movement has experienced rapid growth, 
particularly within evangelical circles.  The popularity of emergent Christianity concerns many 
conservative evangelicals who view the movement as threat to core evangelical values, beliefs 
and practices.  Conversely, many prominent emerging Christians such as Mark Driscoll and 
Shane Claiborne, believe Emergent Village exercises too much influence within the emerging 
conversation and have thus publicly distanced themselves from some of the more radical 
theological expressions of Emergent Village.  On a final note, this thesis uses the term 
―emergent‖ as well as ―emerging.‖  To clarify, ―emergent‖ is used in a narrow capacity to 
describe members of Emergent Village, whereas ―emerging‖ is used when referencing members 
of the broader emerging church movement. 
 
Evangelical for Social Action (ESA)—Though it has no formal affiliation with Emergent Village 
or the emerging church movement, ESA is an evangelical think-tank seeking solutions to social 
and economic problems.  Since its inception in 1973, ESA has led the charge to revamp the 
political and social aspirations of American evangelicals, and was for a time viewed with great 
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suspicions by more conservative evangelicals.  While these suspensions have subsided in past 
years, thanks largely to the continued and purposeful engagement of ESA with the greater 
evangelical community, some on the right continue to hold considerable animosity towards ESA 
due the connections with several evangelical environmental organizations, as well as for the 
sympathies many ESA members hold with the emerging church movement.   As the parent 
organization of the EEN, it would seemingly fit to place ESA among the creation care ranks.  
However, as this thesis will show, the religious, social, economic and political aspirations of 
ESA have always been far broader than those of the above creation care organizations.  Indeed, 
these aspirations are in much greater synchronicity the core values of Emergent Village and the 
social gospel message of the broader emerging church movement.  Thus, while ESA is a sort of 
hybrid organization, occupying space in both the emerging church and creation care realms; I 
have included it as a unit of study within the emerging church movement for the reasons stated 
above. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
Within academic literature, one of the more discussed social effects of the rapid 
proliferation of Internet usage has been the fragmentation and polarization of American political 
discourse; what Bruce Bimber sees as a consequence of ―accelerated pluralism.‖50   This is taken 
up in more depth in Chapter 2, but for now, briefly, accelerated pluralism views social 
segmentation as stemming largely from new forms of electronic media.  With the abundance of 
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choice they offer, these media spur their consumers to retreat into spheres of increasingly 
atomized interests.  In this, they work to radicalize preexisting political and social bias.   
As a starting point this thesis acknowledges that over a period of several years new 
theological divisions have emerged within the American evangelical tradition.  These divisions 
have proven not only contentious, but in many respects seemingly irreconcilable as competing 
religious interests have become firmly convinced of the righteousness of their respective causes.  
This thesis seeks to establish whether Bimber‘s theory of accelerated pluralism can help account 
for these divisions.  To that end the following hypothesis has been developed as a possible 
explanation: 
 
1) Recent evangelical fragmentation is to some extent been facilitated by the 
proliferation of the Internet, whereby dissident cultural and theological elements are 
afforded more efficient means of organization and networking, thus enabling them to 
better challenge the established orthodoxy of the evangelical tradition. 
 
However, given that religious organizations are often incubators of significant social capital, 
which in turn affects mobilization and civic engagement thresholds, it is similarly hypothesized 
that:  
2) While the Internet has greatly contributed to the success of many newer, theologically 
divergent evangelical organizations, existing church apparatuses, which place a 
premium on in-person meet-ups and collective gatherings, have similarly played an 
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important role in the success of said organizations by affording an intimate setting 
more suitable for proselytizing and community development. 
 
With the evangelical tradition moving in radically new directions, the need exists to re-examine 
evangelical political values.  For instance, recent theological concerns over environmental 
degradation are causing a rift between many evangelical environmentalists and the Republican 
Party.  As such it is further hypothesized that: 
 
3) Given the growing popularity of the creation care movement, environmental 
protection is increasingly becoming an important electoral issue among evangelical 
Christians, and is putting new pressure on Republican politicians to support greener 
environmental policies. 
 
For their part, Democrats have been eager to leverage the shifting values of evangelical 
Christians for political gain.  However, it has not been without its challenges; not least because 
while many evangelicals are embracing a broader social platform on the whole, they remain 
adamantly opposed to abortion.  In fact the Evangelical Climate Initiative‘s Call to Action casts 
the fight for environmental protection in clearly ―pro-life‖ terms, and the declarations and 
mission statements of numerous creation care groups describe similar worldviews.  To overcome 
this challenge, Democrats have been running pro-life candidates in more heavily evangelical 
districts and states.  As already noted this strategy has had some electoral success, but has also 
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worried the party‘s more liberal base, in particular women‘s groups, who view such a strategy as 
jeopardizing the party‘s support of reproductive rights.  However, I hypothesize that these 
concerns are largely misguided as: 
4) Despite the growing number of pro-life Democrats in congress, abortion rights will 
remain unaffected at the Federal level so long as Democrats retain their congressional 
majorities, as party leaders are unwilling to bring legislation restricting the rights of 
women to a floor vote. 
 
Methodology 
 
As Joel Smith observes, all too often in the social sciences, we scrabble about how to do 
something, rather than just doing it.
51
  This has largely been my own experience of political 
science.  While many political scientists are uniquely qualified to speak in their area of expertise, 
it seems few are all that interested in genuinely engaging with the political process.  As David 
Adamany remarked at the 2010 Annual State Politics and Policy Conference in Springfield, 
Illinois, ―[i]t seems to me a fair characterization that research in political science has steadily 
distanced itself from the concerns of policy makers and political activists.‖52  Adamany 
continues, noting: 
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There was also a time when many in public service considered themselves 
members of the political science profession, belonging to the American Political 
Science [Association], and receiving—even occasionally reading something in—
the American Political Science Review or another of our journals.  It is within my 
memory when in presidential election years, the annual meeting of the APSA 
featured a major address by a presidential or vice presidential candidate, a 
national party chairman, or some other highly placed political figure who believed 
that political science mattered in their real world.    But that was decades ago. 
 
What has changed I believe is the trajectory of research in political science.  Its 
methodology has advanced dramatically in the direction of quantification, 
statistical methods, and modeling. Our research is no longer within the grasp of 
those who practice politics and, in a great many cases, no longer within the grasp 
of our undergraduate students.   The science in political science looms larger, the 
politics in political science smaller.
53
 
 
To conclude, Adamany argues that the consequence of this distance ―may be that we 
have less and less to say to those who are active participants in the political and governmental 
processes.   In turn, we may know less and less about the work they do, the issues they face, and 
methods of their vocation.  And we are, consequently, less able to be effective participants in that 
other world.‖54 The shame in this, I believe, is that unlike most politicians, academics are 
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uniquely qualified to probe deeply the many complexities facing society, as well as to advance 
good policy and (hopefully) influence public discourse. 
I do not wish to suggest that methodology is unimportant.  Indeed methodology is the 
crossroads where theory and methods intersect and serves to shape inquiry.
55
  To this end, a 
sound methodological approach that is both comprehensive and able to adopt a variety of 
research methods and techniques is needed, particularly when breaking new ground.   With this 
in mind, we would be wise to heed the argument of John Law that the social sciences suffer from 
a perceived need to be overly scientific.  As Law notes, ―the world is not to be understood in 
general by adopting a methodological version of auditing.  Regularities and standardizations are 
incredibly powerful tools but they set limits….And they set even firmer limits when they try to 
orchestrate themselves hegemonically into purported coherence.‖56  The need then, at least 
according to Law, is for a methodological approach that values heterogeneity and variation, as 
such an approach makes possible the discovery of new knowledge, while accepting that society 
is a ―generative flux of forces and relations that work to produce particular realities.‖57 I have 
followed Law‘s advice and have borrowed from several methodological practices.  Yet before 
we can delve too deeply into a discussion of methodologies, it is important to note that guiding 
this methodology is the research design.  
While a tendency exists to view methodology and research design as essentially the same 
process, it is important to bear in mind that the research design is a much broader operational 
canopy incorporating the methods by which research questions are answered and proper 
conclusions drawn.  Within the social sciences, there are two types of research questions; 
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descriptive research questions which answer “What is going on?” and explanatory research 
questions, which address “Why it is going on?”  As an observer of religion and politics in the 
United States, I have for some time now been witnessing an important cultural shift within 
evangelical circles, whereby a growing number of evangelicals have been breaking with the 
Christian Right and adopting a broader social and political agenda than has historically been the 
case.  From the onset, the growth of evangelical environmentalism and the emerging church 
movement served as a point of scholarly interest, while questions regarding the political 
ramifications of these respective movements served as the initial catalyst for this thesis.  With 
my curiosity roused, I naturally sought a greater descriptive understanding of these movements, 
and was similarly interested in knowing why this was happening. 
While answers to the first of these questions came relatively easy, answers to the latter 
proved more elusive.  In grappling with understanding why these movements were growing, 
greater clarity arrived in my first year of grad school, when by happy chance I began a side 
project exploring the political impacts of new media.  As I became increasingly exposed to the 
communicative ideas and theories within in this literate (literature which will be discussed later 
in this thesis), answers to the latter questions came into greater relief.  Armed with this 
information, I set forth the hypotheses which you have just read.  From there, I laid a 
methodological framework which I believed was be best suited to test these hypotheses and 
which are laid out in greater detail below.  In testing these hypotheses, however, another equally 
important question surfaced.   
Throughout this research, I have been keenly aware that the phenomenon under study is 
in many ways affecting American politics (though I believe the greatest impacts are yet to come).  
For this reason, I have never been fully satisfied to merely know what is going and why, and 
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have instead been compelled to push this research one step further.  Simply put, not only do I 
want to know the ―what‖ and ―why‖ answers, but I also want to know the impacts of these 
phenomena, particularly as they pertain to the American political process.  With these 
considerations in mind, I commenced this thesis with Joel Smith‘s admonition that researchers 
would do well to consider the following five questions, both at the onset of their research, as well 
as throughout its duration.
58
  These questions are: 
 
1. What does one want to know and why? 
2. What is to be observed? 
3. Which and how many objects are to be examined? 
4. How are the phenomena of interest to be observed? 
5. And finally, how are answers to be decided and conclusions drawn? 
 
Before proceeding any further, I feel the need to justify the autobiographical 
underpinnings of my research design.  While classical positivism demands the removal of the 
researcher as a subjective participant, the study of the social sciences makes such demands all 
but impossible.  Juergen Habermas, for instance, has used hermeneutics to show the limits of 
positivism in the study of social phenomena, while at the same time demonstrating how overly 
traditional hermeneutical approaches in the study of social sciences undermines social criticism 
and retards future innovation and understanding by fixing researchers to inelastic methodologies 
and modes of thinking.
59
  In taking these criticisms onboard, the English philosopher Roy 
Bhaskar has developed critical realism.  Briefly, critical realism looks to provide explanations of 
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events and phenomena, rather than simply descriptions.  Such an approach has many applications 
beyond the confines of ―specific research subjects and sites,‖ yet at the same time upholds the 
researchers ―hermeneutic insight into the pre-interpreted nature of their subjects matter and the 
reflexive implications of their research  practice.‖60  Moreover, while Bhaskar contends that the 
debate between positivism and hermeneutics has tended to concentrate on epistemological 
approaches, or the ways in which we know, Bhaskar‘s critical realism instead focuses first on 
ontological questions, before shifting to the epistemology at hand.
61
  Doing so, allows 
researchers to provide ―a more subtle and complex view of society in which human agents are 
neither passive products of social structures nor entirely their creators…‖62  
In keeping with my own views on the role of the researcher as well as the nature of their 
research, I have instinctually gravitated towards Bhaskar‘s critical realism and have seen no 
reason to stray from it in this thesis.  As a social scientist, I believe my obligation is to present 
my research in a fair and honest manner.  With that said, I cannot as a researcher, whose identity 
is informed by a complex variety of social forces and whose very existence continually reshapes 
the realities of those around me, remove all tinges of bias from this thesis.  Nor should I.  The 
best I can do is acknowledge this bias, both to myself and you the reader, and design and execute 
a research model that accurately represents the facts, rigorously tests its hypotheses, and fairly 
reports its findings.  To the best of my ability I have done just this and now leave these findings 
to you.  Make of them what you will.  
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What Do I Want to Know and Why? 
 
This thesis is interested primarily in assessing the impacts of information and 
communication technology (ICT) on the core concepts of social capital, civic engagement and 
mobilization in relation to evangelical Christian political activity.  
 
What is to be Observed? 
 
The case studies for this thesis are the creation care and emerging church movements of 
the evangelical community.  In particular, this thesis studies the ways in which the new media 
environment has helped direct these movements away from the evangelical periphery towards 
mainstream acceptance, and explores the larger social and political impacts of that quickly 
growing acceptance. 
 
Which and How Many Objects are to be Studied? 
 
A number of organizations exist within the selected case studies.  I have already 
identified four separate organizations for further examination within the creation care movement: 
the Evangelical Environmental Network, Flourish, Renewal and Restoring Eden. Unlike the 
creation care groups, the emerging church movement is a collection of decentralized cohorts and 
home churches.  Many of these bodies are, however, affiliated with the umbrella organization 
Emergent Village, which rather than acting as a cohesive unit, serves more as a clearing house 
and space, both online and in the physical world, for all things emergent.  In addition to these 
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groups, Evangelicals for Social Action has also been singled out due to its many sympathies with 
the emerging church movement and for its early work in advancing the cause of evangelical 
environmentalism.  To better explore the contentious nature of these groups, organizations and 
individuals opposed to the aspirations of the selected case studies are similarly explored.  These 
groups include Focus on the Family, the Family Research Council, the Ethics and Religious 
Liberties Commission, and are joined by religious leaders and laity.  
 
How are the Phenomena of Interest to be Observed? And finally, How are Answers to be 
Decided and Conclusions Drawn? 
 
This thesis takes a comparative-historical approach.  That is, primarily a qualitative 
comparison and historical analysis of various phenomena to explain large-scale outcomes.  A 
common tool for those engaged in comparative-historical analysis is so-called ―pattern 
matching‖—or what is sometimes referred to as cross-case analysis—a procedure that helps 
researchers identify similarities across different case studies to test the validity of stated 
hypotheses.  A common use of cross-case analysis is to provide what is known as causal 
narrative inference, wherein researchers validate aggregate cross-case associations by analyzing 
variables into constitutive sequences across disaggregated events.
63
  Moreover, causal narrative 
inference has the added benefit of supporting event structure analysis, which provides ―a formal 
apparatus for unpacking events and reconstructing their constituent parts as a causal 
interpretation of historical processes.‖64  Such a methodological approach is well suited for this 
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study, as any exploration into the relationship between the new media environment and 
evangelical political activity requires an examination of multiple variables and events.   
Understanding how past advances in communication technologies have impacted the 
political behavior of evangelical Christians is a critical starting point in this thesis‘s search to 
identify case study patterns, but must be coupled with an intimate knowledge of the social and 
historical variables pertaining to such change.  This is because communication technology does 
not operate in a vacuum, but is rather used by actors responding to external stimuli.  By 
comparing various moments in the history of the American evangelical community, this thesis 
can confidently assert that the rise of the creation care and emerging church movements are 
indeed noteworthy changes, and can begin to explore possible reasons explaining their ascent. 
One explanation this thesis will test is Bimber‘s theory of accelerated pluralism, which, briefly, 
asserts that the Internet is eroding the influence of organization and group leaders while leading 
to a restructuring of community and social order.
65
  In testing this hypothesis, a number of 
variables must be taken into account, particularly the high stocks of social capital embedded in 
religious communities and the ease with which these communities can be mobilized for political 
and civic engagement.  If the hypothesis holds, this thesis can then study the broader social 
impact of an increasingly fragmented evangelical community. 
To better understand the creation care and emerging church movements, this thesis also 
utilizes the ethnographic research techniques of observation and semi-structured interviews.  
Selected organizations and individuals were engaged in a variety of settings, including church 
meetings, worship services, camping trips, at bars, in cafés and restaurants, on college campuses, 
online, over the phone, and in individual homes.  The structure of each encounter was 
determined by the schedule of the observed participants or groups.  Whenever possible, 
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analytical interpretations of key issues and events were discussed with relevant parties, the data 
recorded and archived. 
32 interviews with participants in 9 states were conducted.  These interviews were both 
with ―managerial‖ or ―elite‖ evangelicals, as well as with activists on the ground.  Interview 
subjects were chosen based on several criteria, which included their formal or informal 
leadership in a given organization/movement, or their knowledge of, membership to, or activism 
on behalf of, a particular movement or group.  Many of the interviews were semi-structured.  
Semi-structured interviews have long been used in the social sciences for better data collection 
and comparative analysis as they free researchers from the rigidity of stringent interview guides 
and thus provide the flexibility to explore unforeseen developments and probe provoking 
questions.  Although all reasonable attempts were made to conduct interviews in-person, as a 
result of geographic disbursement some interviews inevitably had to be conducted over the 
phone or online.  Some of the shortcomings of online interviews are that they limit the ability of 
the researcher to moderate the interview and eliminate the sense of immediate contact.  These 
shortcomings are arguably offset by the fact that online interviews give respondents ample time 
to fully consider their answers.
66
  When interviews were conducted online, both synchronous and 
asynchronous data collection occurred.  In every case, deliberate care was taken towards building 
trusting relationships with interview subjects, an important consideration in any online 
environment.
67
 Similarly, when asynchronous online interviews are used, Bampton and 
Cowton‘s approach of small batch questions was frequently employed, whereby regular contact 
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was maintained over the course of several days, weeks, even months, and only a few questions 
asked at a time.
68
 
 As Andrew Abbot notes, a common approach in the social sciences is to: 
[t]hink about cases independent of one another and, often, of the past.  We 
characterize cases by properties like gender, race, totalitarianism, or 
bureaucratization and then ask how these properties are connected together in 
something we call a causal chain.  Our methods are founded almost exclusively 
on such a model of social reality.  And they have produced much interesting 
knowledge.
69
 
Yet this approach, as Abbot notes, has significant drawbacks. ―[I]t doesn‘t do very well by its 
own standards:  Variance explained is often small, and effects are often substantively minimal 
despite their statistical significance.  Rather than cumulating, we see diminishing returns.‖70  Put 
another way, while statistical surveys are useful in explaining independent events, without proper 
contextualization, they are poor substitutes for explaining why a social phenomenon has 
occurred and what such developments mean more broadly. 
 Despite their drawbacks, statistical surveys can be used to complement qualitative 
analysis. Given the extraordinary financial costs of nationally representative surveys and the 
modest monetary means of this research, such surveys play a limited, yet important role in this 
study.  However, in addition to relying of public opinion polls and the surveys of other, much 
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larger established research groups such as the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, I 
conducted an online poll (N = 850) for this thesis.  The poll itself, which is entitled the Internet 
and Evangelical survey, was a 45-question survey and took around twenty minutes to complete.  
Data was collected from January 21, 2009 through February 27, 2010.  Respondents were not 
chosen, but rather answered online pleas that were posted on various web pages, such as 
Facebook group pages and blog postings.  Renewal, the ESA, Restoring Eden, and various 
Emergent Village cohorts similarly encouraged their members to participate in the survey.  In 
these cases, a link to the survey was sent out to members on group list servers, or to all members 
of a Facebook group page. 
The Internet and Evangelicals survey derives many of its questions from the Pew Forum 
on Religion and Public Life‟s, 2008 US Religious Landscape Survey.  Without doubt, Pew‟s 
survey is the largest and most comprehensive investigation into the religious habits, practices and 
beliefs of the American people to date.  In all, more than 35,000 Americans aged 18 and older 
participated in this survey.  In seeking a reliable control against which the Internet and 
Evangelicals survey can be compared, I have purposely retained several questions asked in the 
US Religious Landscape Survey, as doing so will better allow me to better analyze of potential 
trends and political deviations between the respondents of the respective surveys.  Determining 
which of Pew‟s questions to include was somewhat of a subjective decision, though I sought to 
use a cross-section of questions on a wide-range of economic and social issues.  These questions 
include those likely to illicit more emotional responses, such as those pertaining to abortion, gay 
rights and the likes, as well as those likely to be more benign, such as questions on foreign policy 
and economic regulations. 
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It is important to note that while several demographic questions such as age, gender, 
religious attendance, political persuasion, and party identification were asked, questions 
pertaining to income and education levels were intentionally left out of the Internet and 
Evangelicals survey.  This was done because three of the six organizations that participated in 
this survey are comprised primarily of college students.  Thus, asking about income and 
educational attainment would have failed to provide either a stable measurement or an accurate 
barometer, as educational and income levels fluctuate significantly for the average twenty-
something American.  Including these questions in the survey would muddled findings and could 
lead to inaccurate conclusions based on information that rapidly changes.  Finally, the Internet 
and Evangelicals survey was never intended to be a representative survey.  Such surveys require 
an enormous financial investment and are beyond the means of this thesis.  Instead, the Internet 
and Evangelicals survey was conducted to compliment the qualitative nature of this thesis.  As 
such, it is best to view this poll as an exhaustive archive of 850 structured interviews that serves 
to supplement the qualitative analysis of this thesis. 
Much like personal interviews, web analysis plays an important role in this thesis as it 
sheds light on the structure and practices of the six organizations affiliated with the selected case 
studies.  In particular, Kristen Foot and Steven Schneider‘s conceptualization of web spheres as a 
unit of analysis is employed to gain a better understanding of the online activities of the selected 
case studies.
71
  Such an approach allows for a comprehensive study of the evolving cyber 
practices of the creation care and emerging church movements through improved analysis of web 
content, processes and practices.   
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Plan of Thesis 
 
As this thesis will demonstrate, the rise of the new media environment is pushing 
American evangelical Christianity into uncharted theological and political waters.  To better 
address how the Internet is affecting the interplay between religion and politics in the United 
States, this thesis has grounded much of its research in an analysis of social capital, civic 
engagement, and mobilization, as these topics are important variables that can shed considerable 
understanding on the social changes and unrest currently gripping the evangelical community.  
Chapter 2 of this thesis, ―A Review of the Literature Examining the Effect of the Internet on 
Social Capital,‖ serves as a review of relevant social capital, civic engagement, and mobilization 
literature, and presents key theories and arguments upon which much this research is built.  
Chapter 3, ―Evangelicals and American Politics,‖ continues the work of the literature review by 
providing empirical evidence of the above theories in action.  Not only does this chapter provide 
a contextualization of these theories in terms of on-the-ground developments, but it also offers a 
historical review of the political rise of the Christian Right, while noting the crucial importance 
of media in this narrative. 
Chapter 4, ―Breaking the Monologue Part I:  How the Internet is Empowering the 
Evangelical Periphery,‖ offers empirical evidence demonstrating the influence of the Internet on 
the religious fragmentation of the American evangelical community, while Chapter 5, “Breaking 
the Monologue Part II: The Online Evangelism of the Creation Care and Emerging Church 
Movements,‖ provides specific insight into how various evangelical groups are using the Internet 
and other media to advance their message and gain broader public support.  Chapter 6, ―New 
Political Orientations in Evangelical Christianity,‖ extends the work of the previous chapters by 
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examining the many emerging and often polarizing theological debates within the evangelical 
tradition.  Chapter 6 similarly argues that these changing theological perspectives are leading 
many evangelical Christians down an alternative cultural and political path than that of their 
parents and grandparents. 
Having established that new media is indeed leading towards the theological and political 
fragmentation of the American evangelical community, Chapter 7, ―The Death and Resurrection 
of the American Religious Marketplace,‖ departs from earlier chapters to begin a multi-chapter 
exploration of the political and social implications of this development. Chapter 7 argues that a 
fragmented evangelical community is rejuvenating the American religious economy by 
providing believers with greater religious choice.  As a result, not only are more liberal 
expressions of Christianity benefiting from this change, but also non-traditional forms of 
religious worship, such as so-called ―house churches‖ and other small religious cohorts.  
Moreover, changes such as these further cripple the long held religious monopoly of the 
Christian Right and are leading towards a moderation of religious and political beliefs among 
many American evangelicals. A key area where we are witnessing significant evangelical 
moderation is the environment.  While evangelical environmentalism admittedly remains 
controversial within the evangelical tradition (a point which serves to further reinforce the 
religious fragmentation argument) the fact that many evangelical Christians are eagerly 
embracing environmentalism as a religious imperative offers new and critical opportunities to 
advance the cause of global environmental stewardship.  Chapter 8, ―Evangelical 
Environmentalism and the Politics of Climate Change,‖ explores these opportunities in much 
greater depth.  One of the main arguments advanced in this chapter is that Democrats can make 
substantial inroads with the evangelical community by more aggressively campaigning on 
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matters of environmental stewardship.  Doing so will have the added benefit of pressuring 
Republicans to adopt a more friendly environmental platform.  However, while such religious 
outreach is increasingly common among Democrats, some in the party are uneasy as they worry 
that an embrace of these more conservative voters will lead to an abandonment of core party 
principles, most notably on issues of women‘s reproductive rights.  Chapter 9, ―Abortion, Faith 
Outreach and the Democratic Party,‖ explores this point in greater depth and concludes that the 
increase number of pro-life Democrats in the United States House of Representatives during the 
110
th
 and 111
th
 Congress had a negligible effect on status of abortion rights.  It concludes with 
the argument that Democrats would be wise to take advantage of the changing evangelical 
community by continuing recent faith outreach efforts, and if need be, by running pro-life 
Democrats in more socially conservative districts and states where, despite moderation on many 
issues, political support of abortion rights continues to be an electoral impediment separating the 
party from broader evangelical affirmation. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A REVIEW OF LITERATURE EXAMINING THE EFFECT OF THE INTERNET ON 
SOCIAL CAPITAL, CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND MOBILIZATION 
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 On Halloween night American children are no longer given candied apples.  Instead, 
parents have come to rely on the safety of pre-wrapped miniature chocolate bars and other 
sweets, as trust in one‟s own community has deteriorated.  Across the country, membership to 
long established organizations is dwindling, while neighbors are increasingly becoming 
strangers, and co-workers are quickly assuming the role of acquaintances.  Cities are growing, 
suburbs are expanding and every year more new services roll onto the market that promise the 
same thing: buy this product and you can enjoy less direct interaction with others.  It is a 
frightening trend for many, but one Americans are not unfamiliar with.  For instance, “as 
families left cities for the suburbs in a national migration throughout the 1940s and „50s, they 
sought ways to establish community ties.  Churches were an obvious anchor, and church 
membership shot up to record levels.”72  In the half century since then those historic levels have 
dropped just nine points, with some 40 percent of the current American population attending 
church on a weekly basis
73
.  However, academics and politicians alike continue to note a far 
more precipitous decline in social capital, civic engagement and a demobilized American 
electorate.  An impressive literature examining these vital areas of political participation has 
emerged of late, and substantial work has explored them on both empirical and theoretical fronts.  
Not only has this collective work laid the foundations for a new area of academic study, but it 
has also captured the attention of policy makers and the public.  Most recently, a growing subset 
of this work has focused considerable attention on the social effects of the Internet.  The scholars 
engaged in this work, as will be demonstrated, are largely divided into three camps: those who 
view the Internet as increasing community connectedness, those who believe the opposite to be 
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true, and finally, those who hold that the Internet effectively does neither, but rather serves as 
just another medium through which existing relationships are maintained. 
As already noted, existing scholarly research has failed to address how the Internet 
affects the interplay between religion and politics in the United States.  However, there is much 
relevant material on the Internet‟s effect on the key concepts of social capital, civic engagement 
and mobilization. Given that American religious organizations and institutions have historically 
relied on strong internal community and a deep sense of theological symmetry (belonging) in 
order to mobilize their supporters behind particular civic and political engagements, 
understanding how the Internet is effecting these areas is a crucial first step. 
 
Social Capital and Civic Engagement 
 
Traditional understandings of ―capital‖ largely derive from economic conceptualizations 
and are usually perceived in relation to labor markets.  This purely economic understanding of 
―capital‖ and ―labor‖ has not been particularly contested historically, insofar as scant 
disagreement has emerged as to who or what has routinely been in a position to command labor 
forces:
74
 those with power, or, more particularly, those with cash.  However, French sociologist 
Pierre Bourdieu argued that an explicitly economic conception of capital is insufficient for 
understanding many common social situations.
75
 Bourdieu distinguishes between three different 
types of capital: cultural, economic and social.  With some overlap, these various kinds of capital 
exert their influence in quite distinct fashions.  While economic capital makes use of labor 
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markets and the laws governing supply and demand, cultural capital relies on those forces and 
institutions, such as schools, which are used to replicate prevailing social norms, mores and 
practices.  Social capital, on the other hand, mediates power through the social relations an 
individual develops.  These relations commonly play out through activities of civic engagement, 
such as membership in formalized associations or political parties, as well as voluntary and 
informal associations.  In this context, one‘s social status—usually brought about through the 
networks one belongs to—is of equal importance, and in some cases more important, than 
economic capital.  It is with social capital that our analysis begins. 
 
Two Traditions of Social Capital 
 
Concern over the vitality of communities and the health of societies is by no means a 
contemporary debate.
76
  Indeed, the field of sociology developed in concert with societal changes 
brought about by industrialization, bureaucratization and urbanization.
77
  However, in recent 
years debate over the relative health of society has returned to the public forum with increased 
vigor and focused attention on the concept of ―social capital.‖  While no accepted definition of 
social capital yet exists, two defining traditions have emerged.
78
  The critical tradition of social 
capital recognizes its work on predominantly two fronts: prestige and social relations.
79
  As 
regards prestige, the social status of an individual plays a significant role in one‘s ability to 
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acquire goods and services.  For instance, the purchasing power of $10,000, regardless of 
whoever possesses it and however it was acquired, has merely the purchasing power of $10,000.  
Similarly, a twenty-dollar bill given to a clerk at Macy‘s is simply a twenty-dollar bill and is 
therefore not indicative of one‘s social standing.  Yet at the same Macy‘s, a Platinum American 
Express Credit Card tells the clerk far more about the customer.
80
  In this case, the social value of 
a platinum credit card, even one twenty dollars from its credit limit, is of considerably more 
social value than a mere twenty-dollar bill.  As regards social relations, the critical tradition 
perceives social capital to be ―the product of investment strategies, individual or collective, 
consciously or unconsciously aimed at establishing or reproducing social relationships, which are 
directly usable in the short or long term.‖81  In other words, it pays to know the right people. 
Among the scholars who have emerged as significant figures in this tradition is Nan Lin, who 
places additional significance on social networks, insisting that social capital be viewed as an 
individual ―investment in social relations with expected returns in the marketplace.‖82  For Lin, 
society is the marketplace, and the returns of which she speaks are those goods and services 
made possible through one‘s social position, networking, or some likely combination of the two.  
On the political front it is easy to see how the critical tradition, with its emphasis on the 
strategic interactions of individuals or groups of individuals for the purpose of fostering gainful 
social relations, could be useful in evaluations of power and power relations. In stark contrast to 
the critical tradition is the communitarian tradition, which maintains that ―a person‘s family, 
friends and associates constitute an important asset, one that can be called on in a crisis, enjoyed 
for its own sake, and leveraged for material gain.‖83  In this tradition, social capital resides in the 
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community and serves as the lubricant by which trust is established, communities are built and 
democracies thrive.
84
  For communitarians, this non-individualistic tradition has a much larger 
role to play in the relative health and prosperity of communities.  In between this 
individualistic/communitarian dichotomy is a collection of scholars whose work attempts to 
bridge the divide.  For instance, Francis Fukuyama perceives social capital to be both an 
individual asset as well as a communal good. Fukuyama asserts that social capital is a utility that 
“permits individuals to band together to defend their interests and organize to support collective 
needs.”85  From this vantage point it is easy to understand how the interests of a relatively 
homogenous group of individuals, such as an organization of dedicated journalists committed to 
the principles of a free and open press, could likewise serve a greater social good.   
Underpinning the critical and communitarian understandings, as well as those attempts 
that seek to bring them together, are the concepts of trust and reciprocity.  This is due to the fact 
that ―social capital is produced by the intentional activities of individuals who are connected to 
one another by ongoing networks of social relationships.‖86  A consequence of social interaction 
is the generation of accepted levels of trust between participants.  Presumably, therefore, the 
closer and more intimate the relationship is between one individual and another the higher the 
levels of trust.  Reciprocity is also established through continued interaction:  the more my friend 
scratches my back, the more likely I become to scratch theirs.  Conversely, when social relations 
are weak, or when strong relations deteriorate, aggregate levels of trust and reciprocity diminish.  
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In this manner, it must to some degree be taken for granted that higher levels of community 
involvement and social relations create higher levels of trust and reciprocity.  Without this axiom 
the social capital literature would be unable to expand its scope of study.   
Evidence supporting both the critical and communitarian understandings of social capital 
can be found among religious organizations.  As this thesis will demonstrate, the prestige of 
respected church leaders has proven a decisive advantage for evangelical political mobilization 
and civic engagement, while the network of evangelical churches, mission societies, universities 
and bible colleges, radio and television stations, publishing houses, lobbying groups and the like, 
have provided a critical apparatus for reaching the public and influencing public policy.  At the 
same time, the evangelical community is much more than an extensive network of para-ministry 
organizations, while respected church leaders and opinion makers are not limited to those 
individuals with a radio program or best-selling book.  Every Sunday, tens of millions of 
Americans attend worship at an evangelical church and the associations made there often shape 
individual identities and deeply influence political persuasions.  When studying relationships 
such as these, one would fall prey to a false dichotomy to choose either an analysis of the critical 
or communitarian tradition at the exclusion of the other.  This is so as social relationships are 
both bonds that constitute greater social goods, as well as resources upon which people depend.  
Among the evangelical community, the tight weave bringing together individual relationships 
and broader institutional coherence requires us to adopt different modes of analysis 
(communitarian and critical) depending on the object and circumstances under review. 
 
Are Social Capital and Civic Engagement in Decline? 
 
70 
 
Analyzing a number of trend surveys, time logs and census data reports, among other 
resources, Robert Putnam has concluded that Americans connectedness has substantially 
declined since the mid 1960s.
87
  Among the many culprits recognized as contributing to this 
decline are: urban sprawl,
88
 television and other forms of multi-media,
89
 a general decline in 
face-to-face interaction,
90
 two-career families,
91
 a dip in both religious attendance and civic 
participation,
92
 the professionalization of political activities and the rise of interest groups,
93
 
increased cynicism towards government and politicians and/or decreased confidence in 
governmental institutions,
94
 lower levels of social and inter-personal trust and increased civic 
fear largely generated by sensationalism in mainstream media.
95
  
Working largely from the above findings, and drawing heavily upon the writings of 
Alexis de Tocqueville, Putnam attempts to illustrate the dangers associated with declining levels 
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of social capital and civic engagement.  While exploring the newly forged American Republic, 
Tocqueville took considerable notice of Americans‘ many associations (pools of social capital), 
commenting, ―Americans of all ages, all stations in life, and all types of disposition are forever 
forming associations.‖96  For Tocqueville, these voluntary associations played an essential role in 
facilitating American democracy by fending off political repression and reigning in any would-
be tyrant.  ―No countries,‖ Tocqueville decried, ―need associations more—to prevent either 
despotism of parties or the arbitrary rule of a prince—than those with a democratic social 
state.‖97  As Putnam perceives it, diminished civic and social involvement represents a historic 
shift in the nature of the American character and threatens to tear the fabric of American social 
and political life.  Here again he draws on Tocqueville, for just as in colonial America, 
Tocqueville‘s native France had recently undergone radical social upheaval, in which an 
―aristocratic, communally oriented society‖ gave way to a ―democratic, individualist society.‖98 
However, democracy in these countries took rather divergent paths.  In France, the revolution 
subsequently resulted in a form of ―atomistic despotism, in which politically equal citizens‖ 
tended to their own self-interests, thereby leaving the door open for a ―few rulers to grab and 
centralize‖ power, while in America, by contrast, ―public-spirited mores and institutions of civil 
society‖ served to check centralizing forces and help to reinforce attitudes of democratic 
equality.
99
 Thus, if Putnam is indeed correct in his assertion that American stocks of social 
capital are in decline, such decay could have disastrous effects on the performance and structure 
of public governance. 
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Despite strong empirical data suggesting levels of American social capital has been 
declining for the better part of the last half-century, Putnam and his supporters are not without 
their critics.  Everett Carll Ladd, for instance, directly questions Putnam‘s assertion that civic 
activity has waned. Ladd attempts to show that Americans are just as politically active today as 
they were in years past, and that in fact, charitable giving and time spent volunteering have 
actually increased over the years.
100
  Nancy Ammerman is another who disagrees with Putnam, 
particularly his assertion that American‘s are losing touch with one another.  She writes: 
 
Knowing that people are not bowling in leagues does not tell us that they are 
necessarily bowling alone.  They may be bowling with informal friendship 
groups, their families, or their Sunday school classes.  The decline in one form of 
associational participation—while disconcerting to those with an economic 
investment in that form—does not necessarily mean a decline in association as 
such.
101
 
 
Similarly, taking aim squarely at Putnam‘s overall thesis, Paul Rich argues that ―historical 
evidence indicates that associations come and go,‖102 and that for some time now ―it has been 
apparent that individual associations rise and fall and that no complex society has discovered 
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the secret of organizational equilibrium.‖103 Additionally, Rich writes that ―different kinds of 
voluntarism are constantly being invented.‖104  Rich continues, stating that the World Wide 
Web has ―created a whole new voluntary world, which is just beginning to find its voice.‖105  
By raising the topic of the Internet as a new means of civic engagement, Rich is entering into 
a hotly contested debate that is thus far anything but settled and that merits additional 
attention.  
 
The Internet As Diminishing Civic Engagement and Social Capital 
 
With a rapid expansion of research examining the impact of the Internet on society, 
considerable literature has emerged alleging a negative correlation between Internet use and 
social capital.
106
 One of the more common and re-occurring themes to surface throughout this 
body of work has been the assertion that the more time one spends on-line, the less time one has 
to foster and care for existing social relations. Putnam, while acknowledging the potential the 
Internet poses in displacing time spent in-front of television, concludes that ―the commercial 
incentives that currently govern Internet development seem destined to emphasize individual 
entertainment and commerce rather than community engagement.‖107  Such a development, if 
true, could lead to further ―social isolation and depression.‖108  On this point Putnam is far from 
alone.  Robert Kraut et al. relay the concern of many authors, alleging that the ―ease of Internet 
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communication might encourage people to spend more time alone, talking online with strangers 
or forming superficial ‗drive by‘ relationships, at the expense of deeper discussion and 
companionship with friends and family.‖109  Furthermore, considerable apprehension has been 
expressed over the validity of on-line communications.  Many people, for instance, regard email 
as a less serious mode of communication for maintaining social relationships.
110
  Additionally, 
legislators and public officials consider email correspondence less seriously than other forms of 
communication.
111
  One reason for this last may be due to the difficulty in knowing whether or 
not the sender is an actual constituent.  Similarly, email is often perceived the same way as 
formatted mass mailings, as the effort required to produce such correspondence is considerably 
less than what is required for writing a hand written letter or in making a personal phone call.  
 Analyzing contemporary lifestyles, Jorge Reina Schement puts forward the argument that 
the modern home serves as a haven away from public life, where individuals retreat to the safety 
of their own nests, thereby avoiding considerable civic participation.  Aiding greatly in this 
public withdrawal has been the convergence of computer-mediated communication (CMC) and 
the American consumer culture.  For Schement, the home has today become a ―market-window‖ 
offering ―many opportunities to avoid the shoving and nastiness associated with shopping in 
                                                 
109
 Kraut et al., ―Internet Paradox Revisited,‖ in Wired Homestead; see also, Robert LaRose, Matthew Eastin, and 
Jennifer Gregg, ―Reformulating the Internet Paradox:  Social Cognitive Explanation of Internet Use and 
Depression,‖ Journal of Online Behavior 1 no. 2 (2001).  Found online at:  
<http://www.behavior.net/JOBv1n2/paradox.html> (Accessed November 17, 2007); Malcolm Parks and Lynn 
Roberts, ―Making MOOsic:  The Development of Personal Relationships On Line and a Comparison to Their Off-
line Counterparts,‖ Journal of Social and Personal Relationships 15 no. 1 (1998): 517-537; and Jeffrey Cole, 
―Surveying the Digital Future,‖ The UCLA Internet Report (2000).  Found online at: 
<http://WWW.CCP.UCLA.EDU/pages/internet-report.asp> (Accessed December 12, 2007). 
110
 Robert Kraut and P. Attwell, ―Media Use in a Global Corporation:  Electronic Mail and Organizational 
Knowledge,‖ in Culture of the Internet, ed. S. Keisler (Mahwah, NJ:  Erlbaum, 1997). 
111
 Lilliard E. Richardson Jr., Linda M. Daughty and Patricia K. Freeman, ―E-mail Contact Between Constituents 
and State Legislators,‖ State and Local Government Review 33, no. 1 (2001):  23-31. 
75 
 
public.‖112  As a result of the privatization of this once highly public exercise, consumers are less 
acquainted today with their local surroundings than they once were.   
 
The Internet as Subsidizing Existing Levels of Social Capital and Civic Engagement 
 
In contrast to the view that growing Internet use is resulting in declining levels of social 
capital and civic engagement, is the position that the Internet neither creates nor directly 
diminishes either.
113
  Rather, it is held by some that the Internet subsidizes existing social 
relations and civic participation.
114
  In this view, the Internet will not awaken ―a new spirit of 
community,‖ but will rather serve as ―an additional outlet for people who are already connected 
to other people.‖115  Giovanna Mascheroni advances this point by demonstrating how so-called 
―global nomads‖ (back-packers) use the Internet to maintain existing social relationships.116  
Furthermore, additional evidence is accumulating that shows Internet use conforms to existing 
patterns of communications and simply augments more traditional technologies.
117
 
 When attention is shifted to the types of participation taking place online, we find that 
Internet activities are similar to off-line patterns.  As such, socioeconomic biases that exist in 
nearly all conventional forms of political participation seem unlikely to disappear on the Internet, 
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even as Internet access gradually widens to reach the electronically disadvantaged.
118
 As access 
to the Internet continues to grow, off-line activities, such as the viewing of passive 
entertainment, video gaming, gambling and other activities void of any civic benefits, 
increasingly finds a home online.  This expansion of online activities could potentially keep 
politically apathetic individuals away from meaningful public discourse and civic engagement as 
their choices in online activities continues to diversify and as competing media outlets continue 
to vie for their attention. Thus the result of greater Internet use will most likely be an ever-
enlarging intellectual gap between the well-informed and the rest of society.  
Quan-Haase and Wellman note that there is no strong statistical association 
demonstrating a positive or negative correlation between Internet use and active participation; 
people who engage in political and organizational activities tend to use the Internet as much as 
those who are disengaged.
119
  Nonetheless, the Internet remains a viable medium for political 
activists to propagate their message and to contest public policy, as the dichotomy that once 
separated online political activity from its off-line counterpart has all but faded into oblivion.  
Today, individuals who are politically active online are likewise active off-line and with 
increasing vigor, and those who are active off-line are increasingly finding the Internet as 
another medium for political participation.
120
  Despite this trend, however, several authors have 
questioned the Internet‘s overall impact on the political process.  Prior to the success of the 
Obama campaign in defeating Democratic rival Hilary Clinton, Elaine Ciulla Kamarack noted 
that while the Internet had helped candidates raise funds, mobilize supporters and spread their 
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message, it had thus far failed to secure any insurgent candidate their party‘s nomination for 
president.
121
  The question thus remains: What was it about Obama‘s campaign that proved so 
dramatically different?  We will return to this question shortly. 
 
The Internet as Fostering Additional Civic Engagement and New Forms of Social Capital 
 
 The belief that the Internet helps to maintain existing social capital, as well as creates 
more, is the third major argument commonly advanced in the existing literature. While this 
position, often described as ‗utopian,‘ has long been present in on-going debates, it has recently 
gained considerable traction, as increasingly authors once hostile to this position have come to 
embrace it.  Most famous among them is arguably Kraut et al., who in a substantial revision of 
their 1998 work, found that the Internet allowed socially isolated individuals to avoid feelings of 
loneliness and despair.
122
  This position was also reflected by Adam Kushner of Newsweek who 
reported that many high school and college graduates are opting out of reunions as the social 
networking site Facebook affords a quick and easy way to remain in touch with old friends.
123
  In 
addition to making existing relationships more manageable, it has also been noted that the 
Internet connects geographically dispersed people with common interests, similar histories, or 
rare afflictions, and serves as a medium through which meaningful affinities are formed and 
various types of support offered.
124
  In addition to bridging geographic gaps, some evidence 
suggests that the Internet is likewise re-acquainting individuals with their local community.  
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Moreover, a number of authors have also found a positive correlation between Internet use and 
inter-personal trust.
125
 
 Through the use of prolific online social networks such as Facebook and Craigslist, 
individuals are discovering a host of people, groups, and organizations with which to identify, 
and are using these communities to form altogether new affiliations.  Evidence further indicates 
that ―individuals who are members of several social networks are using the[ir] membership to 
strengthen weak ties across different groups,‖126 and making friends where friends once did not 
exist.  Activity such as this is a crucial first step in the process of mobilization and further serves 
as an adhesive for civil society.  Additionally, the strengthening of weak ties that occurs via the 
Internet often leads participants to meet face-to-face.
127
  Similarly, increased social trust, which 
Kobayashi et al. argue is ―enhanced through the collective use of the Internet, may in turn 
enhance the level of social participation in the offline world.‖128 
 Advances in Internet technologies and changes in its usage have likewise forced a critical 
re-evaluation of social capital and civic engagement.  Such changes have not only brought about 
new online possibilities in areas from political campaigning to entertainment media, but as 
access to the Internet has gradually widened, the daily practices of habitual users have been 
steadily transformed.  Rasanen and Kouvo, for instance, argue that Internet users spend less time 
watching television and listening to the radio,
129
 while other Internet technologies such as text 
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messages and emails are often employed to arrange face-to-face meetings.
130
  Similarly, Anita 
Blanchard argues that ―[i]nternet activity supplements interactions with others [and] increases 
activity in civic and political groups.‖131  On this point, Ji-young Kim adds: 
 
The Internet seems to herald a new political culture and to foster a vibrant civil 
society by providing channels through which the public can react to what is 
happening at the centre of politics, and by remapping the relationship between 
government officials and politicians and their public, as well as between members 
of the public at large.
132
  
 
Yet rather than serve to reinforce the centralization of power and bureaucratization of 
government, Joseph Nye Jr. notes that ―new information technologies have tended to foster 
network organization‖ and have helped to form ―new types of community.‖133  Further evidence 
of this point can be found through consideration of Obama‘s 2008 Presidential campaign.   
By tapping into public dissatisfaction with the status quo and merging it with a message 
of change and hope, rather than just that of anger and dissatisfaction (as Dean had done four 
years prior) Obama was able to build a transformative campaign and a community of loyal 
Obama fanatics.  His reliance on online donations, viral campaigning and the growing netroots of 
the Democratic blogosphere not only brought down the Hilary Clinton machine, but also 
introduced countless millions to the political process.  His strong support among younger 
Americans, a heavy online demographic, also illustrates another important aspect in the evolving 
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nature of the political process.  Brian Stelter, for instance, notes that, ―younger voters tend to be 
not just consumers of news and current events, but conduits as well—sending out e-mailed links 
and videos to friends on their social networks.  And in turn, they rely on friends and online 
connections for news to come to them.‖134  Thus, far from leading to social atomization, as some 
authors assert, the Internet appears to be a ―technology through which social capital can be 
created [as] it draws people into contact with others to create shared resources and communal 
concerns.‖135  Nan Lin observed this phenomenon with the rapid outpouring of support for and 
the quick mobilization of Falun Gong supporters in response to the Chinese crackdown on the 
faith.  Quan-Haase and Wellman have further observed that ―the fact that people are not 
interacting in visible public spaces does not mean that they are in isolation.‖136  Rather, 
contemporary analysis of social capital and civic engagement must take this virtual reality into 
consideration.  Failure to do so will present a partial picture when a more comprehensive 
examination is required. 
   
Changes in Civic Engagement and the Pluralized Nature of Contemporary Society 
 
When dealing with a static culture measuring corresponding levels of social capital and 
civic engagement from year to year can be a relatively straightforward process.  However, when 
changes occur to a population that either alter the make-up of that population, or changes the 
way in which the population engages one another, measuring social capital and civic engagement 
becomes a more problematic task.  The following sections will address this difficulty by 
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illustrating some of the important changes that occurred in America between the years of 1960 
and 2000, and then by discussing what these changes have meant to the larger social fabric. 
 
Changes in the Nature of Civic Engagement 
 
If there is one overriding principle learned from the study of society, it is that societies 
are anything but static.  Changes in political order—from the very small, such as the peaceful 
exchange of power from one political party to another, to the very large, as in the overthrow of 
political regimes as witnessed with the fall of Saigon or the collapse of the Soviet Union—are 
evidence enough that societies are perpetually on the move.  Perhaps even more telling than the 
political fortunes of various communities and people are changes to the very structure of social 
orders.  As Mancur Olson reveals, the nature of social organization has altered significantly with 
time.  For instance, where once the family unit served as the dominant and near exclusive social 
institution, new associations gradually emerged that have taken on many tasks once associated 
with the family (such as education and employment), thereby effectively expanding the 
parameters of reliance for most individuals today.
137
  When one considers the contemporary roles 
played by non-kinship structures such as the state, schools and large multi-nationals, the 
evolutionary nature of society is placed into greater relief. 
Given the importance of historically contingent factors, such as changes in the economy, 
a growing and diversified culture, expanded possibilities for political participation via non-
traditional venues and outlets, as well as technological advancements that have altered the way in 
which individuals communicate with one another and gather information, it is surprising that 
                                                 
137
 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action:  Public Goods and the Theory of Groups  (Cambridge:  Harvard 
University Press, 1965). 
82 
 
Putnam has given such changes so little attention.  Yet this is preciously what Putnam does 
throughout much of his work.  Far from taking such social changes into account, Putnam chooses 
instead to compare snapshots of 1960s America with America at the end of the twentieth century.  
While such a technique is useful when comparing periods of relatively little change, the two 
Americas Putnam compares are just that, two very different countries, much the same way 
Europe was a different place following the invention of the printing press.  As Caroline Tolbert 
and Ramona McNeal justly point out, the last two decades are by themselves a unique historical 
period, in which major transitions were underway ―in terms of how political information is 
transmitted to voters,‖138 as well as in terms of how the average citizen is political engaged.  
Among the many political changes that characterize this historical period was a dramatic rise in 
the number of and membership to large issue-oriented organizations such as Greenpeace and 
Amnesty International.  While Putnam acknowledges gains made by such mass-membership 
organizations and even goes so far as to view them as having ―growing political importance,‖139 
he is ultimately dismissive of their growth and questions the overall positive impact such groups 
have upon society.  ―In many respects,‖ Putnam suggests, ―such organizations have more in 
common with mail order commercial organizations than with old-fashioned face-to-face 
associations.‖140  Yet far from holding a monopoly over opinion, Putnam‘s criticism represents 
but one side of what has become a heated debate.  While certainly a number of academics see 
civic engagement declining, others perceive modes of civic engagement as having significantly 
evolved over the course of the past several years.
141
  Thus, Debra Minkoff is far more 
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enthusiastic regarding the gains of mass-membership organizations.  Though she concedes to 
Putnam that these groups are less likely to generate face-to-face social relations, Minkoff 
believes mass membership organizations to be ―more likely to generate societal conflict than 
consensus,‖142 thereby contributing to the democratic dialogue of the American people and 
adding ―to the stability and growth of civil society.‖143   
As for the supposed loss of face-to-face interaction, Nicolas Lemann has found that such 
interactions rely less today on formal organizations such as Parent Teacher Associations, Boy 
Scouts and Putnam‘s much beloved bowling leagues, and more on informal groups and 
gatherings such as ―informal parents groups, ‗soccer mom‘ networks, singles groups, fitness 
clubs and the so-called on-line communities of the Internet.‖144  In addition to the expansion of 
informal associations within society and the achievements of many mass-membership 
organizations, another political phenomenon has likewise cultivated considerable public attention 
and support: grassroots organizations.   
The emergence of grassroots organizations represents a historic shift away from 
institutional reliance and appeals directly to participatory engagement.  Vital to this phenomenon 
has been the advent of the Internet and other forms of technology that free individuals from their 
local surroundings and allows them to ―choose what information to access and when to access ― 
it.
145
  Due to this newly actualized transcendence of local space, information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) require us to reconsider political engagement as ―a series of places 
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embodying reconstructed models of citizenship and new forms of political activism.‖146  
Embedded within this realm of civic activity are networks of wired activists who, among other 
things, have been: 
 
Creating online petitions, developing public awareness Web sites connected to 
traditional political organizations…building spook sites that make political 
points…creating online sites that support and propel real-life (RL) protest…and 
creating online organizations that have expanded to do traditional RL activities.
147
   
 
Activities such as these have not only changed the nature of political participation, but have also 
demonstrated why a new conceptualization of civic engagement is indeed needed.   
As a growing number of individuals increasingly find their way online and as regular 
daily habits change as a result, challenging new questions arise concerning the complexities of 
contemporary social relations, civic engagement and contested political activity.
148
  For instance, 
the widely adopted practice of conscience driven consumption, such as the purchasing of “fair-
trade” goods, certified “organic” produce and “conflict-free” diamonds, illustrates the difficulty 
of measuring contemporary civic engagement, as measuring this sort of activity can be difficult 
to quantify.  The Internet, however, aids in this practice by empowering citizens to quickly and 
easily seek information that would otherwise require a significant investment.  As a result of this, 
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thresholds for civic engagement are lowered and more citizens are becoming increasingly aware 
of possibilities for political activity.
149
  
In addition to lowering thresholds for engagement, the Internet is also fostering new 
networks and repositories of citizenship with its ability to connect far-flung individuals and 
groups with shared or similar interests.  By serving as a vehicle through which bottom-up 
grassroots activity is made easier, the Internet has evolved into an effective medium through 
which the power of individuals is both greatly enhanced and better positioned to serve larger 
collective goods.  For instance, the case of the American Libertarian Party‟s successful 
opposition of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation‟s (FDIC) so-called “Know Your 
Customer” proposal, illustrates clearly how a relatively small group of individuals can have 
significant political impact by acting as a watchdog group and by raising awareness with other 
groups with sympathetic positions.
150
 
 
Accelerated Pluralism 
 
 
As this chapter has illustrated already, contemporary debates on social capital and civic 
engagement are ongoing.  While a number of academics believe America to be increasingly 
plagued by waning levels of civic engagement, others have come to the conclusion that America 
is instead witnessing a historic period marked by the proliferation of issue oriented causes.  In 
finding the latter to be the case, Bruce Bimber argues that America is on a path towards what he 
calls ―accelerated pluralism.‖  Underlying the premise of accelerated pluralism is the 
understanding that society is undergoing significant fragmentation whereby previous interest-
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based group politics is shifting towards a more fluid issue-based group politics, consequentially 
resulting in declining institutional coherence.
151
  The Internet has aided this process extensively 
by providing a medium through which individuals with similar interests can freely engage with 
one another.
152
  In cyberspace, for instance, individuals are better able to  ―overcome place based 
limitation to communication,‖153 thus allowing ―stamp collectors, organic gardeners and knitting 
enthusiasts in Australia (to) exchange news, gossip and items of interest with similar enthusiasts 
in Mexico and Mauritius.‖154  In some cases, ―access to the Internet provides the opportunity to 
participate in networks and interests communities that would be unavailable otherwise.‖155  
However, not everyone finds the move towards a more pluralistic society to be a positive 
development.  Francis Fukuyama, for instance, while acknowledging the importance of voluntary 
associations to the health of any democracy, nonetheless writes, ―while it may be true that 
democracy is not possible in the absence of civil society, too much civil society can often be the 
bane of democracy.‖156  Recognizing the need people have to belong to groups, Fukuyama 
continues, ―people are picking and choosing their values on an individual basis, in ways that link 
them with smaller communities of like-minded folk.‖157   Yet this tendency to build ―in-group‖ 
solidarity comes at the expense of outsiders. For societies with too many tightly bonded groups 
or networks, the risk of social fragmentation and community strife increases.
158
  Hanwoo Lee 
expands upon this point, noting that while people purposely seek out others with shared or 
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similar interests, when those interests are of a political nature, hostilities often arise as group 
membership tends to entrench participants into more radical and extreme positions, and often at 
the expense of meaningful and constructive dialogue.
159
  When political information is sought 
online, individuals are likely to visit sites that reflect their own views.  In these cases, ―the 
acquisition of new information does not necessarily make citizens better informed in a rational 
or objective sense.”160  This apparent paradox turns on the fact that citizens acquire and learn 
information in ways that are biased toward reinforcing previously held beliefs and mental 
constructs.‖  Even more troubling is the fact that ―new information resources are likely to be 
used mainly by the most well informed, who are already most likely to be engaged.‖161  This 
being the case, a situation in which those already rich in politically relevant social capital will 
likely obtain more, while those poor in political information will not take full advantage of this 
new medium.
162
 
 
Mobilization 
 
 Classical mobilization theory developed at a time in which the Internet was still in its 
infancy and was used primarily at research institutions and in the Armed services.  With today‘s 
widespread use of the Internet and other forms of ICTs, many scholars are re-visiting theories of 
mobilization to synchronize them better with the realities of today‘s world. 
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Revisiting the Theory of Collective Action 
 
 
Popularized by Mancur Olson, the theory of Collective Action (CAT) rests on two 
essential tenets.  The first of these asserts a public need to discourage so-called free riding, 
whereby individuals contribute either too little or too late in a project to significantly enhance 
public goods. The second tenet concerns the need for formal organization in ―locating and 
contacting potential participants in collective action, motivating them, and coordinating their 
actions.‖163  Yet as a result of emerging ICTs, and the means by which they are regularly 
deployed, Bimber et al. raise significant questions regarding the ability of CAT to address 
contemporary models of collective behavior.  Perhaps the easiest way to identify these new 
challenges resides with the latter of these tenets. 
In the absence of advanced ICTs, organizations play a central role in the collection and 
distribution of information and in coordinating the activities of group members and sympathetic 
supporters.  Yet with the dawning of the Internet age, what once took a large library and a small 
army of researchers can now be readily achieved by a determined graduate student with a 
reliable connection.  All the more telling is the speed by which such a student is now able to 
collect vast amounts of information and the ease by which they are able to transmit such 
knowledge at little to no cost.  As Bimber and company explain: 
 
Recently, an array of actions in which technologies of information and 
communication are central has proven theoretically and empirically intriguing 
from a collective action standpoint.  Self-organization online groups, rapidly 
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assembled networks of protesters, ―meet ups,‖ new structures for interest groups, 
and ―viral‖ e-mail lists are all examples of collective behaviors employing 
advanced communication and information technologies.…As a result of emerging 
information technologies, communication is not necessarily as costly, difficult, 
time consuming, or limited by the cognitive constraints of individuals as it once 
was.
164
 
 
What results from such activities is an environment in which considerable power flows from the 
grassroots up.  Thus, the networks one has access to prove just as important, if not more so, than 
associational memberships or the organizations to which one belongs.  In taking advantage of the 
Internet‘s ability to lower transaction costs across the board, actors have new organizational 
possibilities that are increasingly emancipated from the material resources and coordinated 
mechanisms of the past.  Furthermore, much of the information one now receives online comes 
from an already trusted source, either because that individual has purposely chosen to visit a site, 
or because it has come from a close friend or family member.  Such trust is what drives viral 
campaigning and news distribution. 
In addressing the emerging challenges new information and communication technologies 
pose to CAT, scholarly work has thus far been straightforward and required little clarification by 
way of examining the changing importance of organizations.  The question of free riding, 
however, is substantially more complex as it looks not only at motivational factors, such as the 
lowering of thresholds for active participation, but also requires a recalculation as to what 
constitutes an act of contribution to a collective endeavor and explores the blurring of 
public/private boundaries.   
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 In what is termed ―second-order communality,‖ Bimber asserts, individuals are 
increasingly contributing to ―information repositories with no or only partial knowledge of other 
participants or contributors and without a clear intention or knowledge of contributing to 
communal information with public goods properties.‖165  Examples are increasingly common 
and widely found on the web, and include the posting of information ―on a web page or weblog, 
contributing to discussion[s] on an electronic bulletin board, participating in online 
‗credentialing‘ activities of various forums, revealing the identities of networks of friends and 
common interests in social-networking environments, and even passing forward a list of useful e-
mail addresses in the header of a message.‖166  However, in many cases, for such activities to be 
of any use to a larger collective action, individuals must be able to sift through the Internet‘s 
endless pools of information and misinformation.  For this reason, web search engines and so-
called ―pro-sumers,‖ individuals who add on to the value of a product or service, have taken on 
new importance and play a vital role in both the gathering and transmission of knowledge.  As a 
result of ―second-order communality,‖ the line separating the useful contributor and the free rider 
becomes blurred and it is increasingly difficult to differentiate between the two. 
 Just as the roles of contributor and free rider are becoming less distinct through Internet 
activity, questions regarding the disappearance of public/private boundaries are similarly being 
raised.  These boundaries have largely vanished as a more flexible nature of collective activity 
comes to the fore.  For instance, second-order communality has not only changed the ways in 
which information flows, but it has also enabled people to better ―exploit technology for 
performing basic collective action functions in the absence of traditional organization and 
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accumulated resources.‖167  As a result of this more fluid understanding, individuals cross 
public/private boundaries all the time, most notably when they alert others of their interests.  
When such an intention is acted upon, a collective action takes place.
168
  By its very nature, 
however, the Internet jeopardizes the confidentiality any group attempts to secure, no matter how 
small and exclusive, by placing considerable control over the dissemination of their interests into 
the hands of others.  Thus, what may have been an email intended for small readership, may well 
be forwarded to many more mailboxes. 
 As a result of technological forces reshaping social group dynamics, Bimber and his 
colleagues advance a compelling re-conceptualization of CAT.  Other scholars have adopted this 
new paradigm as they attempt to better illustrate the many ways in which new technologies have 
morphed organizational behavior.  For example, Andrew Chadwick demonstrates how 
―traditional interests groups and parties are experiencing Internet fueled increases in grassroots 
influences,‖169 which he argues is leading many of these hierarchical organizations to adopt 
practices akin to their smaller and less structured counterparts. Chadwick further asserts, 
―[f]ormal hierarchical means of mobilization in pursuit of specific goals are being augmented by 
forms of behavior.‖170  Examples include ―posting messages to online forums and collaboratively 
maintaining data repositories, e-mail lists, and blogs in which the information and 
communication resources required for mobilization are ‗happy accident‘ outcomes of countless 
small-scale individual contributions.‖171  As a result of this phenomenon, traditional ideologies 
and the organizations that represent them are being forced to find new ways to attract support.  In 
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their place, a politics of coalition building in which ad-hoc interests converge for a period of time 
and then disperse, are increasingly coming to fill an ever-enlarging role in public discourse. 
While the examination of the changing nature of organizations has proven a worthwhile 
endeavor meriting considerably more attention, any analysis into mobilization literature would 
be incomplete without an exploration of the motivational factors that propel individuals from 
passive observer to active participant.  What follows is such an examination.    
 
Collective Behavior 
 
The positive and negative implications prescribed to each action are important in the 
decision making process of any rational actor.  In theory, the greater the negative effects (or the 
lower the positive effects), the higher the ―threshold‖ for action will be.  For instance, a person 
compelled to join a riot is more likely to do so when a sufficient number of their peers have 
already joined because, as the number of rioting participants rises, the likelihood that an 
individual will be arrested for rioting are exponentially lowered.
172
  To put this more bluntly, 
when individuals question whether or not they should join in an activity, particularly those on the 
margins of social acceptability, they find safety in numbers.  Admittedly, however, rioting is an 
extreme example of collective behavior, and one that does not take place on a regular basis.  
However, similar social patterns can be found in the more mundane activities of day-to-day life.  
For example, Granovetter argues that when it comes to supporting political candidates ―one‘s 
decision to vote for a particular candidate may depend heavily on how many others have already 
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decided to do so.‖173  This can be so for any variety of reasons, such as an individual‘s innate 
desire to blend in with one‘s peers, or supposed wisdom of crowds.    
To presume, however, that every social influence has equal weight is a fallacy.  In the 
case of the participant who is debating whether or not they should join a riot, the action of a 
single close friend or beloved family member may well serve as a far more compelling reason 
than that of the combined actions of many strangers.  In cases such as these, it is easy to see the 
importance strong social ties carry and, as such, where social capital studies hold considerable 
relevance in the examination of mobilization behavior.
174
  It is therefore not at all surprising to 
learn that the groups we choose to join and the people we associate with tend to hold a sizable 
influence in determining our own behavior.  In the United States, outside of the family, no group 
is arguably of greater importance than the religious organization.  For in such associations, not 
only are communal needs often met through the supportive structures found in churches, 
synagogues, masques and other houses of worship, but so too are deep personal and spiritual 
needs.  As such, it is easy to understand the tremendous sway a much beloved religious leader is 
able to exert over their congregation.  While the example of Church serves as an extreme case of 
collective action, Granovetter highlights a case study in which peer pressure amongst friends was 
likewise examined.  In the case of delinquent youths, individuals were asked for their views on 
illegal activity.  In private, most of the boys in this study ―did not think it ‗right‘ to commit 
illegal acts or even particular[ly] want[ed] to do so.  But group interaction was such that none 
could admit this [to the group] without a loss of status.‖175  The threshold for committing illegal 
acts was comparably low for this group, as refusal to do so would diminish social standing. 
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In many social settings, such as work, we are limited in our ability to choose whom we 
can interact with.  Nevertheless, the desire to be selective in choosing our friends and other close 
personal relationships is by no means new.  Lazarsfeld and Merton‘s work shows how 
friendships are often formed via homogeny, and further illustrate how it is only natural to extend 
our social selectivity to the political organizations we engage in.
176
 Yet in groups where 
homogeny reigns supreme or where diversity is whittled away, there is far more risk that more 
extremist positions will triumph.  In the online world, there is every reason to believe similar 
results occur.  For example, Freeman and Rogers have shown how Internet technologies help in 
shaping shared ideologies and are often used to recruit new member with sympathetic 
positions.
177
  Additionally, with the relative anonymity afforded by the Internet and the ease by 
which geographic space is conquered, the World Wide Web serves as a ready venue for fringe 
groups to propagate.   
  
Conclusion  
  
 Declining participation in traditional civic activities, such as church attendance and 
bowling leagues, has brought attention to the state of American communities and the relative 
health of American society.  Alarmed by these developments, several scholars have arrived at the 
conclusion that both social capital and civic engagement are declining in the United States.  Far 
from having universal support, however, these claims have spurred a barrage of question over the 
general assertion that social capital and civic engagement are in decline, to the methodology used 
to arrive at such a conclusion.  Noting significant changes in both the character of the American 
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people and the technological advancements that have reshaped society, a growing group of 
scholars argue that measurements of social capital and civic engagement are best understood 
when new types of relationships and new forms of engagement, such those found online, are 
taken into account.  This more fluid approach to understanding contemporary levels of social 
capital and civic engagement has caused considerable debate regarding the social implications of 
the Internet.  Among those to have ventured into the this debate, most fall into one of three 
categories: those who see the Internet as further eroding social capital and civic engagement, 
those who see the web as subsidizing existing activities and relationships, and those who believe 
the Internet fosters new relationships and activities.  In examining the relevant data and current 
trends, most recent academic work asserts a positive correlation between Internet activity, social 
capital and civic engagement.  
 In bringing groups of people together, such as dispersed communities and those with 
similar interests or worldviews, the Internet not only generates substantial in-group solidarity, 
but it also runs the risk of fragmenting society into smaller associations of likeminded 
individuals.  While most communities can healthily withstand such fragmentation to some 
extent, too much, as it has been argued, poses a threat to the general demos of civil society.  As 
such, considerable attention has been paid to exploring newer ways in which people connect to 
one another and engage in society more broadly.  Such research has not only forced a critical re-
evaluation of civic engagement, but also questions classical notions of mobilization theory.  
Classical theories of mobilization, developed before the introduction of ICTs, put emphasis on 
large, well-financed hierarchical organizations.  At that time, information gathering was both 
costly and restrictive and the dominant media through which information was efficiently 
disseminated worked on a one-to-many model.  As a result of this, few social actors aside from 
96 
 
large organizations could bear the considerable costs associated with widespread political 
activity.  However, with the advent of the Internet and other many-to-many mediums, the high 
costs once associated with information gathering and its dissemination, as well as that of 
widespread social and political organization, have been substantially lowered.  Thus, newer 
groups with less rigid hierarchies and more fluid notions of membership have not only emerged 
as a major force within society, but have also led many older, more established organizations to 
adopt practices commonly associated with grass-roots activities.  This in turn has raised 
significant questions about the desirability of a society that predominantly engages civically 
through mass membership organizations.  Similarly, the growing importance of mass 
membership organizations appears to be directing civic political engagement from interest-
oriented towards issue-oriented activity.   
 With it ability to transcend geographical limitations, the Internet has proven to be an 
impressive tool, enabling individuals to participate in activities and belong to networks far 
beyond their local communities.  As a result, American society is undergoing a period of marked 
transformation, and one that is increasingly defined by political fragmentation and issue 
pluralization.  This of course is not the first time American society has undergone social 
upheaval, nor will it be the last.  During past periods of transformation, American churches and 
houses of worship have served as crucial anchors for community life.  However, in a rapidly 
changing media environment, the nature of church, and more specifically, the social bonds that 
have for so long served as an indelible source of strength within these religious communities, is 
being tested in potentially perilous new ways. 
 As shown in the introduction of this thesis, changing communication technologies can 
have dramatic consequences on religious and political landscapes. In the course of the last half-
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century, other innovations in communication have played a decisive role in reorienting American 
religious communities.  Such innovations, however, are not isolated occurrences, but rather occur 
on a broader historical and social continuum.  Exploring this continuum will provide critical 
insight into the events reshaping American society today. To this end, the following chapter 
explores important technological and historical developments that have helped transform the 
evangelical community into a powerful political force.  
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EVANGELICALS AND AMERICAN POLITICS: 
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Even by American standards, the past three decades have been an unusually intense 
period of religious fervor and significant religious political activity.  During this time, 
evangelical Christianity has emerged as both the nation‘s dominant religious expression and as 
an important pillar of Republican political support.  This chapter addresses the historical roots of 
these developments, paying particular attention to the effects of broadcast media on the 
coalescing of the evangelical voting bloc.  However, this chapter recognizes that communication 
technologies do not operate in a political vacuum, but rather are influenced by any number of 
external social factors.  To avoid an overly technological determinist interpretation, this chapter 
considers the factors contributing to the political rise of evangelical Christianity within their 
historical context, viewing them alongside America‘s ever evolving media and political 
landscape. 
It is generally acknowledged that the evangelical community is a distinct and influential 
cultural force in America, but that force did not develop spontaneously.  Like all cultural forces, 
the evangelical community required careful cultivation in its infancy and even today demands 
continual maintenance.  This is so as: 
 
the cultural dimensions of civil society is not given or natural.  Rather, it is in a 
state of social contestation: its associations and networks are a terrain to be 
struggled over and an arena wherein collective identities, ethic values and 
alliances are forged.  Indeed, competing conceptions of civil society are deployed 
in a continual struggle either to maintain cultural hegemony by dominant groups 
or to attain counter-hegemony on the part of subordinate collective actors.
178
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In the United States, the Christian Right has enjoyed a position of both cultural and 
religious hegemony for the past thirty years.  Its ultraconservative interpretation of biblical 
scripture and the Christian gospel has profoundly impacted American politics and has long 
served as the loudest, and at times seemingly only, religious voice in the country.  In an effort to 
maintain this culturally advantageous position, evangelicals have made effective use of emerging 
and innovative communication technologies.  Such technologies have played a critical role in 
proselytizing new converts to the ―Word of God,‖ maintaining the allegiances of existing 
members, expanding church networks and infrastructure, and in developing organizational 
resources. 
Beyond institutional growth there is, however, a more prophetic reason why evangelicals 
have historically embraced new communication technologies.  As Jeffery Hadden notes, ―[t]he 
sacred texts of Christianity command the followers of Jesus to preach the Gospel to every living 
creature on earth (Mark 16:15).  Evangelicals take this commandment seriously, and many 
among them view the development of radio and television as instruments sent by God to help 
them fulfill this ‗Great Commission.‘‖179  And as we shall see, the fortunes of the evangelical 
tradition have in many ways been inextricably linked to the development of communication 
technologies. 
Historically, communication has developed along one of two singular paths, either 
broadcast (one-to-many) or inter-personal (one-to-one).  In many respects, these platforms 
complement the sorts of communications that have been in existence in churches for years, as 
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they merely replicate the preacher/congregant role, albeit on a larger scale.  However, as a result 
of the computer age, newer communication technologies have emerged that have both radically 
changed the nature of communication and expanded upon the organizational potential of other, 
more antedated technologies.  This is so as instead of simply mimicking the broadcast nature of 
past technologies such as radio and television, computer mediated technologies offer participants 
a many-to-many means of interaction and make audience penetration less costly.  As noted in the 
previous chapters, with the proliferation of these newer technologies, cultural institutions built 
upon older communication regimes have been presented with dynamic new challenges.  This is 
certainly the case for evangelical Christians. 
For evangelicals, the rapidly changing media environment has rendered it impossible for 
a few elites to effectively control the Christian message, while simultaneously dictating the terms 
of what has long been a one-sided monologue.  This in turn has placed considerable strain on the 
established evangelical orthodoxy and is working to reorient the nature of evangelical civic 
engagement.  However, before we can properly examine how the Internet is affecting the 
interplay between religion and politics in the United States, it is crucial to understand prevailing 
evangelical worldviews and the influence of past media regimes. 
 
Eschatology and the Public Square 
 
School children learning the history of the American people are often told that the 
Puritans came to the new world in search of religious freedom.  This is simply not true.  
Religious freedom was a luxury the Puritans already enjoyed in their adopted Holland.  Instead, 
the real impetus for their colonization lay in the post-millenialist belief that humans had to work 
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towards and thus earn the second coming of Christ.  As such, the Puritans sought to establish a 
fundamentalist society that England and other European countries would eventually look to as an 
example of pious living and would therefore be compelled to reform their own societies into 
greater accordance with God‘s law.  With time, post-millenialist views gradually gave way to 
premillenial dispensationalism, a theological position that believes the second coming of Christ 
is imminent. As such, it is important for dispensationalists to live each day as if it were the last 
(as they quite literally believe today may be just that).  At present, roughly two out of every three 
Americans subscribe to some form of dispensationalism,
180
 and though it is easy to understand 
how such a belief in the literal end-times can have far reaching implications on the way in which 
one would choose to conduct daily life, its implications for the broader electoral process are 
more complex. 
Dispensational believers emphasize the point that biblical scriptures speak of Christ‘s 
imminent return and that to be accepted by the Lord, one must be loyal to God and do God‘s 
―duty and service while waiting.‖181  For much of American history, this duty and service was 
largely seen as distinct from public life and separate from political affairs.  The late Jerry 
Falwell, an avid dispensationalist, crystallized this point in 1965 when he declared, ―preachers 
are not called upon to be politicians, but soul winners.‖182  Of course Falwell later became an 
active political campaigner, thus the timing of this statement similarly helps to illustrate the point 
that while religion has long been a fixture within American society, it was only in the last quarter 
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of the twentieth century that the pursuit for personal salvation became so intertwined with the 
political process. 
The transition for many evangelicals from spiritual salvationists to political operatives 
began in earnest in the 1970s and was led in large part by Hal Lindsey. Lindsey was made 
famous by his best-selling dispensational account, The Late Great Planet Earth, which 
―reportedly sold eighteen million copies and which was described by the New York Times as the 
‗number one non-fiction best-seller of the decade.‘‖183  By the end of the 70s Lindsey had 
become a household name in many evangelical circles and his tremendously popular writings 
had sown the seeds of the evangelical political movement.  In 1980 Lindsey expanded upon his 
earlier positions in Countdown to Armageddon, which, among other things, characterized 
evangelicals as a marginalized people, and included a concerted push for stronger links between 
religious practice and political activism.   
In Countdown Lindsey called upon Christians to take back their country and to preserve 
its religious heritage.  He argued that with Christ‘s return imminent, ―Christians should live as if 
Jesus could come today, and that means that we must actively take on the responsibility of being 
a citizen and a member of God‘s family.  We need to get active electing officials who will not 
only reflect the Bible‘s morality in government, but will shape domestic and foreign policies to 
protect our country and our way of life.‖184  Others soon joined Lindsey in his call to action. 
Several of these, such as Pat Robertson and James Dobson, continue to exert considerable 
influence over the election of public officials and the development of public policy.   
Another notable dispensationalist follower of Hal Lindsey is Tim LaHaye.  LaHaye is a 
prominent evangelical leader and co-author of the best-selling Left Behind novel series: a 
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fictional account of the end-times which has sold an astonishing 65 million copies in the United 
States alone, a mark Harry Potter has yet to best.  Today, the Left Behind franchise is deeply 
embedded in the American end-times movement and includes Left Behind Prophecy 
Conferences, where believers meet and discuss signs of the end-times; visits to the Holy Land 
and the Valley of Megiddo, the supposed sight were Jesus will vanquish his enemies and restore 
God‘s Kingdom on Earth (a popular activity encouraged by many churches); box-office movies; 
and online video games in which teenagers play as Christian soldiers caught up in the 
Tribulation.
185
  Given the enthusiasm that Left Behind has managed to generate, it is unlikely that 
a major shift in eschatological thinking will occur within the American public any time soon.  
With this understood, the emergence of dispensational belief at the fore of American politics 
represents, to date, the apex of what has long been a reactionary movement.  This point is 
reflected in Countdown, where Lindsey asks Americans to ―take their country back.‖  Yet the 
question remains:  From whom does Lindsey want to take America back? 
 
 
Monkeys, Satellites, and a Catholic President:  How Societal Upheaval Brought 
Evangelicals to the Political Fold 
 
In a century that gave us the counterculture and political unrest of the 1960s, it is easy to 
forget that the 1920s were an equally turbulent time for the American people.  After decades of 
scientific and political advancement, in which rationalism gained broad public acceptance and 
women secured the right to vote, it seemed society began to stall.  Not only did the decade kick 
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off with the passing of the 18
th
 Amendment, which prohibited all non-religious use of alcohol, 
but an increase in immigration from Eastern Europe helped to revive the Ku Klux Klan, whose 
ranks ―swelled to 5 million members.‖186  And while the 1920s also saw the election of the first 
woman to the United States Congress, feminists had little reason to celebrate, as the first 
congresswoman was none other than Alice Robertson of Oklahoma.  Robertson, who had 
previously served as president of the Oklahoma Anti-Suffrage Association proved to be anything 
but a friend of the women‘s movement as she went on to oppose ―everything the Women‘s Joint 
Congressional Committee wanted.‖187  With this rocky start, it is little wonder that by 1933 only 
13 women had come to serve in the United States House of Representatives, and of them, seven 
had assumed the seat vacated by their husbands.
188
   
Yet despite the cultural tensions of the 1920s, science continued to enjoy broad public 
support.  Even Darwinism, which many evangelicals view today as a great social scourge, was, 
in 1920, largely accepted as a matter of fact.  As David Greenberg notes: 
 
Although Darwin‘s theories had met fierce resistance when first proposed in 
1859, in time they secured general approval.  Even many Christian leaders, once 
hostile to evolution, endorsed the theory—one of several trends that split many 
Protestant denominations into modern (or liberal) and fundamentalist camps.  ―By 
the time of World War I,‖ wrote the historian William Leuchtenberg, ―an attack 
on Darwin seemed as unlikely as an attack on Copernicus.‖189 
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Yet all this began to change by the summer of 1925, when a clerk at a little known public 
advocacy group known as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) read of the Tennessee 
Butler Act, which banned the teaching of evolution in public schools.  Disturbed by what they 
perceived to be a deliberate attempt by the state legislature to undermine the wall that separated 
the state from church influence, the ACLU decided to challenge the law directly.   At the time, 
however, the ACLU was still in its infancy, having been formed only five years prior, and thus 
lacked legal representation in the state.  As such, the ACLU decided to take an ad out in a 
prominent Tennessee newspaper, promising to defend ―any teacher who made a ‗friendly 
challenge‘ to the law.‖190  Answering this call was a young Dayton man by the name of John 
Scopes.   
At roughly the same time, and unbeknown to the ACLU, Williams Jennings Bryan, a 
three-time Democratic nominee for President and former Secretary of State under Woodrow 
Wilson, was increasingly troubled by the public‘s embrace of evolution.  It was not, however, the 
theory‘s scientific application which bothered Bryan so greatly, as in fact he had nothing at all 
against evolution ―as scientific theory.‖191  Instead, what was troubling Bryan was the recent 
advance of ‗Social Darwinism,‘ a popular social theory that argues human society is ―an arena of 
struggle in which the strongest prevail, the fittest survive, and [where] the poor ‗misfits‘ must be 
neglected in the name of social progress.‖192  All of this flew in the face of everything Bryan 
ever staked a political claim upon, not to mention his Christian faith.  Thus, when Bryan heard of 
the Tennessee challenge, he agreed to take the case as a prosecutor for the state. Scopes in turn 
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accepted the help of Clarence Darrow, a famous New York defense attorney, who was 
determined to ―show up Fundamentalism...to prevent bigots and ignoramuses from controlling 
the educational system of the United States.‖193 
When the trial ended, Scopes was convicted of violating the Butler Act and fined 100 
dollars.  It was an outcome the ACLU had been expecting and it immediately appealed the case 
to the federal courts.  What the ACLU had not anticipated, however, was the intense media 
attention the case drew.  With such names as Bryan and Darrow involved, by the time the trial 
commenced in July of 1925 it had attracted the attention of the major press and media outlets and 
filled the daily headlines of the country‘s many newspapers and movie reels.  Throughout the 
course of the trail, the press largely depicted creationists as backwards thinking and ignorant of 
scientific theory.
194
 One account by H.L. Mencken of the Baltimore Sun described 
fundamentalists as coming from the ―lower orders‖ of humanity, from which ―no man of any 
education or other human dignity‖ would dare to associate.195  Faced with this onslaught of 
public attacks, fundamentalist Christians did what many groups do when fired upon: they dug in 
and became all the more resolved.  
Following the trial, the people of Tennessee elected the state‘s lead prosecutor to the U.S. 
Senate and rewarded a junior prosecutor with a seat in the House.  Similarly, Governor Peay, the 
man who had signed the anti-evolution Butler Act into law, was overwhelmingly re-elected to 
serve a third term.  Elsewhere across the South and the Midwest, the Scopes trial stood as 
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testament that laws forbidding the teaching of evolution could withstand judicial scrutiny.  One 
result was that in due time some fourteen states considered similar legislation.
196
  Another result 
was that high school biology textbooks nationally slowly began to remove any mention of 
Charles Darwin or his theory.  This was in no small part due to the fact that educators and 
superintendents approve and buy high school textbooks, not specialists in the field.  Thus, for 
teachers and school administrators wishing to escape the wrath of angry priests and upset 
parents, evolution became a strictly hands off topic.
197
  Naturally, publishers wishing to sell their 
biology textbooks took notice of the public sentiment and adapted to meet the mood of the 
market. 
And so it was that for roughly the next thirty years American children grew up largely 
ignorant of one of biology‘s most fundamental theories.  However, this all changed in 1957 when 
Americans began hearing ―an uncharacteristic note in their political discourse—self-doubt.‖198  
The origin of this doubt was the Soviet satellite Sputnik, which, as it lay in orbit around earth, 
served as a reminder to Americans that they were falling behind the Soviets.  In the aftermath of 
Sputnik‘s launch, America recommitted itself to the schooling of its youth.  Additional money 
for education was swiftly made available and before long evolution was back in the classroom.  
Early opposition from evangelicals was scant as many were lured by the prospect of a flush 
school budget to fight Communism, even if it meant discussing Darwin.
199
  Gradually, however, 
outside social forces began to once again move American culture in a new direction.  As time 
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would demonstrate, there were limits to how far evangelicals could be pushed, and the historic 
presidential campaign of John F. Kennedy was the first to test them. 
By itself, the election of the nation‘s first Catholic President did not push evangelicals 
over the edge.  That said, the presidency of John F. Kennedy came at a time of immense social 
and cultural upheaval.  In addition to grappling with issues of racial inequality, a second wave of 
feminist activism was sweeping through America.  This time, however, women were not simply 
insisting on equality at the ballot box, but were instead demanding the right of reproductive 
autonomy.  Adding to these tensions was a series of decisions made by the United States 
Supreme Court that severely curtailed the role of religion in the public sphere.  For instance, in 
1962, the Court handed down the Engel decision, which banned ecumenical public schools and 
served as a pre-cursor to the monumental 1963 Schempp ruling, which effectively outlawed 
sponsored Bible readings and prayer in public schools.  These decisions greatly angered 
evangelicals and propelled some in the movement to take action.  As David Hall notes, ―success 
might have eluded [evangelicals] had it not been for the turmoil of the sixties and the division 
that opened up in the aftermath of the Supreme Court decisions and the ‗cultural revolution.‘‖200  
Paul Weyrich argues, however, that despite rapid change, what ―galvanized the Christian 
community was not abortion, school prayer or the ERA....What changed their minds was Jimmy 
Carter‘s intervention against the Christian schools, trying to deny them tax exempt status on the 
basis of so-called de facto segregation.‖201 
Ultimately, it is unlikely that one particular issue angered the evangelical community 
enough to make them emerge from their self-imposed political isolation.  What is more probable 
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is that the culmination of these events so disturbed evangelicals, as well as others who had not 
previously identified with this group, that they felt they had few options but to fight for their way 
of life.  This is so as people in rapidly changing times are often drawn to organizations that 
appear to offer some subjective sense of normality.  Beginning in the 1960s and extending even 
to this day, Christian conservative groups ―perceive themselves as culturally embattled and thus 
forced to become politically active in the hope that they can salvage some lifeworld 
protection.‖202  Yet to go from being a culturally ―embattled‖ group to a major political force is 
no easy task.  At the most fundamental level substantial organizational resources and the means 
for effective mobilization are required.  Fortunately for evangelicals, the very nature of religious 
bodies provided them with a significant competitive advantage not often afforded to secular 
organizations. 
 
Media and the Unification of American Evangelicals 
 
When it comes to mobilizing their supporters, religious organizations enjoy key 
advantages over their secular counter-parts.  This is so as three characteristics that favor 
mobilization efforts are regularly found among religious groups, namely: leadership, collective 
identity, and the availability of resources.  In addition to having recognized charismatic leaders 
capable of leveraging their holy status to further political ends, religious movements also enjoy 
powerful collective identities and shared theological beliefs, all of which contribute to high 
levels of commitment on the behalf of believers.  Finally, as religious movements can rely on 
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tithes, offerings and other charitable giving, they are often spared the financial hurdles of other 
incipient social movements.
203
  With specific reference to conservative evangelical mobilization, 
Margaret Ann Latus notes: 
 
Religious motivation provides a value framework for everything [Evangelicals] 
do in life, and this is true of politics no less than of anything else.  Related to this 
religious zeal is the fact that other incentives for participation...are less necessary 
for individuals driven by the conviction of their faith.  Leaders have merely to ask 
and it shall be given unto them.
204
 
 
As Who??? Latus?, points out, the ―deep-seated passion of conservative evangelicals‖ is an 
attribute that is rarely shared by those opposing their efforts.
205
 
By the 1960s and 1970s the evangelical community had many religious leaders, was rich 
in resources, and had a budding and motivated religious base.  As Tona Hangen notes, ―over the 
decade of the fifties, membership in American churches rose from 64.5 million to 114.5 million, 
to include 60 percent of the national population.‖206  However, the dramatic increase in church 
attendance was not equal across denominations.  For instance, many mainline protestant 
denominations, such as northern Presbyterian and Episcopalians, witnessed overall net losses 
during this same period.
207
  Furthermore, it was also during this time that the evangelical 
                                                 
203
 Matthew Marostica, ―Religion and Global Affairs: Religious Activation and Democracy in Latin America,‖ SAIS 
Review 18, no. 2 (1998): 45-51. 
204
 As quoted by Vernon L. Bates, ―Lobbying For the Lord:  The New Christian Right Home-Schooling Movement 
and Grassroots Lobbying,‖ Review of Religious Research 33, no. 1 (1991): 4 of 3-17. 
205
 Ibid. 
206
 Tona J. Hangen, Reclaiming the Dial:  Radio, Religion & Popular Culture in America  (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2002), 147. 
207
 Joel A. Carpenter, ―Fundamentalist Institutions and the Rise of Evangelical Protestantism, 1929-1942,‖ Church 
History 49, no. 1 (1980): 62-75. 
112 
 
Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) supplanted the mainline Methodist Church as the largest 
protestant denomination in America, a title the SBC retains to this day.  Yet despite the rapid rise 
of evangelical Christianity, a common and unifying identity was not something that came 
naturally to many denominations.  It was instead something which had to be fostered, and had it 
not been for the self-imposed cultural isolation fundamentalists undertook in the aftermath of the 
Scopes trial, it is questionable such an identity would have ever emerged. 
As it happened, in the wake of the Scopes trial, ―fundamentalists retreated from the wider 
culture and built up their own separatist networks of schools, churches, Bible colleges, and, of 
course, radio stations.‖208  In doing so, they ―laid the foundation for the emergence of neo-
evangelism in the 1950s, a movement of intellectually and culturally engaged Christians.‖209  
These religious institutions served as an invaluable cog in the formation of unified collective 
cultural identity, and as the American population grew throughout the first half of the twentieth 
century, so too did the demand for protestant ministers and trained laity.
210
  Meeting this demand 
were the growing number of Bible institutes, which in addition to their educational activities, 
often ran publishing houses and organized week-long summer Bible conferences, which 
―supplied staff evangelists for revival meetings and provided churches with guest preachers.‖211  
Similarly, advertisements for denominational colleges, which had previously appealed largely to 
adherents of the advertising college‘s affiliate denomination, were soon appearing in the 
periodicals of other denominations.  As enrolment to these institutions rose, the various branches 
of evangelical Christianity increasingly came into contact with one another and forged both 
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shared identities and a dense network of social and religious support.
212
  Additionally, Bible 
colleges were also readily organizing massive revivals that attracted swarms of enthusiastic 
Christians.  These activities helped to overcome long standing denominational divides and 
brought ever more people to the cause of evangelical ministry.   
While attending one of these revivals, a reporter was struck by the unity which he 
witnessed and commented ―a Methodist Bishop, a Baptist evangelist, a Presbyterian professor, a 
Lutheran pastor, a Christian layman and a Rescue Mission superintendent could stand on the 
same platform and preach the common tenets of the Christian faith while multitudes of believers 
wept and rejoiced together as if some glorious news had for the first time bust upon their 
ears.‖213  As time progressed, these Bible institutes began to focus their considerable attention 
and resources on another medium through which the masses could be reached: radio broadcast.  
By 1942, for instance, a single religious organization, the Moody Bible Institute, was ―releasing 
transcribed [radio] programs to 187 different stations,‖ and had a radio staff of nearly 300 who 
busied themselves by visiting churches to raise awareness of Moody‘s religious broadcasts.214   
Yet despite the eagerness by which evangelicals greeted the advent of the age of radio, it 
proved, nonetheless, a difficult medium to tap.  Many of the problems evangelicals ran into were 
largely self-made.  For instance, by 1943 all of the major national radio broadcasters had pulled 
commercial evangelism from the air.
215
  This action was the direct result of numerous 
inflammatory remarks made religious commentators while broadcasting.  Arguably the most 
notorious offender was Father Charles E. Coughlin.  Although a Roman Catholic Priest, and thus 
unaffiliated with the evangelical community, it was Coughlin who most scared major radio 
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broadcasters away from paid religious programming.  ―His bellicose attacks on communists, 
socialists, international bankers, Jews, labor union leaders, and finally, President Franklin 
Roosevelt led many to fear Coughlin more than Germany‘s Hitler.‖216  And so it was that when it 
came time to renew his contract, most broadcasters chose not to, citing a newly established 
National Association of Broadcasters‘ code of ethics that barred ―controversial‖ speakers.   
As a result, national radio broadcasters increasingly chose to air the more benign sermons 
of the National Council of Churches (NCC), an umbrella group that included most mainline 
protestant denominations and had ties to the Catholic Church and Judaism.  Broadcasters 
provided this ―sustaining time‖ free of charge to earn credit that could be used as evidence that 
their stations were providing invaluable public service, thus assuring them the renewal of their 
public broadcast license.  By contrast, most evangelical preachers found themselves unable to 
secure even paid radio time on any of the major networks.  Forced to turn to smaller and cheaper 
markets, evangelists quickly found a home among the local stations of America‘s more rural 
populations.  Soon thereafter, many evangelical ministries busied themselves with setting up 
their own radio stations or buying existing ones.  Consequently, throughout the 1940s and 1950s, 
radio evangelists grew quite adept at running and maintaining their own radio stations, while the 
NCC and other mainline protestant groups increasingly grew dependent upon the charity of the 
country‘s major radio broadcasters.  In 1960, the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) 
changed course and decided to permit radio and television stations the right to claim paid 
religious broadcasting as part of their public service, thus negating any incentive broadcasters 
once had to give away air time for free.  Evangelical ministries, flush with cash, quickly 
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swooped in and bid the NCC out of the market.  Today, 1960 is often regarded as a cultural 
milestone marking the ―‗virtual silencing‘ of mainline churches in mass media.‖217 
Aided by this new FCC regulation, evangelicals were able to cultivate their ties with 
America‘s many protestant traditions in another venue, as the rapid expansion of religiously 
oriented broadcasting gradually pushed the movement towards greater ecumenical ministries.  
Providing a further catalyst was the advent of televangelism, which saw its audience grow from 
some 5 million in the late 1960s to nearly 25 million by the mid 1980s.
218
  Leading this charge 
was Pat Robertson who founded the Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN) in 1961, which was 
quickly followed by Paul Crouch‘s Trinity Broadcasting Network (TBN) and Jim Bakker‘s 
Praise The Lord network, also known as PTL.  Together, these three networks stood as giants in 
an industry soon saturated with smaller, more regionally based programming.  Collectively, such 
religious broadcasts proved vital to the cultural and political unification of American 
evangelicals. 
One key reason why television was so adept at bridging many long held denominational 
divides is due to its mainstreaming effect.  As George Gerbner discovered in the 1970‘s, 
television creates a confluence of attitudes.
219
  When viewed heavily by initially disparate and 
divergent groups, what results is the homogenization or mainstreaming of political views and the 
cultivation of common perspectives.  When audiences are repeatedly exposed to the same or 
similar message, that message begins to shape their opinions of the world around them.  To this 
end, the conservative theology of early televangelists helped move many viewers towards the 
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conservative end of the political and religious spectrum.
220
  Adding to Gerbner‘s insights, Leon 
Festinger further notes that individuals make a habit of seeking information with which they 
already agree.
221
  This effect works to reinforce pre-existing biases and may help to explain 
Gerbner‘s mainstreaming effect.  By appealing to individuals who already felt threatened by 
significant social upheaval, televangelists helped to foster a community of conservative 
Christians whose numbers grew as viewers increasingly gained access to cable T.V., and whose 
message gradually moved away from the center in order to meet market demands.
222
 
In the wake of the many financial and sexual scandals that rocked televangelists in the 
1980s, it has become the norm to dismiss them and their ministries.  Yet throughout the 1980s, 
televangelists were among some of the most influential leaders in the nation.  In 1980, for 
instance, Pat Robertson helped to mobilize a half-million participants to a rally called 
―Washington for Jesus‖ through the use of his radio and television broadcasts. 223    Similarly, 
Tamney and Johnson have shown that significant support for the Moral Majority came from 
individuals who were already watching religious programming.
224
  This success can likely be 
attributed to the fact that religious broadcasts work to reinforce an individual‘s existing social 
and political values, as an individual, having become interested in religion in a formal setting, 
transfers ―this interest to other forms of religious experience.‖225  The basic premise here is that 
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―traditional church participation stimulates an interest in religion and causes those affected 
people to watch religious programming.‖226  
Today, many Americans assume that the golden days of televangelism are behind them, 
and in an increasingly saturated and fragmented media environment they may be right.  
However, it would be wrong to presume that Christian media is in decline.   Since the 1980s 
Christian media has grown significantly in both size and scope.  In addition to broadcasting Bible 
studies and worship services, networks such as CBN and TBN are now producing their own 
syndicated television programs and wide-release movies.  Joining them is an increasingly 
diversified array of Christian media, which includes a growing Christian book and e-book 
market,
227
 and as already noted, a budding Christian video games market.  Indeed, while many 
Americans might assume the most common way of experiencing the Christian faith is by 
attending church service, they would in fact be wrong.  A 2002 poll conducted by the Barna 
Research Group found that, ―a greater number of adults experience the Christian faith through 
Christian media, such as radio, television or books, than attend Christian churches.‖228  This poll 
found, for instance, that while 63% of American adults had attended a church service in the last 
month, some 67% had turned to Christian radio, television or books as a part of their religious 
devotion. 
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The Fall of the Religious Left 
 
So far, this chapter has looked at how key historical developments, from theological 
shifts, to the rise of contentious social issues, to the growth of inter-denominational networks and 
the utilization of evolving communication technologies have helped propel evangelical 
Christians towards greater political power.  Equally important to this story, however, is the 
collapse of the ―Religious Left,‖ which allowed evangelicals to monopolize the protestant 
marketplace.  While much of the left‘s decline can be attributed to the assassination of key 
leaders, such as the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert Kennedy—tragedies that robbed 
the left of iconic figures—perhaps more important to the fall of the left, was the loss of a 
collective identity and the disappearance of shared values.  For instance, despite prevailing 
romantic beliefs, Martin Luther King Jr. was not always a unifying force within the broader 
progressive political movement.  And at no time was he more divisive then when he focused his 
energies away from racism to other social issues.  As Diane Winston notes, ―when King turned 
to the issues of poverty, labor unrest, and the Vietnam War, he was criticized by fellow civil 
rights workers, savaged by politicians, and excoriated in the media.‖229  It was also during this 
particularly volatile time that ―religious progressives who had made common cause with King 
splintered into antiwar organizing, feminism, black nationalism, La Raza and gay liberation.‖230  
With the assassination of Dr. King, and later Robert Kennedy, American liberalism was left 
adrift.  Their message, though by no means lost, was nonetheless overwhelmed by an increasing 
number of groups and special interests, each of whom could claim to be leaders in their own 
right.  For their part, the media was quick to report the deconstruction of the left.  And with each 
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emerging movement and new interest group came the added glare of media attention and public 
scrutiny.  As the religious left continued to deteriorate, its message increasingly became 
vulnerable to lampooning attacks and marginalization.
231
   
Capitalizing on this division was an all too eager group of evangelicals who not only 
sought increased political influence, but who were also alarmed by the growing trend of ―loose‖ 
biblical interpretations.  By the late 1970s, for instance, a small group of Baptist leaders made 
public their intentions to take over the SBC and rid it of what they perceived to be a liberal drift 
in their seminaries, Sunday schools, and mission boards.  Over time, the once moderately 
conservative SBC moved radically to the right.  Today, the SBC is arguably one of the most 
conservative protestant denominations in the United States.  Its official church doctrine declares 
that women are not to be ordained, abortion is a sin in all cases, and that God does not hear the 
prayers of Jews.
232
  Yet as startling as this takeover was, in the long run it proved to be an 
example for many others to follow.  For instance, once success in the SBC was secure, 
conservative Christians sought to extend their influence over other denominations as well.  Some 
of these efforts proved fruitful; others futile.  Among the fruitful efforts was the Christian Right‘s 
attempts to fracture the congregations of resistant denominations through the exploitation of 
wedge issues.   
Among the more audacious tactics deployed by these groups were claims made both on 
60 Minutes and in Readers Digest (at the time America‘s most watched news program and most 
read magazine) that the National Council of Churches (NCC), the largest gathering of mainline 
protestant denominations, was not only sympathetic to Marxist guerrillas in Latin America, but 
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in some cases, was funding them directly.
233
  Grounds for these assertions came by way of 
liberation theology, a theological movement that enjoyed marginal support within some 
protestant circles, and which emphasized Christ‘s role as a liberator of the oppressed more than 
his status as a savior.  Yet as potent as these allegations were, their impact remained small when 
compared to the Christian Right‘s exploitation of the internal division many mainline churches 
were experiencing on the issues of gay marriage and gay clergy ordination.  On this front, the 
late Diane Knippers, a leader within the evangelical community, admitted that her goal in raising 
these internal divisions was ―to diminish and discredit the religious left‘s influence.‖234  Today, 
efforts such as Knippers have largely succeeded, as ―the old mainline churches have been 
culturally and institutionally displaced by a new plurality; yesterday‘s supposed fringes are 
taking over American Protestantism‘s main square.‖235  Taking its place has been the ―individual 
pursuit of salvation through spiritual rebirth, often in circumstances of sect-driven millenarian 
countdowns to the so-called end times and an awaited return of Christ.‖236  As an increasing 
number of evangelicals began calling for broader political engagement, America‘s religious left 
could offer little meaningful resistance.  Thus the fall of the left drastically changed the nature of 
American politics and moved the country in a noticeably different, and altogether more 
conservative, political direction. 
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Evangelicals and the Reagan Presidency 
 
With mainline protestant denominations under considerable duress, the 1980 presidential 
election proved noteworthy in that it was the first election in which the evangelical vote proved a 
decisive electoral factor.
237
  It also serves as an important cultural benchmark as Reagan‘s 
victory helped to ―push millions of newly energized evangelical voters into the eager arms of the 
Republican Party.‖  That Reagan came to be the darling of the Christian Right was itself the 
result of an intensive political courtship.
 238
 
Believing Carter held weak support among his supposed base of white evangelicals, 
Reagan‘s campaign made a concerted effort to win over these voters.  As Amy Sullivan, a 
contributing editor at Time Magazine and former aide to the now retired Senate Majority Leader 
Tom Daschle notes: 
 
The Great Communicator knew how to speak the evangelicals‘ language, even if 
it wasn‘t his native tongue, and he used it to good effect.  Addressing a gathering 
of TV preachers and other religious right leaders in Dallas a few months before 
the election, Reagan hit all the right notes.  He complained that the Supreme 
Court‘s school-prayer decision had ―expelled God from the classroom.‖  He 
reiterated his oft-made observation that everybody in favor of abortion had 
already been born.  He spoke admiringly of the Bible, explaining that ―all the 
complex questions facing us at home and abroad have their answer in that single 
book.‖  And if there were any holdouts left among the assembled clergy, he 
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melted their hearts by declaring, ―I know you can‘t endorse me...but I want you to 
know that I endorse you.‖239  
 
Determined to defeat President Carter, Jerry Falwell called on some 20 religious leaders 
and political operatives to his Thomas Road Baptist Church.   At this meeting, Falwell talked 
openly about the religious importance of electing Ronald Reagan.
240
  Following this, ―Falwell 
and his associates started going from state to state, meeting Catholics, old-line Protestants, and 
evangelicals, putting together (Moral Majority) chapters everywhere.‖241  When these efforts 
proved successful and Reagan was in the White House, evangelical hopes were riding high.  
However, with the Democrats controlling the House, Reagan was limited in what he could do.  
Even so, when Reagan did first have a real opportunity to give back to evangelicals—in July of 
1981 with the retirement of Associate Justice Potter Stewart—he disappointed.  Rather than 
nominate a conservative who would have pleased many in the evangelical camp, Reagan instead 
went with the more moderate, and pro-choice, Sandra Day O‘Conner.  Reagan‘s next nominee, 
Antonin Scalia, was viewed by many as a reliable conservative, yet when he appointed for the 
third and last time in his presidency, he once more chose a moderate: Anthony M. Kennedy.    
Far from being the exception, disappointments such as the O‘Conner and Kennedy 
appointments emerged as a regular theme throughout Reagan‘s presidency.  For instance, in 
1982, Reagan ―halfheartedly honored his promise to support a constitutional amendment 
allowing school prayer, [by] refraining from putting enough political muscle behind it to 
bulldoze it through the Senate.‖242  Worse still, in the mid 1980s Surgeon General C. Everett 
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Koop issued an early warning about the AIDS epidemic.  In a special report Dr. Koop 
―advocated sex education, including teaching about homosexual behavior, as an essential tool in 
stopping the spread of the disease, and even promoted the use of condoms for sex outside of 
marriage as a means of protection.‖243  With these actions before them, evangelicals learned the 
painful political lesson that, ―having a sympathetic president like Ronald Reagan did not 
guarantee that their political expectations would be satisfied.  When push came to shove, Reagan 
abandoned conservative Christians.‖244  
In an acknowledgment of their limited political powers, ―conservative Christians at the 
end of the 1980s refocused their energies on forming a strong grassroots political movement.‖245  
By the end of Reagan‘s presidency, evangelical organizations dotted the American landscape.  
One of these newly minted organizations was Pat Robertson‘s Christian Coalition.  From the 
beginning the Christian Coalition was ―supposed to fill the vacuum left by the demise a few 
years earlier of the Moral Majority.‖246  To help in this effort, Robertson tapped 28-year-old 
Ralph Reed to lead the coalition.  Together, these men began programs that trained ―conservative 
Christians to run for office and to manage other people's campaigns.  [In turn] these trainees 
became active in state and local Republican parties throughout the nation. They ran for 
municipal offices and school boards.‖247 And so it was that at unprecedented rates, evangelicals 
were mobilized and soon able to take over the Republican Party. Fast forwarding: in 2002, 
Campaign and Elections published a report in which it found ―that in forty-four states, Christian 
conservatives controlled at least a quarter of the GOP‘s state committees, up from thirty-one 
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states just six years earlier.‖248  And in eighteen of these states, Christian conservatives 
completely dominated the state committees altogether.  
 
Why Democrats Lost the Catholic Vote and How It Further Empowered Evangelicals 
 
By 1984 it had become apparent that evangelicals were voting in large numbers for 
Republican candidates.  In examining the political behavior of the Christian Right, Clyde Wilcox 
found that contributions from Christian Right PACs flowed almost exclusively to ―Republicans 
challenging vulnerable Democratic incumbents, or to Republican incumbents facing strong 
challengers,‖249 a practice few other PACs follow.  Yet despite the growing numbers of 
evangelicals and their clear preference for Republican candidates, Democrats could have 
maintained a politically advantageous position had other religious political affiliations remained 
unchanged.  This is because as a region, the south (where evangelicals are strongest) is far from 
having enough electoral votes to elect a president by itself.  It represents only a fraction of the 
total American population, which leaves ample margins for Democrats to establish and maintain 
a working congressional majority.  And while the evangelical movement remains strong in most 
other parts of the country, its political influence could otherwise be offset by other religious 
groups or with establishment religious coalitions.  Thus, the problem Democrats have been 
running into over the past three decades has not been the loss of evangelicals by themselves, but 
rather the combined loss of this group and sizable numbers of northern working class Catholics.  
When these two groups vote together, Democrats lose.   
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Exactly how it is that Democrats lost favor among many Catholic voters has as much to 
do with religious doctrine as it does with the party‘s own failure to fully appreciate the 
magnitude by which changing social circumstances can affect political preferences.  For 
instance, shortly after his election to the papacy in 1958, Pope John XXIII announced that he 
would be summoning Church Bishops to Rome for a Second Vatican Council.  Their task was to 
determine how the Church should respond, ―and if need be, adapt...to the rapidly changing world 
around them.‖250  What flowed from this Council was truly monumental.  Not only was nearly 
two millennia worth of religious practice altered—most notably the fact that Mass would now be 
conducted in the local vernacular—but also that the Church came to the firm conclusion that it 
should have ―true freedom...to pass moral judgment even in matters relating to politics.‖251  The 
result of this decision represents a fundamental shift in the thinking and practices of the Catholic 
Church.  In using this language, the Church chose to take a more active role in the moral 
judgment of society and freed itself from the near exclusive practices of charity work and the 
salvation of souls.  Following the Second Vatican Council, the Catholic Church viewed itself as 
being in the business of saving humanity. 
In America, as in other countries around the world, the Catholic Church continued its 
work with the poor, but it increasingly took a more critical stance on what it viewed to be the 
moral decay of society.  Its first significant venture into politics took place with the Griswold 
decision, in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that women were constitutionally afforded a 
right to birth control.  On this decision the Church came out in strong opposition, a position most 
Americans did not share.  A decade later when the Roe decision was made, the Church again 
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came out in opposition.
252
  This time, however, Democrats made a severe miscalculation in both 
the response of the public and the Church.  For the public, abortion was a messy issue and far 
more complicated than birth control.  Unlike in the Griswold case, which concerned something 
largely viewed as a simple and rational family-planning barrier that merely prevented the 
beginning of life, with Roe vs. Wade the public, by contrast, was confronted with the possibility 
that society had effectively legalized the killing of innocent life.  For the Church, its opposition 
to abortion was a simple and long-standing matter and the unanimity with which Catholics 
opposed abortion in the 1970s was more solid than on any other social matter.
253
  As major 
Democratic officials came out in support of abortion rights, they attracted considerable heat from 
the Church.  Not only did the Catholic Church mobilize its adherents, but it also adopted one of 
the most comprehensive plans to combat abortion and its political supporters, calling on 
Catholics everywhere to oppose pro-choice candidates and politicians.
 254
  Further still, a number 
of pro-choice Catholic politicians were publicly prevented from receiving Holy Communion (as 
John Kerry was in 2004) and in some extreme cases, were even excommunicated from the 
Church.   
Complicating matters even further for Democrats was the fact that a number of pro-
choice Catholic politicians spoke very little about their own faith, especially when compared to 
their evangelical colleagues.  Their silence is arguably a part of the culture of the American 
Catholic Church, in which Catholics are brought up to see their faith as a private matter.  It is 
also likely that this silence is an attempt by many pro-choice Catholic politicians to remain under 
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the radar, thereby escaping the wrath of the Church.  Yet this silence has only added to public 
perceptions that the Democratic Party is a party without religion.  By default, the failure of 
Democrats to talk openly and candidly about their own faith has allowed Republicans to cast 
themselves as the party of the faithful.   
At the launch of his 1992 presidential bid Bill Clinton understood more than most 
Democratic politicians the political dilemma his party faced and the deep misgivings many 
Americans have about abortion.  Having been raised an evangelical Baptist and educated at a 
Catholic University, Clinton had been surrounded by religion throughout his early life.  Unlike 
Michael Dukakis before him, Clinton took numerous opportunities to speak before religious 
bodies and made a habit of addressing Catholic Americans.  Yet, for all his work, many voters 
remained troubled by Clinton‘s support of abortion rights.  This said, Clinton was hardly the first 
Democrat to take heat on this issue, and like all smart campaigners, Clinton learned from others.  
In 1989, for instance, ―a San Diego bishop barred Lucy Killea, a California state 
assemblywoman, from taking Communion because she supported abortion rights.‖255  As 
Killea‘s position on abortion rights increasingly became the focus of her re-election campaign, 
Sam Popkin, a professor from the University of California, San Diego, advised Killea that rather 
than continue to insist that abortion be kept ―legal and safe,‖ she might try saying ―legal, safe, 
and rare.‖  The addition of that single word seemingly worked as Killea won re-election.  When 
Clinton, in the early days of his presidential campaign ran into similar troubles, Popkin sent a 
note to Hillary Clinton, advising that her husband make a similar change to his language.  In 
response, Clinton did adopt the ―legal, safe, and rare‖ mantra, though with one slight alteration: 
Clinton wanted to keep abortion ―safe, legal, and rare.‖256  
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Throughout the remainder of the presidential campaign, Clinton kept up this rhetoric.  In 
accepting his party‘s nomination for President he declared before the crowd and the millions 
watching on television that he was not pro-abortion but was instead pro-choice.  By modifying 
the way in which Clinton spoke about abortion, he managed to crystallize the feelings of many 
Catholics, and for that matter, many Americans.  Far from wanting abortion illegal, Clinton 
simply wanted to make abortions rare.  By comparison, both Gore and Kerry failed to articulate 
this point with the public, and ultimately failed to connect with Catholic voters in the same way 
Clinton had. 
 
Evangelical Voters and the Election of George W. Bush 
 
After eight years of Ronald Reagan, and with the ultimate failure of Pat Robertson‘s 
presidential bid, evangelical voters faced an unhappy reality in 1988.  Despite their growing 
influence and the early success of Robertson‘s bid for president, vice-president George Bush had 
won the Republican nomination.  Acknowledging his own inability to appeal directly to 
evangelicals, and recognizing the growing importance this group now exercised within the 
American electorate, George Bush saw little choice but to rely on his eldest son to act as a 
surrogate on his behalf.  To assist in this task, the younger Bush came to work closely with Doug 
Wead, a close advisor to the vice-president.  Together, these men understood how the marketing 
of moral values, which by the end of the 1980s was a common feature on religious broadcasts, 
was helping to recast Christian identities.  Furthermore, Bush and Wead were amply aware that a 
new Christian Right was coming to the fore, and that this group had its own subculture ―with its 
own myths, its own language, its own heroes and villains and its own nonnegotiable political 
129 
 
issues.‖257  To succeed in their task, the two men decided it was better not to have the elder Bush 
make overt gestures of his own religious faith, as they feared it might be seen as insincere and 
unauthentic.  Instead they chose to focus their attention on amplifying Dukakis‘s  religious 
shortcomings.  With Dukakis being secular, this job proved easy enough.  In 1992, however, the 
Democrats nominated an evangelical of their own, and Bush was defeated when some 19 % of 
evangelical votes shifted from the Republican column to the Democratic.
258
 
Seven years later, while attending Sunday service at Park Methodist Church in Dallas 
with his mother Barbara, George W. Bush heard Pastor Mark Craig preach a ―rather pointed 
sermon about Moses‘ reluctance to lead his people.‖259  Following the sermon, Bush reportedly 
called James Robinson, a conservative Southern Baptist televangelist and said, ―I‘ve heard the 
call....I believe God wants me to run for president.‖260  From there, Bush began to assemble an 
experienced team of political strategists and pollsters, led by Karl Rove.  To ensure the 
nomination went smoothly, Rove busied himself securing endorsements from key Republican 
officials and orchestrating ―a campaign to woo powerhouse pastors and Christian Right 
leaders,‖261 a constituency Rove correctly surmised held the success of his candidate in the 
balance.  Yet courting evangelicals posed sizable risks for the then Texas governor.  In making 
too concerted a push for this group, the Bush campaign ran the risk of alienating moderate 
Americans, who, while largely church goers themselves, where nonetheless made uneasy by 
some of the more extreme positions of the Christian Right.  This became a central dilemma of 
the campaign as they struggled to navigate the political waters between Christian conservatives 
and more moderate and secular voters.  To address this problem, the campaign relied heavily on 
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the art of narrowcasting, whereby political messages are tweaked depending upon the audience 
one is addressing.  In putting theory to practice, Bush, while continuing to speak openly about 
his faith, nevertheless toned down his remarks at nearly every major campaign event.  To casual 
observers, Bush‘s rather benign religious statements were seen as political ploys aimed to remind 
the electorate of the ethical shortcoming of President Bill Clinton.  And while these remarks 
certainly served this end, they had deeper meanings that were accessible only to those who knew 
what to listen for.  When the time came for Bush to focus more ardently on religious voters, he 
purposely chose more narrowly targeted press outlets such as Christianity Today and the World 
magazine.  These outlets were not only widely read by evangelical Christians but were also 
largely ignored by the mainstream press. 
In addition to these efforts, the Bush campaign, with help from the Republican National 
Committee (RNC), was also busy courting Catholic voters.  In 1998, for instance, the RNC 
launched a Catholic Task Force to drum-up support for the party in the upcoming presidential 
election.  Concentrating initially on Rust Belt states, the RNC hoped this task force would lure 
back those Reagan Democrats whom the party believed had soft support for the current 
Democrats.  Their technique was to deploy staff members on the ground with the job to make 
contact with Catholic congregations and compile a list of Catholic voters.  By 2000, the party‘s 
Catholic outreach ―expanded into such states as Florida, New Jersey, and Louisiana.‖262  By the 
end of the 2000 election cycle, the RNC ―had a list of 3 million church-attending Catholics who 
were the targets of a $2.5 million direct-mail and out-reach effort.‖263  In addition to these 
mailings, Catholics on the Task Force‘s list similarly received a minimum of two campaign 
phone calls and were often asked to identify other voters on behalf of the Bush campaign. 
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Yet despite these outreach efforts and the aura of inevitability which the Bush campaign 
worked tirelessly to construct, the Arizona Senator John McCain managed an insurgent 
candidacy that caught many in the Bush camp by surprise.  When McCain scored an impressive 
victory in the New Hampshire Republican Primary, ―Rove immediately dispatched his candidate 
to speak at Bob Jones University, a fundamentalist Christian college based in South Carolina.‖264  
For moderates, this act, while questionable, was largely dismissed as necessary courting for an 
electoral base Bush desperately needed in that state‘s conservative primary.  By moving to the 
right, a tactic Bush often used whenever he found himself in political trouble, his campaign 
managed to score a decisive victory in South Carolina.  McCain rallied with an unexpected win 
in Michigan (an open Republican primary in which more non-Republicans voted than 
Republicans) and in his home state of Arizona.  But these victories proved short lived after 
McCain attacked evangelical leaders as ―agents of intolerance.‖265  Following these remarks, 
McCain found himself lacking the necessary support to further challenge Bush as several closed 
primaries loomed near.
266
  By the end of the night on Super Tuesday, Bush emerged the clear 
frontrunner and party favorite to challenge sitting vice-president Albert Gore.
267
  As history 
would have it, the 2000 presidential race would be one of the closest ever.  While Bush 
ultimately emerged the victor, he did so lacking a clear mandate.  To help heal the divisions of a 
bitterly divided country, Bush gave numerous assurances that he would govern from the middle.  
Yet while the press made much over Bush‘s sliver thin margin of victory—a mere five electoral 
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votes and the loss of the popular vote by more than half a million—another more troublesome 
story had developed for Democrats. 
While Democrats had long acknowledged that the party had lost sizable ground with 
religious voters, many were surprised to learn just how deep those losses actually were.  Among 
weekly churchgoers, Bush had beat Gore by 30 points and had won two-thirds of those voters 
who ―described the nation‘s moral climate as off on the wrong direction.‖268  In addition, Bush 
bested even Reagan amongst white evangelical voters, capturing 75% of that voting bloc.
269
  
Furthermore, in what has become a testament to the power of Christian Right organizations to 
mobilize this base, one poll showed that 79% of evangelicals who voted for Bush did so after 
being contacted ―at least once by a religious right organization.‖270  Problematic for Gore was his 
net capture of just 50% of Catholic voters, down four points from the previous election cycle.
271
  
Yet as startling as these numbers were, the so-called ‗God Gap‘ would only worsen.  Democrats 
were again reminded in 2004 of just how important faith is to the American people. 
 
The 2004 Presidential Race 
 
For a brief flash on November 2
nd
 2004, it appeared Massachusetts Senator John Kerry 
would be elected the nation‘s 44th president.  Nearly every poll prior to the election showed a 
very tight race, and early exit polling data on the morning of the election indicated a Democratic 
victory.  Had Kerry won, few would have been surprised by the result as Bush was contending 
both with a sagging economy and what was daily becoming a more and more unpopular war in 
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Iraq.  When Kerry lost, however, many were stunned to learn that cultural values had been the 
single most important issue for the electorate.
272
  Yet this result was precisely what Rove had 
been aiming for.  Following the tightly contested 2000 presidential election, Rove estimated that 
some ―four million evangelical Christians had stayed at home‖273 rather than vote on election-
day.  Rove recognized that the key to Bush‘s re-election was in to mobilize these voters to the 
polls the next time around.  To achieve this task, the president and his team undertook one of the 
most extensive religious courtships in American history.  That courtship began in Bush‘s first 
full week in office; more particularly on January 22
nd
 2001, the 28
th
 anniversary of Roe V. Wade.  
By executive order, Bush reinstated Ronald Reagan‘s global gag rule, effectively 
forbidding any foreign health agency receiving American aid to provide abortion services or 
even abortion information.  Months later, and after several meetings with religious groups, Bush 
announced that he would also forbid the use of federal dollars to fund future research into 
embryonic stem cells.  This decision further solidified the support of America‘s most listened to 
evangelical, the Rev. James Dobson of Focus on the Family, who noted, ―needless to say, I was 
elated to learn, that contrary to our fears, Mr. Bush was planning to act on behalf of unborn 
life.‖274  Yet as important as these actions were to the base, Bush made his largest religious gains 
on another two issues.  One of these, Bush‘s Faith-Based Initiatives, had been long in 
development and even served as the centerpiece of the previous campaign.  The other, gay 
marriage, came courtesy of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, and caught many by 
surprise. 
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The reinstatement of the global gag order and the prohibition of federal funding for the 
research of new embryonic stem cell lines made Bush considerable friends among evangelicals.  
Once instated, these executive orders were then paraded before the Christian Right in hopes of 
luring those four million evangelicals Rove so often talked about to the polls.  Yet in energizing 
his own religious base, Bush also managed to mobilize substantial opposition among many in the 
medical profession and in the ranks of various women‘s groups.  In addition to angering these 
constituencies, Bush‘s pandering to the right also succeeded in raising serious suspicions among 
America‘s more moderate electorate, a group who had largely voted for him on the presumption 
that, like them, Bush too was a moderate at heart.  In an effort to counter growing questions and 
sagging approval ratings, the Bush White House sought to make inroads where few Republicans 
dared, namely among Black and Hispanic Americans.   
Going into the 2004 election, the Bush camp knew that winning the support of racial 
minorities was no easy task, particularly the support of black voters.  Bush had, after all, spent 
considerable time and resources campaigning to this constituency in the 2000 general election, 
only to be rewarded with less than 10 % national support.  The key to improving these numbers 
was to show that Bush cared about black people, and so it was that Bush, through his Faith-
Based and Community Initiatives program lavished conservative black preachers and their 
churches with sizable sums of federal money.  This was possible because the Faith-Based and 
Community Initiatives program serves as a federal partnership between government (i.e. 
government money) and those providers most capable of meeting the needs of the poor, namely 
churches in local communities.
275
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Tracking the exact sum of federal grant money distributed through Bush‘s faith-based 
program has proved notoriously difficult, as this money was divided up between various federal 
departments and agencies, as well as each state being provided a lump sum.  In March of 2005, 
however, ―Bush proudly told a conference of religious leaders that the federal government gave 
$2 billion in grants to faith-based groups the year before.‖276  By 2004, some $300 million 
dollars went to promoting healthy marriages and another $75 million for responsible fatherhood, 
two issues that disproportionately affect the black community.
277
  To further assist/court the 
black community, the White House regularly organized a series of seminars throughout black 
neighborhoods that taught community and religious leaders how to apply for and receive federal 
faith-based money.   
Although government grants to religious charities are by no means new, President Bush 
took this practice in unparalleled directions.  As the self-avowed evangelical Amy Sullivan noted 
in a 2004 Washington Monthly article, ―[t]he policy of funding the work of faith-based 
organization has, in the face of slashed social service budgets, devolved into a small pork-barrel 
program that offers token grants to the religious constituencies in Karl Rove‘s electoral plan for 
2004 while making almost no effort to monitor their effectiveness.‖278  John DiIulio, a former 
head of Bush‘s faith-based programs agrees, noting, ―[t]here is no precedent in the modern White 
House for what is going on in this one: a complete lack of a policy apparatus....What you‘ve got 
is everything—and I mean everything—being run by the political arm.  It‘s the reign of the 
Mayberry Machiavellis.‖279  From a governing perspective, what has taken place in the White 
House‘s faith-based program can be considered abhorrent, yet from a political perspective, one 
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would have to say Bush‘s faith-based program was a resounding success. It may well have made 
the difference between victory and defeat. 
In courting black voters, Bush knew he would never win the demographic outright, but in 
tight elections you do not need to win every demographic, sometimes you just need to improve.  
And so it was that through his faith-based grants Bush succeeded in wooing ―black leaders, many 
of them evangelical clergy who lead large congregations.‖280  When on election night it became 
evident that Kerry‘s bid for the White House hinged on his ability to carry the state of Ohio, 
where the election itself was decided by the slimmest of margins, Bush‘s improved showing 
among black voters, a jump of 7 percentage points, proved too steep a hill for Kerry to climb.  
Ultimately, it appears Bush‘s gamble on winning over just enough black voters paid off, as in 
Ohio, this group proved to be a determining factor between a second Bush presidency and a 
Kerry victory.
281
 
In American politics there are arguably few things more important than a well-prepared 
plan.  When it came to religious voters, that is exactly what Bush had, and exactly what Kerry 
lacked.  By expanding his courtship to conservative black churchgoers, and by building upon the 
already impressive religious support generated four years earlier, Bush left nothing to chance.  
To further assist in its religious outreach efforts, the campaign hired a darling of the Christian 
Right, former executive director of the Christian Coalition, and adept political operative, Ralph 
Reed to oversee its efforts.   ―One of the first things Reed did was to appoint chairpersons in each 
of the eighteen battleground states.  In Florida alone, the campaign employed a state chairwoman 
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for evangelical outreach who brought on board outreach chairs in each of Florida‘s sixty-seven 
counties.  Every country chair, in turn, recruited between thirty and fifty volunteers to contact 
and register their evangelical neighbors.‖282 
By contrast, John Kerry had but one staff member responsible for religious outreach, 
Mara Vanderslice, and she received scant party assistance and had no pre-existing database of 
reliable religious allies from which to work.  Yet as bad as all this was for Vanderslice, things 
got significantly worse when Archbishop Raymond Burke declared that John Kerry should be 
denied the Eucharist because of his support for abortion rights. 
Whipped into a frenzy the media launched into what became known as ―Wafer Watch‖ 
and the public quickly began debating the use of Holy Eucharist as a political tool.  Immediately, 
Vanderslice developed a strategy to combat this controversy, which included ―talking points that 
went on the offensive‖ and the promotion of ―Kerry‘s commitment to his Catholic faith.‖283  In 
addition, Vanderslice sought out high-level pro-choice Catholic politicians who were ready to 
make the media rounds.  Surprisingly, for the most part senior Kerry advisors chose to ignore the 
issue believing that it would simply die down.  When questions concerning Kerry‘s Catholic 
credentials did not go away, however, the campaign decided to make one of its few religious 
appeals.  The idea was to organize a national community service day with people of faith just 
weeks before the general election.  The event was called ―People of Faith for Kerry,‖ and it was 
supposed to be covered by the major news outlets in hopes of generating positive press coverage 
for the candidate. But the press never got the memo and subsequently ―not a single reporter or 
photographer showed up to cover the (campaigns) endeavours.‖284  This media failure was a 
direct result of the Kerry communications office, which insisted on controlling all press outreach 
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and refused to allow the volunteers, ―many of whom had relationships with local 
publications,‖285 from contacting the press whatsoever.  When the communications office forgot 
about the event, the public was left in the dark. 
Ultimately, there was little the Kerry campaign could do to prevent the Senator‘s faith 
from emerging as a political issue.  Yet the failure of the campaign to effectively control this 
story is an example of poor managerial judgment and a badly executed plan.  Campaigns need to 
expect the unexpected and be ready to roll with unforeseen developments.  Kerry was 
unsuccessful in doing just this, whereas Bush proved exceptionally adept.  For the Bush team, 
their moment of political genius came in their response to an issue few saw coming. 
In the early days of the 2004 presidential campaign, few political observers foresaw gay 
marriage playing any significant role.  In fact, it was not until the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court on February 3
rd
 of that year ruled in a split decision to expand the state‘s 
definition of marriage to include homosexual couples that the issue even began to register as an 
election year topic.  Yet as viable as gay marriage would ultimately prove to be for Bush, his 
team of senior advisors was initially hesitant to take this issue head-on, as ―60% of voters said 
that they supported same-sex marriage or civil unions.‖286  The problem, the Bush camp knew, 
lay with differentiating support for civil unions and that of same-sex marriage.  By coming out 
too strong against the court‘s decision, Bush ran the risk of offending a substantial portion of the 
American electorate, who when now faced with the topic as never before, might ultimately 
decide to side in support of gay couples.  By remaining quiet, however, Bush would come off as 
insincere and unsupportive of the efforts of the Christian Right, an act that could undermine all 
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the work his campaign had done to lure ever more Christian conservatives to his cause.  For 
these reasons, it was not at all surprising that ―Bush was slow to endorse a constitutional 
amendment to define marriage as between a man and a woman.‖287  Yet as calls from Christian 
leaders came pouring in, and as gay couples began lining up outside city hall in San Francisco 
and Portland, Oregon, Bush publicly declared his support for a federal amendment banning 
same-sex marriages.  On July 14
th
, the United States Senate rejected such an amendment, thereby 
leaving little recourse for opponents of same-sex marriage outside the states. 
Although Hawaii and Vermont had already recognized civil unions some years before, 
and a handful of other states already had amendments or laws banning same-sex marriage, most 
states had yet to address the issue of gay marriage in any meaningful way.  Michigan was one of 
the few states that had and how things played out there is telling.  In 2003 State Senator Alan 
Cropsey introduced a bill banning same-sex marriage.  Anticipating a bitter and emotionally 
charged fight, Cropsey, counted on strong support from his state party.  To his surprise, however, 
it was not the Michigan Republican Party that came to his aide, but rather the Roman Catholic 
Church, which spent nearly a million dollars in an effort that secured the passage of his bill.
288
  
One year later, a similar story played out, though this time across 13 different states (11 on 
election-day).  In these contests the untold story of the 2004 election ―is that evangelical 
Christian groups were often more aggressive and sometimes better organized on the ground than 
the Bush campaign....[I]n many respects, Christian activists led the charge that GOP operatives 
followed and capitalized upon.‖289  In many instances, scores of clergy members went as far as to 
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attend ―legal sessions explaining how they could talk about the election from the pulpit.‖290  
Similarly, countless churches launched voter registration drives and issued countless voter guides 
instructing congregants on how to vote, with the Christian Coalition alone mailing some ―30 
million voter guides in 2004.‖291   As such, states with gay marriage ballot propositions provided 
Bush with just the issue needed to drive evangelicals to the polls.  Furthermore, evidence seems 
to suggest that while gay marriage mobilized Christian conservatives behind Bush, it had an 
opposite, demobilizing effect on secular voters, a demographic with which Democrats enjoy 
sizable support, thus damping secular turnout and Kerry support.
292
 
On this single issue more than any other, evangelicals mobilized in ways never before 
seen in the whole of American history.  While Kerry supporters were busy phone banking and 
knocking on doors, Bush increasingly came to rely on the strength of the Christian Right.  As 
would be the case, Bush‘s re-election efforts were not particularly stealthy, as some Democrats 
have surmised.  His efforts were simply taking place where most secular Americans never dared 
venture: churches and mega-churches around the country.
293
 
 
Is There a Changing Evangelical Landscape? 
 
When elections are decided by the narrowest of margins, any shift of support often 
proves consequential.  In both the 2000 and 2004 presidential cycles, religious support for the 
Democratic nominee steadily ebbed when compared to Bill Clinton‘s re-election of 1996.  In 
1996, Clinton enjoyed the support of 54% of all voting Catholics and 32% of evangelical voters.  
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In 2000, by contrast, Gore‘s share of religious support had slipped to 50% among Catholics and 
28% among evangelicals.  By 2004 those figures were down even further, when Kerry received a 
mere 46% of the Catholic vote and an anemic 22% of evangelicals.
294
  Following these losses, 
many Democrats began to take seriously the party‘s ineffectiveness in wooing religious voters 
and once again made religious outreach a top priority. 
Leading this charge has been Common Good Strategies (now the Eleison Group), which 
is to date the only Democratic consultancy firm specializing in religious outreach.  With their 
help, Democrats have begun to amass an impressive string of electoral victories as an increasing 
number of religious voters in key districts and swing states are once again pulling the lever for 
Democratic candidates.  Most notable among recent victories was the 2006 re-election of 
Michigan governor, Jennifer Granholm, who, despite presiding over an ailing economy in her 
first-term, was able to run and win on a pro-choice, pro-gay rights platform while capturing 47% 
of the evangelical vote.  The secrets to Granholm‘s success lay with her willingness to speak 
openly about her faith and to personally engage evangelicals on their own turf.  Similar stories 
have likewise played out for other Democrats willing to follow comparable campaign strategies.  
In Ohio, Governor Ted Scrickland frequently visited churches, engaged congregants and spoke 
of abortion reduction, rather than simply labeling himself as pro-choice.  In addition to these 
efforts, Strickland also harnessed the power of Christian radio and did so early.
295
    
In learning important lessons since 2004, Democrats have increased willingness to 
engage the religious voter and gradually opened up about their faith.  Campaign stops at 
churches and synagogues are an important aspect of this outreach, as they not only place the 
candidates among actual voters, but they also provide excellent photo ops and are often covered 
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by both conventional and religious press.  In addition, Democratic candidates are increasingly 
spending money advertising on Christian media outlets, while the national party now promotes 
the use of Christian radio as effective venue for candidates to reach voters.
296
  Furthermore, there 
are fresh signs that the religious left is ending its long-time silence and beginning to mobilize.  
For instance, an organization called Jim Wallis‘s Sojourners has for the past several years busied 
itself organizing rallies and conferences around the country, raising funds and running ads in 
hundreds of local newspapers, as well as having launched an extensive voter registration drive in 
time for the 2008 presidential election.  Similarly, a group of three Catholic friends angered by 
the willingness of some Catholic priests to use communion as a weapon subsequently launched 
the Catholic Voting Project website, which allows ―visitors to take an online quiz to see how 
their positions [match] up with those of the Church.‖297  From there, site visitors are then able to 
see how their positions compare against political candidates.  
During the 2008 presidential campaign, Barack Obama launched an all out offensive to 
bring religious voters back to the Democratic Party.  For instance, when he first introduced 
himself to the nation at the 2004 Democratic National Convention, Obama inserted several 
religious references, such as ―I am my brother‘s keeper‖ into his speech, and at one point even 
drew from the lyrics of a famous church camp song when he declared he worshiped ―an 
awesome God.‖298  The use of such rhetoric, as well as a willingness by Obama to cast several 
political issues in a religious context (as he has so often done with the environment), strikes an 
important chord among evangelical voters, particularly younger ones, who unlike their parent are 
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more likely to be working towards the eradication of poverty or the preservation of the natural 
environment, rather than picketing abortion clinics.  To this end Obama launched his religious 
outreach offensive, once called the ―The Joshua Generation Project,‖ which aimed to specifically 
―solicit, engage, and win the votes of young evangelicals, young Catholics, and ‗people of 
faith,‘‖299 through a series of house parties, blogs, concerts, and more.300  Speaking directly of 
this endeavor, Obama stressed: 
 
I'm here because somebody marched. I'm here because you all sacrificed for me. I 
stand on the shoulders of giants. I thank the Moses generation; but we've got to 
remember, now, that Joshua still had a job to do. As great as Moses was, despite 
all that he did, leading a people out of bondage, he didn't cross over the river to 
see the Promised Land. God told him your job is done. You'll see it. You'll be at 
the mountaintop and you can see what I've promised. What I've promised to 
Abraham and Isaac and Jacob. You will see that I've fulfilled that promise but you 
won't go there. We're going to leave it to the Joshua generation to make sure it 
happens. There are still battles that need to be fought; some rivers that need to be 
crossed. Like Moses, the task was passed on to those who might not have been as 
deserving, might not have been as courageous, find themselves in front of the 
risks that their parents and grandparents and great grandparents had taken. That 
doesn't mean that they don't still have a burden to shoulder, that they don't have 
some responsibilities. The previous generation, the Moses generation, pointed the 
way. They took us 90% of the way there. We still got that 10% in order to cross 
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over to the other side. So the question, I guess, that I have today is what's called 
of us in this Joshua generation? What do we do in order to fulfill that legacy; to 
fulfill the obligations and the debt that we owe to those who allowed us to be here 
today?
301
 
 
Overall, Obama‘s effort to tap the religious vote seems to have paid off.  Although he has 
yet to reach the marks set by Clinton, he has nonetheless made substantial inroads and improved 
upon Kerry‘s 2004 showing.  Moreover, given Obama‘s willingness to engage religious voters, 
coupled with the new social and political concerns of the so-called Joshua Generation, new 
political calculations are indeed needed. 
 
Conclusion 
   
As this chapter has shown, communication technologies played a crucial role in both the 
rise and homogenization of American evangelical Christianity.  At the same time, these 
developments did not occur in a social vacuum, but were rather a part of a broader historical 
narrative.  Collectively, this information provides a more accurate picture regarding the means 
by which the Christian Right was able to assert such tremendous influence over the American 
political process.  However, as this chapter has also shown, society is anything but static and as 
our story continues to unfold, we must occasionally pause to reexamine previously held truths.  
For instance, with the advent of the Internet, elite control over the flow of communication has 
been disrupted, giving voice to previously voiceless people.  One result of this development has 
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been the rise of new religious movements such as creation care and the emerging church, both of 
which are increasingly challenging the cultural supremacy of the Christian Right by placing 
significant new emphasis on issues previously ignored by the established evangelical vanguard.  
Much of this has occurred because ―rather than promoting consensus and the resolution of 
conflict in accordance with shared values, the Internet provides a site where virtual individualism 
exists in primacy over the reality of geographical and political boundaries.  It is through these 
virtual meeting places that opinion may be formed, and become collective without reference to 
traditional actors.‖302  As evangelicals come to increasingly rely on the Internet as a means of 
communication and organization, the influence of the Christian Right will continue to be 
diminished. 
If history is to serve as any barometer, the effects of the new media environment on 
religious communities will be no less revolutionary than those brought about by previous media 
regimes.  By applying prevailing theories of how the Internet is affecting aggregate levels of 
social capital, civic engagement and mobilization to on-the-ground developments of the 
evangelical tradition, this thesis can better explore how changing communication technologies 
are affecting the interplay between religion and politics in the United States.  It simultaneously 
tests crucial hypotheses, such as whether Bimber‘s theory of accelerated pluralism can account 
for recent fragmentation within the evangelical community, as well as the extent to which face-
to-face interactions remain an important feature in expanding religious movements. 
Whatever the results of this investigations may be, there are two truths that seem to 
logically imply a third.  First, America has long been a nation of religious adherents.  The 
American political processes and its governing bodies are largely characterized by prevailing 
                                                 
302
 Heather Savigny, ―Public Opinion, Political Communication and the Internet,‖ Politics 22, no. 1 (2002): 7 of 1-8. 
 
 
146 
 
religious views.  Politicians who tread on faith, or who fail to tap America‘s ground swell of 
religious support, do so at their own political peril.  Second, Internet technologies are not only 
revolutionizing the way in which politics is conducted, but are also changing the way we live our 
lives and interact with those around us.  These facts are not mutually exclusive, but rather occur 
simultaneously in contested social settings.  In identifying the importance of past social forces 
and/or historical patterns, scholars are able to provide critical insight into the structures 
governing contemporary society and better evaluate how changes to these structures might affect 
society more broadly.  Thus the implied third truth is that political parties and politicians would 
be wise to understand how the new media environment is affecting the religious views and 
practices of Americans, as such knowledge would greatly benefit policy makers and activists 
alike.  The chapters that follow navigate this winding path, and will examine previously 
unexplored consequences of the changing media landscape on the interplay between religion and 
politics. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
FROM MONOLOGUE TO DIALOGUE PART I: 
 
HOW THE INTERNET IS EMPOWERING THE EVANGELICAL PERIPHERY 
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By its nature, civil society is a forum through which competing interests vie for broader 
public support.  As the public is itself ever fluid and evolving, this fact renders the cultural 
dimensions of a given society as anything but static.  In the United States, evangelical Christians 
have long enjoyed considerable political influence and evangelical Christianity serves as an 
important source of identity for millions of Americans.  To presume, however, that all 
evangelicals are theologically and doctrinally similar would be a fallacy of grave proportions.  
As the previous two chapters have already highlighted, evangelical Christianity, as a whole, is a 
diverse group of religious adherents, some belonging to established denominations, others not; 
yet each member brings with them a unique history, tradition and set of beliefs.  In spite of these 
many differences, over the past 30 years evangelicals have coalesced behind conservative 
political causes and have emerged as a crucial electoral base for the Republican Party.  Much of 
this political unification is the result of deliberate efforts by evangelical leaders to strengthen the 
bonds of kinship and to increase trust and social capital among American evangelicals, and was 
achieved in part through the heavy use of broadcast media.  To help illustrate the extent to which 
these efforts have been successful, it is worth considering this simple fact:  In 2004 some 26.5 
million self-described evangelicals cast their ballet to re-elect George W. Bush.  As a percentage 
of the overall voting electorate, those 26.5 million votes accounted for slightly more than one-
fifth of all votes cast in the 2004 general election, and 43% of Bush‘s vote total.  As a voting 
bloc, evangelicals supported Bush over Kerry 78% to 21%.
303
 
 Kerry‘s anemic support among evangelical voters was but a continuation of a larger 
electoral trend that saw Democrats lose ground among this constituency in every presidential 
election since 1992.  To address this political disadvantage, Democrats in both the 2006 and 
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2008 elections undertook an extensive faith-based voter outreach initiative, the likes of which 
had never before been attempted by the party.  As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, 
evidence from the 2008 general election suggests these efforts may be starting to close the God 
Gap.  However, the fact that evangelicals remain a reliable pillar of Republican support suggests 
the evangelical voting bloc may have an impenetrable Republican foundation.  Yet as this and 
other chapters will demonstrate, the Republican ground occupied by the American evangelical 
community may not be as solid as once thought.  This is so because in contrast to the likes of Pat 
Robertson, James Dobson and Jerry Falwell, three men who worked tirelessly to cultivate a 
conservative religious movement in the United States, many of today‘s emerging evangelical 
leaders are calling conservative evangelical Christianity to task.   While leaders such as Brain 
McLaren and Richard Cizik, and groups such as Emergent Village and the Evangelical 
Environmental Network, serve niche theological interests, they are also creating considerable 
internal evangelical division and deepening theological disputes.  In this regard, these groups and 
their leadership pose a far more serious threat to the unity of the Christian Right than do outside 
forces.  Furthermore, if history serves as any barometer it is unlikely that recent advances in 
communication technologies will leave the evangelical community unchanged.  While past 
technologies, such as broadcast media, helped to establish the political and cultural dominance of 
the Christian Right, these technologies have since been surpassed by newer communication 
technologies.  As a result, the monologue that for so long served to silence cultural dissent has 
since given way to a more organic and authentic dialogue. 
This chapter proceeds by continuing the exploration of how broadcast media encourages 
the homogenization of political views and social values.  It then contrasts this effect with that of 
new media, which provide consumers with an abundance of choice, as well as an effective 
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platform from which dissident cultural elements can organize their efforts, mobilize supporters 
and expand their base.  Specifically, this chapter explores the role the Internet has played in the 
rise of the creation care and emerging church movements, by providing first-hand accounts from 
on-the-ground activists.  From there, this chapter looks into the possible cognitive effects of 
electronic media and presents arguments suggesting that the evangelical community has been 
greatly affected by a societal shift from a predominantly typographic print-based culture to that 
of an electronic image based culture.  It then places these arguments within the broader 
discussion of how the Internet is affecting relative trust levels and evangelical social capital, 
while simultaneously changing evangelical cultural attitudes, thus disrupting the monologue of 
the Christian Right. 
 
Broadcast Media, Mobilization and the Faithful 
 
For purposes of mobilization, religion often serves as an important motivating factor due 
to the value framework it provides its adherents.  In this respect, religious zeal often negates the 
necessity for the incentives that might otherwise be needed to compel an individual to action.  
Yet religious zeal is not the only advantage favoring religious mobilization.  As discussed in 
Chapter 3, Marostica argues that religious organizations have inherent advantages that their 
secular counter-parts often lack.
304
  For starters, religious organizations have leaders capable of 
using their holy status to further various ends.  Assisting the causes of these leaders is a strong 
sense of collective identity, well-developed ideologies and a passionate fellowship base.  
Moreover, many of the monetary needs of religious movements can be readily addressed through 
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pre-existing mechanisms such tithes and offerings.  Moreover, the public nature by which such 
tithes and offerings are collected creates considerable onus on individual members to give, which 
in-turn increases one‘s sense of belonging to the group and greatly mitigates the so-called ‗free-
rider‘ effect.  Collectively, these advantages, when coupled with the deeply held worldviews of 
religious people, inevitably make mobilization less challenging. 
 However, while the mobilization of a single faith community, such as a house of worship 
or even an entire denomination, may be comparatively easy in contrast to secular mobilization 
efforts, uniting multiple religious organizations or denominations is no simple task, particularly 
when each group is confident of its own righteousness. The fact that evangelicals have emerged 
as both a sizable and reliable coalition for conservative candidates and political causes is perhaps 
the single most important development in American politics since Roosevelt solidified union 
support for Democrats in the 1930s.  As the previous chapters have already noted, broadcast 
media, such as radio, television and print, played a crucial role in bringing together the divergent 
factions of the evangelical tradition.  While this much is largely taken for granted today, when 
radio preachers and later televangelists first appeared on the religious horizon, there existed 
considerable concerns that these newer forms of electronic ministry would serve to privatize 
faith and greatly erode the significance of the local church.  For instance, in 1967 Thomas 
Luckmann characterized American faith as an increasingly ―privatized‖ act.305  The crux behind 
Luckmann‘s assertion is that as cities grow and as geographic mobility increases, small 
neighborhoods and communities are replaced with larger, less personal hubs of social 
interactions, such as shopping malls, movie theaters and sports complexes; and all this at a time 
when modern economic life demands the frequent displacement of individuals as jobs change 
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localities and people change careers.  As Americans are uprooted more-and-more from their 
local communities, the ability to form lasting relationships becomes increasingly strained, thus 
testing the ability of religious groups to provide the kind of intimate fellowship that was once 
common place.  All these themes are reminiscent of popular social capital literature, and like 
many of those authors, they too greatly concerned Luckmann.  Confronted with these realities, 
Luckmann concluded that rather than looking outward for spiritual fulfillment, Americans were 
instead being forced to turning inward. 
Of course by the time Luckmann published his thesis in 1967, radio preachers were quite 
prevalent on America‘s radio dials, and the number of televangelist and religious oriented 
television programming was quickly growing.  This fact only added to Luckmann‘s belief in the 
privatization of religious faith.  In addressing Luckmann‘s observation, renowned religious 
scholar Robert Wuthnow notes that one of the key attractions of religious broadcasting is the 
perceived ease by which ties can be severed.  As Wuthnow writes, ―switching television 
channels is a good bit easier than switching churches.‖306  Indeed, the very fact that broadcast 
media provides religious consumers an array of religious options (albeit vastly fewer than those 
available online) lends itself to Luckmann‘s privatization thesis.  As Wuthnow notes in greater 
detail, televangelism allows individuals to: 
‗Shop around‘ until one find just the television preacher who suits one‘s own 
personal tastes without ever leaving the comforts of home.  In addition, the 
opportunity to watch dozens of different programs enhances the likelihood of 
developing a purely idiosyncratic version of faith—a little self-help doctrine from 
Rober Schuller, some political views from Jerry Falwell, and a sense of liturgy 
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from the local parish‘s broadcast.  Furthermore, the lack of feedback and 
interaction that characterizes mass media communication may reinforce 
eclecticism:  lacking opportunity to ask questions, not having to confront others‘ 
views in open discussion, and not having to accept any doctrines or creeds for 
‗membership,‘ the religious television viewer is essentially free to derive his or 
her own interpretations.
307
  
 Yet despite this privatization effect, it has been shown that religious broadcasting does 
not promote the withdrawal of religion into the private sphere; indeed quite the opposite.  In the 
years following the publication of Luckmann‘s thesis, a number of studies have demonstrated a 
positive correlation between increased viewing of religious programming and an increase in both 
bridging and bonding social capital, which has benefited churches and believers alike.  As 
Wuthnow explains further, ―religious television has been used to raise funds and to develop 
mailing lists for political campaign; it has also played a major role in aggregating the resources 
needed to build alternative educational institutions, such as Liberty Baptist College, CBN 
University, and Oral Roberts University.‖308  Moreover, while ―televangelism may siphon some 
support away from local churches…its viewers, supporters and contributors maintain an above 
average level of activity in and contributions to those churches.‖309 
As previously demonstrated, broadcast technologies are uniquely suited to bridge 
denominational divides, which in-turn enhances bridging social capital by mediating shared 
religious experiences, while the religious fervor its audience walks away with after viewing such 
religious programming increases the likelihood that they will further embed themselves in a 
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house of worship, thus strengthening bonding social capital with local parishioners.  Moreover, 
the mainstreaming effect caused by regular television viewing creates a confluence of ideas and 
―a coming-together of attitudes.‖310  These attitudes help shape values and worldviews, which in-
turn inform topics of conversation and direct future civic engagement and aid in mobilization 
efforts.  When these programs are viewed ―heavily‖ and by ―divergent‖ groups, what results is 
the homogenization or ―mainstreaming‖ of political values.  With time, and if left unchecked by 
competing views or claims to truth, these values tend to slide towards the extreme ends of the 
political spectrum.
311
  For instance, when an individual is caught up in the mainstreaming effect, 
they make a habit of seeking information with which they already agree.  The effects of this are 
not unlike an echo-chamber, in that repeated exposure to the same idea or set of ideas, works to 
reinforce and further polarize pre-existing biases.
312
  By appealing to individuals who felt under 
threat by the social upheavals of the 60s and 70s, televangelists in the 80s and 90s helped to 
foster a community of conservative Christians whose numbers grew as viewers increasingly 
gained access to cable television.  All the while, the message of these religious programs 
gradually crept toward the right end of the political spectrum, and was mutually reinforced as it 
got caught up in a feedback loop.
313
  As such, the consolidation of evangelical political capital 
following the rapid growth of televangelism serves as a prime example of how broadcast media 
can positively impact both bonding and bridging social capital.  The bonding aspect comes into 
play by bringing new religious converts to the evangelical community, and similarly mediates 
shared religious experiences, all while deepening the religious passions of existing adherents.  
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Conversely, the advent of televangelism helped in no small part to bridge denominational and 
theological divides, and further unified a broad swath of conservative religious believers.  
A more recent development in the world of televangelism, and one which further aides 
the mainstreaming effect, has been the growing sophistication of electronic Christian broadcasts.  
In an effort to better meet the entertainment demands of the evangelical community, a growing 
number of Christian Networks have been producing scripted shows and full-length feature films, 
while an increasing number of traditional ministries have been taking their cues from the likes of 
the CBN and TBN and have begun experimenting with broadcast media in their own right.  For 
instance, 2008 saw the cinematic wide-release of Fireproof, a film starring Kirk Cameron who 
plays a fire fighter whose marriage is on the brink of divorce.  When Fireproof was released, it 
opened at number four in the nation, beating out Spike Lee‘s Miracle of Saint Anna.  By the end 
of the year, Fireproof’s box office take totaled more than $33 million, a hefty profit for a film 
that cost only $500,000 to produce.  What is perhaps even more astonishing than the profitability 
of Fireproof, is the fact that it was not made by any Hollywood studio, but rather by the 
Sherwood Baptist Church of Albany, Georgia.
314
  
Steve Morales, executive director of the Franklin Springs Family Media Fund, attributes 
much of the success of Fireproof to its positive Christ centered focus, arguing that when it comes 
to such films, there is simply a lack in the market.
315
  Yet by merely producing a film that 
appeals to evangelical values, movie studios are not guaranteeing the films success.  What 
undoubtedly aided Fireproof’s box office success was a deliberate promotional strategy similar 
to the one used by Mel Gibson in the promotion of The Passion of the Christ.  Instead of 
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spending limited resources on a more traditional glitzy ad campaign, as most studios do, the 
makers of Fireproof held hundreds of advance screenings for various church leaders.  In turn, 
these religious leaders spread the word to their own congregations, and encouraged them to see 
the movie for themselves.
316
  This sort of promotional advertising relies on a theory known as 
―significant others.‖  As Watson states, ―[i]t is useful to remind ourselves that audiences have 
their own lived experience to connect with the mediated experience...and an important part of 
that lived experience is other people who make up a context of influences equal to and often 
more powerful than those of the media themselves.‖317  As such, individuals are more likely to 
be persuaded by the opinions of others whom they hold in high regard.  Thus, when a respected 
church elder encourages their congregation to go and see a film, theories of social capital suggest 
that the members of that congregation will do just that.  The empirical evidence concurs. 
 
How Media are Changing the Church 
 
In 2003, the Anglican Communion was ablaze in controversy after the New Hampshire 
Diocese of the United States Episcopal Church elected Gene Robinson, an openly gay and 
practicing clergyman, to be the diocese‘s next bishop.  For many conservative church leaders and 
adherents, the election of Robinson was nothing short of blasphemous and served as further 
evidence that the Episcopal Church was straying too far from biblical principles.   
In an effort to maintain peace within the church, Archbishop Rowan Williams, head of 
the global Anglican Communion, ―persuaded Anglicans to observe three temporary bans on 
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emotive issues such as sending clergy to another country without its agreement, electing openly 
homosexual priests, or blessing same-sex unions while a more permanent structure to resolve 
disagreements is put in place.‖318  Yet these moratoriums were largely ignored, and as a partial 
consequence a number of church parishes absolved their ties with the American Episcopal 
Church.  Among them was a group of Virginia parishes that in 2007 voted to join the 
Convocation of Anglicans in North America (CANA), a group placing themselves under the 
leadership of the Nigerian Anglican Church and its bishop Peter Akinola, a vocal opponent of 
gay rights.  In choosing to join CANA, however, these Virginia parishes were doing much more 
than simply voicing their dissatisfaction with the American Episcopal Church, they were also 
challenging the very notion that geographical space ought to be a central principle for church 
organization.  As Clay Shirky aptly notes:  
 
In a world where group action means gathering face-to-face, people who need to 
act as a group should, ideally be physically near one another.  Now that we have 
ridiculously easy group-forming, however, that stricture is relaxed, and the result 
is that organizations that assume geography as a core organizing principle, even 
ones that have been operating that way for centuries, are now facing challenges to 
that previously bedrock principle.
319
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Since the 2007 vote, the premise that geographic space ought to serve as the organizational 
premise of the Anglican Communion has come under further assault with the formation of the 
Anglican Church in North America (ACNA), a proposed alternative to the U.S. Episcopal 
Province, which if recognized, would mark the first time a province has been defined by 
theological persuasion rather than geographic location. 
To be certain, theological disputes have a long history of dividing religious bodies and 
the Anglican Communion serves as a prime example.  But what is unique about the current 
struggles of the American Episcopal Church is the extent to which the dissident cultural element 
refuses to walk away.  Historically, when such disputes arise, particularly within protestant 
Christianity, the dissident theological group breaks free of the mother church and forms its own 
denomination.  Yet ACNA has not done this.  Instead it fights to be a recognized religious 
alternative within the Anglican Communion.  At the same time, officially sanctioned provinces 
such as Nigeria and Uganda not only maintain full communion with ACNA, but in the case of 
Nigeria, further impugn the authority of American Episcopal province by serving as the nominal 
head of several parishes within the American domain.   
Rather than an anomaly, the recent struggles of the Anglican Communion could be a sign 
of things to come.  In a world where recent innovations have dramatically compressed both space 
and time, which by itself challenges the importance of geographic borders, the Internet, as Cass 
Sunstein notes, affords individuals the opportunity to connect with other people with shared 
interests, ―no matter how specialized, no matter how weird, no matter how big or how small.‖ 320  
To be certain, there is no shortage of Christians opposed to gay sacramental rights, particularly in 
Virginia, but as Marshal Van Alstyne and Erik Brynjolfsson also note, because the Internet 
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makes it easier to find like-minded individuals, ―it can facilitate the creation and strength of 
fringe communities that have a common ideology but are dispersed geographically.‖ 321  Thus in 
connecting dissident religious elements, as well as providing the means to contest religious 
authority and accepted cultural orthodoxy, the Internet, as we have just seen, is capable of 
dramatically reshaping both religion and society.  A driving point of this thesis is that given the 
disproportional influence of the evangelical tradition over the American public it is prudent for 
political scientists and strategist alike to address in detail ways in which the new media 
environment is rapidly reshaping this particular faith tradition.  To illustrate this point further, the 
following section discusses two dissident faith groups whose emergence has been facilitated by 
the Internet. 
 
Evangelical Environmentalism and the Internet 
 
Arguably, the most notable and widely discussed emerging cultural trend among 
evangelicals is the ―care of creation‖ or ―creation care‖ movement.  For groups affiliated with 
this cause, environmental activism is not simply a civic activity, but rather a biblical mandate.  
One of the largest evangelical organizations to take up environmental protection is the 
Evangelical Environmental Network.  Founded by the Rev. Jim Ball in 1993 as an extension of 
ESA, the EEN is a ―non-profit organization that seeks to educate, inspire, and mobilize 
Christians in their effort to care for God's creation, to be faithful stewards of God's provision, 
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and to advocate for actions and policies that honor God and protect the environment.‖322  An 
early manifestation of EEN environmental advocacy appeared in 1996 when congressional 
Republicans tried to overhaul the Endangered Species Act.  The overhaul would have made it 
more difficult to grant federal protection to species threatened with extinction.  Enraged by what 
many evangelicals saw as the attempted trashing of humanity‘s modern day Noah‘s Ark, the 
EEN jumped into action, launching what at the time was an unprecedented environmental 
lobbying effort for evangelicals.  This mobilization of environmental Christians largely stunned 
the GOP, which by 1996 was already considering evangelical support as given.  
In 2002 the EEN rolled out the ‗What Would Jesus Drive?‘ educational campaign, 
―which states that ‗obeying Jesus in our transportation choices is one of the great Christian 
obligations and opportunities of the 21
st
 century.‘‖323  Armed with fact sheets, bumper stickers 
and a host of other church resources, the EEN published books, held conferences and traveled 
the country in an effort to educate congregations about the Bible‘s mandated stewardship of 
God‘s creation.  One result of these efforts, however, was that evangelicals closely aligned with 
the traditional advocacy of the Christian Right began attacking the EEN.  Pat Robertson, for 
instance, stated that, ―the concept of linking Jesus to an anti-SUV campaign borders on 
blasphemy,‖324 while Terry Watkins of Dial-the-Truth-Ministries, also insisted that, ―to degrade 
the Lord Jesus into a[n] environmental-wacko ‗car salesman‘ is beyond simple ignorance – it‘s 
irreverent and it‘s blasphemous.‖325   
More recently, the EEN has teamed up with the National Association of Evangelicals 
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(NAE), the largest representative evangelical body in the country, whose membership includes 
60 different denominations.  In 2006 the NAE, led in large part by Richard Cizik, the NAE‘s 
vice-president of governmental affairs, along with student leaders of the Evangelical Youth 
Climate Initiative, wrote to President Bush and members of Congress urging them to take greater 
action on climate change, stating, ―our allegiance to Jesus Christ demands that the threat of 
climate change no longer be ignored.‖326  Responding to this call, Focus on the Family Chairman 
James Dobson and two-dozen other evangelical leaders called upon the NAE to oust Cizik, as his 
emphasis on climate change was moving support away from the ―great moral issues of our 
time.‖327  However, the NAE did not cave to the demands of the powerful Dobson, and instead 
rebuked Christian Right leaders when it reaffirmed their support for Cizik and his ministries.   
Today, an increasing number of voices are joining Cizik in calling for greater 
environmental protection.  As these voices grow in strength and garner ever more support among 
evangelicals, the embedded nature of its broader community is disrupted, while its stock of social 
capital diminishes.  Evangelical environmentalism represents a cultural chasm between a largely 
younger, more modern evangelical cohort, and that of the older, more established evangelical 
vanguard.  However, while creation care remains a largely divisive issue, it has picked up the 
support of some very important and influential evangelical leaders.  For his part, Pat Robertson 
has since changed his stance on climate change and now speaks regularly about matters of the 
environment on his television show, The 700 Club.  In doing so, Robertson has joined the ranks 
of Billy Graham and Rick Warren, the best-selling author of The Purpose-Driven Life.  Sharing 
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the stage with these men is Restoring Eden founder Peter Illyn. 
At over six feet tall, with a dark scrubby beard and a snakeskin eye patch worn over his 
left eye, Peter Illyn has a presence that is hard to miss.  It is not, however, Illyn‘s physical 
appearance that has garnered him considerable public attention, but rather his activism as an 
evangelical environmentalist.  As Executive Director of Restoring Eden, one of the nation‘s most 
politically active creation care groups, Illyn is at the forefront of one of the most divisive issues 
confronting the American evangelical tradition.  Like most evangelicals, however, Illyn was not 
raised an environmentalist.  Instead, he came to the creation care movement in 1994 after 
embarking upon a four month, 1000 mile llama excursion through the Cascade Mountains; a trek 
he claims left his soul rejuvenated and embedded in him the passion to protect God‘s creation.  
Illyn‘s first taste of political activism came a year later, after Republicans won control of 
Congress and took aim at the Endangered Species Act.  Angered by this action, Illyn, who by 
then had already established some media contacts through his position as a spokesmen for the 
International Llama Association, held a press conference in which he declared, ―My Bible said 
God blessed, protected and made a covenant with all the different species.…What right do I have 
to drive them to extinction?‖328  And this, Illyn says, was the inspiration for his first bumper 
sticker: a salmon inside a Jesus fish, with the words ―Extinction Isn‘t Stewardship.‖  The aim, 
Illyn contends, was to be ―unapologetic, yet winsome.‖329  As Illyn further elaborates, Restoring 
Eden has never wanted to sound, ―shrill,‖ ―strident‖ or ―self-righteous,‖ nor does it want to be 
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―the hippie chick crying because somebody is having a barbeque.‖  At the same time, however, 
Restoring Eden is ―unapologetic that it is wise to take care of the earth.‖330   
Buoyed by a background in marketing as well as nine years as a Pentecostal pastor, Illyn 
was confident he could help grow what was in the mid-nineties an evangelical environmental 
movement still in its infancy.  Yet those early years proved especially difficult.  As Illyn recalls, 
many early activists believed that the creation care movement needed to capitulate to the 
theology of the broader evangelical tradition, a theology that included dominionism.  But Illyn 
has long rejected dominionism, which ―commands the believer to take dominion over God‘s 
creation.‖331  Instead, Illyn is of the opinion that, ―[m]ovements are never born because nobody 
disagrees with them.  They‘re born because you‘ve got a compelling case and a growing group 
of people who share that compelling case.‖332  The difficult part, as Illyn notes, has ―been 
consolidating that compelling case.‖  This, Illyn believes, is where the Internet comes in.   Prior 
to ―email newsletters and the free Internet search engines…you had to stay in touch using 
postage.‖333  For an organization with limited resources, this was a pricy endeavor: ―you‘re 
looking at fifty cents to a dollar just to send a piece of mail to someone, so if you had 5000 
names, you‘re looking at thousands of dollars, ten thousand dollars just to send them something 
twice a year.‖334  And for a lot of years, ―ten thousand dollars was,‖ as Illyn points out, ―the 
majority of our budget.‖335   
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Thus for Illyn, the Internet has proven a boon for creation care groups, as it has provided 
the movement an affordable means both to consolidate and grow what was for a long time a 
―very scattered audience.‖336  This development is in keeping with Bimber‘s contention that: 
 
Communication and information flow will lower the obstacles to grass-roots 
mobilization and organization faced by political entrepreneurs, activists, and 
others, and will speed the flow of politics.  Lower costs of organizing collective 
action offered by the Net will be particularly beneficial for one type of group: 
those outside the boundaries of traditional private and public institutions, those 
not rooted in businesses, professional or occupational membership or the 
constituencies of existing government agencies and programs.
337
 
 
Throughout much of its infancy, creation care occupied space on the evangelical periphery, and 
many of the earliest creation care groups had roots outside of the evangelical tradition.
338
  
However, due to its ability to connect geographically dispersed individuals, the Internet has 
effectively enabled the creation care movement to consolidate.  In an interview with Jason 
Swodoba, a Foursquare pastor and creation care activist, he noted that the Internet has allowed 
him and others like him to connect with the broader evangelical environmental movement in 
ways that would otherwise be impossible.  In this regard, Swodoba, like Illyn, sees the Internet as 
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having played ―a crucial role‖ in his ―eco-theological‖ work, while at the same time, connecting 
―the Diaspora of creation care folks.‖ 339 
Figure 4.1 
Dates Various Creation Care Groups Were Founded 
 
Creation Care Timeline
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*  The above timeline illustrates the rapid acceleration of creation care groups following the widespread public 
penetration of Internet access.  Please note that Emergent Village is in this timeline because although it is not 
specifically a creation care group, its many supporters remain sympathetic to evangelical environmentalism. 
 
 
As the coming chapters will demonstrate in much greater depth, while evangelical 
environmentalism is a large, diverse and growing movement, it is not without its critics, and 
these critics are often fierce in their opposition.  In this regard, it is important to view creation 
care not as a unifying religious movement, but one that for the time being is exacerbating 
tensions within the evangelical tradition. 
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The Emerging Church Movement and the Internet 
 
While many emerging Christians would describe themselves as evangelical or post-
evangelical, followers of this movement, or ―conversation‖ as some prefer, tend to be Christians 
in their 20s and 30s who were raised in the evangelical tradition and who have since become 
―dissatisfied with the dominant expression of ‗contemporary‘ church.‖340  As a result of this 
dissatisfaction, emerging Christians are calling for a radical re-conceptualization of the 
evangelical tradition, one that focuses specific attention on mission work, particularly as it 
applies to the ―post-modern‖ world.  As Amy Green explains, emerging Christians are: 
 
Drawing less from traditional sources such as Sunday services and turning instead 
to friends, online social sites, celebrity pop culture, and podcasts for their 
spirituality.  Often they are cynical of today‘s church leaders but eager to probe, 
discuss, and learn from their teachings.  Politically, they are less motivated by 
issues such as abortion and homosexuality and moved instead by 
environmentalism, genocide in Africa, and poverty.
341
 
 
In placing significant emphasis on issues of poverty, social justice, and the environment, issues 
that have largely been neglected within the evangelical tradition or outright opposed by the 
Christian Right, emerging Christians are working to fundamentally reshape religion in America 
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by removing the ―sterile polarities that have defined the church in the modern era: liberal vs. 
conservative, traditional vs. contemporary, reason vs. experience, faith vs. science, mega church 
vs. maintenance church.‖342   
Like many on the creation care front, emerging Christians view the Internet and its 
networking abilities as a vital tool in organizing their movement and for proselytizing new 
supporters.
343
  Yet far from merely serving as a vehicle by which geographically dispersed 
supporters are connected and new interest groups within the evangelical community grow, the 
Internet also disrupts existing power relations by amplifying voices at the fringe.  Callad Keefe-
Perry is an Emergent Village cohort leader in Rochester, New York.  In an interview he had this 
to say: 
 
So previously if you‘ve got theological questions, you went to the pastor, and if 
you go back hundreds of years, the preacher was the authority on religious matter, 
and up until recently and in certain places that is still the case.  But now what you 
are seeing is these minor voices, [and] some of these people who are speaking at 
the margins are just as acceptable as the monologue.  You can go online and find 
all sorts of things, and there in is the beauty and danger.  You can find whatever 
you want.  So if you‘re not really wanting accountability and you‘re looking like 
you‘re not wanting community, you can find whatever it is you already believe 
and say, ―Wow, I‘m done.‖  But if you‘re responsible with your faith life and you 
want to be engaged in dialogue with…Christian folks, and you want to be 
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challenged by a community of accountability, support and love, then you can find 
some things that might be true and bring it back to a body of folks who are flesh 
and blood and say, ―Here are some things I‘m really grappling with.‖  So it‘s 
made minor voices...that speak from the margins more audible.
344
 
 
Noted emergent author Phyllis Tickle is in agreement with this broader point. As she put it in an 
interview: 
 
As the Internet becomes the place for theological conversation, and as those 
conversation are formed not by seminary trained; and I would say from an 
emergent point of view…we are getting people who realize that they have strong 
opinions or strong questions about theological issues, and that they can ask them 
and decide for themselves on the basis of the conversation which may or may not 
be informed by the academically or theologically trained.
345
 
 
Jim Wallis, another voice of note within the emergent church movement, has similarly taken 
notice of the transformative impact of the new media environment both for people of faith and 
the broader American public.  As Wallis states, ―the Religious Right has been able to win when 
they have been able to maintain and control a monologue on the relationship between faith and 
politics.‖  But this monologue, Wallis contends has eroded with the rise of new evangelical 
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interest groups and interest blocs.  With their arrival, ―the monologue of the Religious Right is 
over, and a new dialogue has begun.‖346 
Not everyone, however, views the Internet as such as the primary driving force of the 
emerging church movement.  Shane Hipps, for instance, views the emerging church as a product 
of a societal shift from a print-based culture to an image-based culture.  As Hipps explains: 
 
What you‟re seeing in the debate between what you might call the modern 
conservative evangelical movement and whatever the emerging church is, what 
you‟re seeing there is actually a debate happening between the right and left 
hemisphere of the brain.  So what the modern evangelical movement, born of a 
very left hemisphere mindset and mentality, which is driven by a left hemisphere 
medium of the printed word, created an understanding of the faith that was 
primarily abstract, individual, doctrinaire, about beliefs and so it perfectly 
mirrored the left hemisphere of the brain which is logical, abstract, rational, 
sequential.  What happened with the rise of television is that it started to activate 
the right hemisphere of the brain in people in our culture.  And the right half of 
our brain is more classically associated with more feminine values, it is more 
relational, it is more intuitive, it is more emotive, it is more experiential, it is non-
linear, it is all those things.  So when a culture shifts from a very dominant left 
hemisphere approach to the brain to a very dominant right hemisphere approach 
to the brain, what we‟ll see are a rise of more feminine values.  And what‟s 
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interesting about the rise of the emerging church is all of their language, all of 
their patterns; all of the things they talk about are directly correlated with 
feminine values.  So there‟s this collapse of hierarchies, an appreciation for 
egalitarianism, a preference for community over individualism, which is a very 
feminine value, a longing for experience, which is a feminine connectedness, 
often it‟s in the body, it‟s a bodily connection, which is a feminine value, versus 
something that takes place primarily in the mind, in the intellect, through reason, 
through cognitive decent, which is classically associated with masculine values.  
And so from my perspective, what I think is interesting, is so many people are 
tying what‟s happening now with the Internet, when in reality what‟s happening 
now is merely a consequence of something that happened decades before.
347
 
 
Yet Hipps has not dismissed the role of the Internet in reshaping the religious experience.  
Instead, he cautions that many of the changes that we might otherwise attribute to the Internet are 
instead the result of processes that have long been in play.  For Hipps, the Internet‘s true impact 
is in its ability to blend the cultural preferences of the right and left-brain.   
 
So one of the things that‟s interesting about the Internet is that it‟s retrieving 
textuality that was lost for a period of twenty or thirty years.  Literacy rates were 
plummeting for a reason and now they are rising again but in a totally different 
way.  It‟s like a reinvented kind of textuality.  In some ways it‟s almost 
paradoxically a right hemisphere approach to writing and textuality.  It is non-
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linear; it is sort of all about interconnectedness rather than non-sequential 
successive paragraphs and pages, which the left hemisphere feasts on, which the 
left hemisphere loves.  So a lot of my interest and approach is exploring what was 
in the modern era a tyranny of the left-brain, and what is emerging now, which is 
the potential for a tyranny of the right-brain.  And what‟s fascinating is the human 
brain has found a natural ecology between these two totally opposing 
hemispheres, but for some reason the human cultures we experience have not 
found a way to have a natural ecology.
348
 
 
And this inability to merge the cultural preferences of the right or left-brain has left a profound 
mark on religion.  As Hipps concludes, “a very left hemisphere approach to faith is deeply 
suspicious and terrified of a right hemisphere approach to faith and the right hemisphere 
approach to faith is deeply angered by and feels oppressed by the left hemisphere approach to 
faith.”349 
 Hipps is hardly alone in discussing how the relationship between media and the right and 
left hemispheres of the brain impact on society and religion.  In The Medium is the Message, 
author Marshall McLuhan notes that cultures that do not utilize reading and writing have vastly 
different perceptions of the world than those cultures which do.
350
  With the advent of radio, 
television and the computer, McLuhan argues that humanity has entered the age of the “global 
village” in which humans are once again communicating face-to-face rather than through the 
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printed word,
351
 and these face-to-face communications alter considerably one‟s response to a 
given message.  For instance, before the Vietnam War, wars were reported through the print 
media with still photos and written stories.  This sort of reporting was processed in the logical 
left hemisphere of the brain.  By contrast, advances in electronic media meant that the Vietnam 
War was broadcast into the homes of Americans.  This sort of broadcasting appealed to the more 
visual oriented right brain hemisphere, which is more apt to illicit an emotional, less rational 
response.
352
  As McLuhan points out, the electronic age has brought the human mind back into 
balance and awareness in that it encourages both logic and intuition.  From a religious 
perspective, Campbell argues that this newly actualized balance, or what he refers to as “whole 
brain” thinking, better enables the devout to appreciate both the visions and doctrines of religious 
life.  “It may be no accident,” Campbell contends, “that along with the new age of electronics we 
are witnessing the new age of meditative prayer, exploring the spiritual dimensions of existence, 
and teaching that silence may be even more important than verbalization.”353  
As our online practices would suggest, consumers are increasingly turning to the World 
Wide Web, not only to “participate in networks and interest communities that would [otherwise] 
be unavailable,”354 but also to get our daily fix of audio and visual broadcasts.  For instance, up 
until this last decade, living rooms often served as a place where families would gather to watch 
the latest network offerings.  Today, however, this is less the case.  For instance, while living 
rooms may continue to serve as a point of communal gathering, many American families are not 
sharing the same mediated experience, as Internet related technologies increasingly serve to 
tailor content to the interests of the individual.  Thus in today‟s living room, it is not unlikely to 
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see dad live streaming Monday Night Football to his laptop, while mom reads the latest thriller 
downloaded to her Kindle or iPad, while their son dons his World of Warcraft avatar and their 
daughter chats with her friends via Facebook.  In this regard, the Internet has evolved to be a 
one-stop destination for both textual and visual media.  It is also a medium that serves as an 
important anchor for communities and interest groups on society‟s periphery.  As will be further 
explored, the ability of the Internet to overcome obstacles such as geographic space and social 
acceptability has played a crucial role in the rise of the creation care and emerging church 
movements.  This is in itself a profoundly important point, for while the electronic age 
encourages more right brain thinking, broadcast media remained a medium that could easily be 
controlled by a handful of religious elites.  
 
Conclusion 
 
For three decades, evangelical Christians have been a crucial pillar of Republican 
electoral support.  More recently, Democrats have sought to capitalize on changing theological 
attitudes within the evangelical community as a means of closing the now infamous God Gap.  
Whether or not Democrats succeed in this endeavor is likely out of their control, as Democratic 
faith outreach is not the source of recent evangelical fragmentation, but rather a recognition of it.  
Indeed, much of this fragmentation has been facilitated by a changing media environment in 
which the Internet and other ICTs emerge alongside broadcast media as the dominant forms of 
electronic media. 
As this chapter has shown, some of the effects of the broadcast age were the 
strengthening of social ties within the evangelical community, the broadening of its social 
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capital, and its political unification behind conservative causes and candidates.  These effects can 
in part be attributed to the mainstreaming effect, in which audiences gradually adopt the opinions 
of broadcasters, particular when opposing viewpoints are unavailable.  By contrast, however, the 
Internet affords media consumers an abundance of choice.  In doing so, the Internet serves as a 
conduit through which dissident religious voices are both empowered and amplified, a fact that is 
lessening the influence of the old guard evangelicals, by bringing to the fore new and previously 
neglected theological agendas such as evangelical environmentalism and the social gospel.  In 
this regard, the Internet works to both destroy and create bonding and bridging forms of social 
capital.  It helps destroy such capital by eroding the stranglehold the Christian Right once had in 
shaping the cultural values views of evangelicals, particularly on matters of the environment and 
social justice, while at the same time creating new communities of like-minded believers who are 
now better able to transcend geographical and organizational limitations.  Moreover, as we shall 
see in the coming chapters, the rise of the creation care and emerging church movement has 
created new opportunities for engaging with and working alongside those outside the evangelical 
tradition. 
Similarly, this chapter has also explored the cognitive impacts of electronic media.  
Specifically, it has presented arguments suggesting that society‘s shift from a predominantly 
print-based culture to an image-based culture has had significant impact on the nature of church.  
For instance, the historical tendency of the evangelical tradition to view faith as primarily 
abstract, individual and doctrinaire is the result of a print-culture, upon which the left-
hemisphere of the brain thrives.  However, with the advent of electronic visual imaging, the 
right-hemisphere of the brain, which is more emotive and intuitive, has found a welcoming 
environment.  This change in culture has led Shane Hipps to argue that many of the impacts 
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typically associated with Internet usage are instead the products of the older broadcast age, such 
as new expressions of faith and worship.  Hipps further argues that by negotiating visual imagery 
and textuality, the Internet is bringing much needed balance between left and right hemisphere 
thinking, a balance that is evident in the emerging church movement.  
In serving as a medium through which like-minded individuals can cluster into 
homogenous groups, thus amplifying the concerns of religious dissidents and those on the 
margins, the Internet is opening up the impact of the electronic media by breaking the 
communicative monopoly of broadcasters.  As a result, not only is the Internet fostering new 
communities among otherwise far flung individuals with shared or similar interests, but it is 
similarly disassembling previously established communities as well.  This is because smaller 
niche groups are often formed at the expense of larger communities.  For instance, while 
countless Christians have been drawn to the emerging church and its supportive and generative 
community, this movement has largely rejected many of the political and theological values of 
the broader evangelical community, and more specifically, that of the Christian Right.  In doing 
so, the Internet has shown itself to be a powerful tool aiding in the rise of dissident religious 
elements, as shown through the two case studies above.  However, to better understand the role 
of the Internet in the fragmentation of the American evangelical community, an exploration into 
how these technologies are practically used is required.  This will be done in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FROM MONOLOGUE TO DIALOGUE PART II: 
THE ONLINE EVANGELISM OF THE CREATION CARE AND EMERGING 
CHURCH MOVEMENTS 
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As the previous chapter has shown, the Internet is helping to transform the nature of the 
evangelical community by serving as an effective medium through which the religious 
monologue of elite evangelical leaders and broadcasters can be displaced by a more organic 
dialogue of religious adherents.  The toppling of this religious hierarchy is an important 
development that, as we shall see in future chapters, is profoundly impacting the course of 
American politics.  This thesis has thus far discussed various theoretical ideas pertaining to the 
relationship between the internet and the fragmentation of the evangelical community, but has 
yet to explore the practical ways in which the Internet is being used by the creation care and 
emerging church movements.  In order to develop a structural framework through which this can 
be achieved, this chapter makes ready use of the work of Kristen Foot and Steven Schneider.  
Specifically, this chapter utilizes Foot and Schneider‟s conceptualization of the web sphere to 
delineate the online practices of the selected case studies and their applicable affiliate 
organizations.   
Foot and Schneider define the web sphere as ―a hyperlinked set of dynamically defined 
digital resources spanning multiple Web sites relevant to a central theme or object.‖355   They 
maintain the boundaries of a web sphere ―are delineated by a shared object-orientation and a 
temporal framework.‖356  Thus, while a web sphere is ―looser than a community or 
organization,‖ it is nonetheless ―tighter than a population or a onetime gathering around a topic 
or event.‖357  Under this definition, it is best to view the evangelical community as a distinct 
population, and the creation care and emergent church movements as central themes and objects 
around which web activity occurs.   
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Within web spheres, Foot and Schneider identify four practices of web campaigning (or 
what might be more accurately referred to as ―web proselytizing‖ in the context of this thesis).  
These four practices include: Informing, Involving, Connecting and Mobilizing.  Important to 
each of these practices are various web techniques, some of which are specific to a single 
practice, while others are shared across multiple practices.  For instance, the use of documenting 
as a web technique is regularly used for the purposes of informing, ―whereas the technique of 
convergence (unifying off-line materials and actions with on-line content) is often used for the 
purposes of informing, involving, connecting and mobilizing.‖358  In highlighting the practical 
application of each web practice as it relates to creation care and the emergent church, this 
chapter sheds additional light on the interplay between the social forces of the new media 
environment and existing religious organizational structures and web habits.  Similarly, by 
comparing the differences of the online campaign practices of secular organizations against those 
of the selected case studies, this thesis can provide insight into how matters of trust, communal 
relations and aggregate levels of social capital impact the activities of religious organizations. 
 
Informing 
 
The distribution of knowledge is foundational to the World Wide Web.  Campaigns 
regularly engage in the practice of web informing by providing online content to visitors of their 
websites.  At its simplest, web informing ―invokes the classic transmission models of 
communication, in which a communicator or producer transmits a message to a receiver or 
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recipient.‖359  On the web, this is achieved when campaigns post organizational histories or 
candidate biographies, issue statements, texts of speeches, press releases and/or other related 
news.  Under these conditions, web producers are in essence merely replicating the models of 
broadcast media in which information is produced by a handful of individuals, and then 
disseminated to audiences for broader public consumption.  However, when the practice of web 
informing includes more dynamic and complex means of information dissemination, such as 
hyper-linking and co-production, then a more sophisticated communication model is required. 
Despite the fact that the new media environment affords web users communicative 
abundance, the broadcasting model continues to play an important role online.  Evidence of this 
can be found by examining the websites of the selected evangelical organizations.   As the figure 
below shows, the Internet is used by each of these groups to broadcast simple, yet important 
information about who they are and what their organizations stand for: 
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Figure 5.1 
Organizational Information Available Online 
 Organization 
History 
Mission 
Statement 
Issue 
Statements 
News/Press 
Releases 
Contact 
Information 
EEN  X X X X 
ESA X X X X X 
Emergent 
Village 
 X  X X 
Flourish X X   X 
Renewal X X X  X 
Restoring Eden  X X X X 
 
*  Data collected 1/09/2009.  Scores arrived at by coding affiliate websites for information pertaining to 
organizational history, mission statements, position taking (issue statements), news and press updates, and contact 
information.  Affiliate organizations can be found online at: www.creationcare.org for EEN, 
www.evangelicalsforsocialaction.org for ESA, www.emergentvilliage.com for Emergent Village, 
www.fourishonline.org for Flourish, www.renewingcreation.org for Renewal, and www.restoringeden.org for 
Restoring Eden. 
 
As the above diagram shows, although ESA is the only organization to use online information 
broadcasting in each of the listed five categories, each group utilizes the broadcast model to 
provide mission statements and contact information. 
 
Informing:  Documentation and Position Taking 
 
One of the earliest hurdles that the evangelical environmental movement had to overcome 
was convincing people that the Bible mandates that humans care for the earth.  As we shall see in 
later chapters, one main reason for this obstacle was a widely held theological tenet within the 
evangelical community known as dominion theology (sometimes referred to as ―wise-use‖ 
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theology).  Briefly, dominion theology is a commonly held belief that the people of God are 
commanded by God to subject the entire world to the Word of God.  As Genesis 1:26 reads:  
 
And God said, ―Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them 
have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the 
cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the 
earth.‖360 
 
However, the Bible is often contradictory and open to interpretation, a point that has 
served the creation care movement well.  In an effort to combat the damning effects of dominion 
theology, evangelical environmentalists have undertaken a massive public educational campaign, 
aimed at highlighting biblical passages that compel believers to care for God‘s creation; what 
Peter Illyn has dubbed the ―acceptability debate.‖361 
Over the course of the last two decades, the creation care movement has undertaken a 
variety of efforts to raise environmental awareness among evangelicals.  One of the most widely 
used means of convincing skeptical evangelicals about the importance of caring for God‘s earth 
is by appealing directly to the highest authoritative source: Holy Scripture.  Those who are non-
religious might laugh at the idea of winning an environmental debate by quoting Christian 
scripture, but evangelicals form an epistemic community that by definition holds scripture as the 
final arbiter of truth.  As such, evangelicals view the use of scripture as no laughing matter.  
Instead, for evangelicals, scripture is the best way to legitimize worldviews and moral claims, 
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and quoting scripture is routinely done by evangelicals in order to advance a given theological 
position: 
 
Figure 5.2 
Frequency of Online Scriptural Citations 
EEN ESA Emergent 
Village 
Flourish Renewal Restoring 
Eden 
76 1 0 2 23 102 
 
*  Data collected 1/09/2009.  Website coded for frequency of scriptural citations.  Count inclusive of all citations, 
including biblical verses appearing more than once per website. 
 
It will be noted from figure 5.2 that while some of the selected organizations routinely quote 
biblical scriptures, others, such as Flourish do not.  This development is particularly interesting, 
especially when one considers the fact that among the listed organizations, Flourish stands out in 
their skepticism regarding the future of their own cause.  For instance, Jim Jewel, formerly of 
EEN and a founding member of Flourish had this to say during a recent interview: 
 
In the Christian community there‘s a lot of misunderstanding, there‘s not deep 
acceptance in some quarters of how environmental stewardships is a part of the 
discipleship challenge for the believing Christian, there‘s a lot of ignorance 
among evangelicals about even practical steps you can take because they haven‘t 
been a part of the discussion at churches.  And when I talk a lot with non-church 
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folks, or people in the mainline those who have been involved with the 
environmental challenge for a long time, they are amazed at how far behind the 
evangelicals are.  They almost can‘t believe it.  And it‘s not that evangelicals are 
just inherently stupid or something it‘s just that that particular issue 
(environmental protection) has not been on our radar screens.
362
 
 
Rusty Pritchard, also of Flourish, expressed a similar view: 
 
I think a lot of younger evangelicals are of two minds about it.  They grow up in a 
culture in which environmentalism is kind of a part of a political correctness that 
they get from early on and so they have on the one hand a set of cultural mores 
that tell them that recycling is good and they know that mantra ―reduce, reuse, 
recycle,‖ they think a little bit about pollution.  They don‘t really get from that 
cultural melee anything that tells them that they should be actively engaged in the 
outdoors, that they should be trying to connect to the land in real physical ways or 
drawing spiritual lessons from it.  That‘s more than the kind of talk that most 
environmentalists can digest.  But you do get a certain sense that to be green is 
good.  But at the same time, I think folks are a bit schizophrenic.  They take 
classes of the biblical worldviews that they learn from their parents, whose 
theology says that you shouldn‘t invest in this world, all of this is going to burn, 
and that you must be laying out treasures out in heaven rather than here on earth, 
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and it‘s this really strict dualistic contrast between where your social investments 
are made.
363
 
 
Given this pessimism about the strength of environmentalism among evangelicals, it is odd that 
Flourish would leave scripture off their website, particularly when other organizations so readily 
quote it.  When asked why they do not make greater use of scripture, Jonathan Merritt, another 
Flourish manager responded by saying, ―put simply, we just haven't gotten around to it.‖364 
By contrast, however, Peter Illyn of Restoring Eden, which was the group most likely to 
quote scripture online, stated: 
 
We‘ve won the acceptability debate, but now we‘re dealing with the where does it 
fit in, and that‘s the evoke set.  We‘re acceptable, we‘re not considered non-
Christian like we used to be.  People used to try to frame us, like the Helen 
Chenoweth‘s would try to frame us as the non-Christians, but the problem was 
that the Bible was on our side, logic was on our side, science was on our side, 
most people‘s personal experiences were on our side.365 
 
It would be nice to say that Illyn is correct, and that environmental protection is a 
religious value that enjoys near universal acceptance within the evangelical community.  But as 
we shall see in the coming chapters, creation care remains a deeply divisive issue in evangelical 
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circles.  For instance, in January of 2011, the Cornwall Alliance, a collection of evangelical 
leaders deeply suspicious of evangelical environmentalism launched the Resisting the Green 
Dragon campaign, which has labeled the creation care movement anti-Christian, and which 
accuses its leadership of perpetrating a ―spiritual deception‖ against the faithful.366  The fact that 
the Cornwall Alliance felt the need to viciously attack the creation care movement speaks not 
only to the growing strength of the movement, but its divisive nature as well.  In this regard, one 
could easily argue that while acceptance of evangelical environmentalism is growing, Illyn‘s 
claim that the acceptability debate has been won seems premature. 
 
Informing:  Linking 
 
Over a relatively short period of time, the use of Internet links has evolved substantially.  
As Joseph Turow notes in the introduction of The Hyperlinked Society: 
 
Links have morphed beyond their initial look to function as hot areas (where a 
picture or graphic are turned into a link), in-line links (where thumbnail photos or 
other elements are connected from one site to another automatically), tags (that 
allow people to categorize links), API (applications programming interface) 
mapping ‗mashups‘ (where people use data from open-source cartography 
programs to make maps with links that suit their purposes), and RSS data (that 
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enable users to connect to changing information from sites without going to them 
directly).
367
 
 
Most websites make heavy use of linking, and commonly through a feature known as 
interlinking, which allows sites to ―structure the information architecture of their site, thus 
defining the range of possible user experiences.‖368  At the same time, outlinking, the practice of 
linking to the websites of outside parties is a practice most campaign websites look to avoid as it 
negates the possibility of structuring user experience.  It similarly exposes the campaign to 
unnecessary risk as the content of third-party websites can change at any time, and remains 
beyond the effective control of the organization. 
While many electoral campaigns have shown a reluctance to outlink, the same cannot be 
said for the religious organizations featuring in this thesis.  While the EEN outlinks only 
sparingly and usually only to provide scientific evidence that climate change is indeed real, the 
Flourish website provides numerous links and even encourages visitors to visit the websites of 
other creation care groups. This is the case with Floresta, about which Flourish had the following 
to say: 
 
Floresta is the coolest organization you‘ve never heard of and their program Plant 
with Purpose may be the coolest creation care initiative around today. Through 
Plant with Purpose, Floresta works to reverse poverty and deforestation by 
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planting trees. They currently work in Mexico, Tanzania, Haiti, and the 
Dominican Republic.
369
 
Similar examples are readily found throughout the creation care web sphere.  For instance, in 
addition to providing links to various third-party news stories about Restoring Eden and other 
publications highlighting the plight of environmental degradation, Restoring Eden also has links 
to no fewer than 15 other creation care ministries or environmental causes under their ―connect‖ 
menu option.  Likewise, Renewal has a menu section entitled, ―Partners and Friends,‖ which 
similarly provides links to outside organizations.   
 Research exploring the impact of web-links on aggregate levels of social capital has 
found them to be important in both the formation and maintenance of weak social ties.  Such 
links, as Ellison et. al, argue ―serve as the foundation of bridging social capital[,]‖ as the 
practices of web-linking and web-connecting, ―support loose social ties, allowing users to create 
and maintain larger, diffuse networks of relationships from which they could potentially draw 
resources.‖370  Moreover, the use of web-links is also well suited for facilitating relationships 
between like-minded individuals and organizations as such ties can be made cheaply and easily.  
Given this, it should come as little surprise that the reason so many of the studied organizations 
readily outlink is due to a feeling of shared mission, a trait not at all uncommon among religious 
organizations.  For instance, when Jonathan Merritt, creation care stalwart and Flourish Church 
Programs Manager, was asked about Flourish‘s partnership organizations, which include 
Renewal and Restoring Eden, Merritt responded by saying, ―the partnership there is more a 
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moniker of perception and fraternity than it is of any type of official partnership.‖371  To further 
stress this point, Merritt noted that ―Flourish doesn‘t share information [with these ―partners‖] 
and we don‘t ask for information.‖372  Still Flourish does provide direct links to these websites 
and on its own website they state, ―Flourish is not a standalone organization.  Our valuable 
partners and related ministries provide many ways for you and your church to get connected to 
God‘s creation, and to care for the people that depend on it.  Here are some folks you should 
check out.‖373  The fact that there is no material upside to these links (and if anything only a 
downside as providing such links could draw support away from Flourish towards a different 
organization) speaks volumes of the sheer trust, comradely and close relationship creation care 
groups have for one another. 
 
Informing:  Co-production 
 
The co-production of web material is where multiple areas of web campaigning practice 
overlap.  The joint production of web objects, such as texts, features and links, are at their most 
basic level a practice of informing.  For instance, the wall on the EEN‘s Facebook group page is 
a great example of co-production.  On this web space, members of the EEN Facebook group 
regularly provide information on a wide range of topics.  For example, one member shared with 
the group how getting a good interest rate from a bank can also be beneficial to the environment, 
while another member sought to better inform the group about the environmental impacts of 
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animal farming.  In each of these instances, links were provided that took the user to third party 
websites. 
 
Figure 5.3 
Screen Shot of EEN Facbook Group Page 
 
 
*  Screen Shot of EEN Facebook Group Page.  Above:  EEN Senior Director of Communications, Alexei N. 
Laushkin encourages Facebook group member Barbara Monroe to seek assistance from fellow creation care 
organization Restoring Eden.  Below:  Facebook group member Launie Boykin promotes a recent update to the EEN 
website.  All information on the EEN Facebook Group Page is viewable by the public 
 
Although the use of links is a common practice in web co-production and further 
demonstrates how web-campaigning techniques overlap, web co-production, such as enabling 
site visitors to comment on posted material, was not a feature available on any websites studied 
besides Emergent Village until 2010.  It was then that the EEN, ESA and Restoring Eden all 
dramatically overhauled their existing websites, while Renewal and Flourish added additional 
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features, such as the ability to comment on blog posts. Needless to say, co-production on these 
websites (that of Emergent Village not withstanding) remains limited.  In many ways, this online 
practice of limiting co-production is reflective of a religious tradition of hierarchy; a tradition 
that while undergoing considerable change remains deeply entrenched.  The fact that the main 
Emergent Village website reads like an electronic announcement board, where visitors can post 
blogs, respond to blogs, as well as upload podcasts, find local cohorts and more, is again 
reflective of the largely decentralized nature of this organization. 
 
Involving 
 
From a social capital perspective, involving is arguable the most important dynamic of 
any of the four web campaign practices as it requires participants to make an investment of either 
time and/or money into the success of an organization, which in turn strengthens the relationship 
between the organization and the individual.  One of the most common ways organizations seek 
to involve participants is through the use of email lists, which often plead for financial support or 
the contribution of one‘s time.   
Generally speaking, the practice of web-involving is relatively new to the virtual 
landscape and is reflective of the growing sophistication of the World Wide Web.  For instance, 
with the introduction of web browsers in the early 1990s, the Internet became a domain more 
easily navigated and thus more accessible to the less computer literate.  Many of the early web 
purveyors were unaware of the social potential of the Internet, and simply mistook the medium 
as another screen at which individuals stared.  As such, producers of online content in the early 
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days of web browsers ―relied on a ‗push‘ or transmission model of communication,‖374 which 
treated Internet users as readers rather than participants.  In a short time, however, the broader 
social potential of the World Wide Web was recognized, and web producers soon sought ways to 
better engage their audience. 
One of the earliest and simplest forms of web involving came via ―text-based 
interactivity.‖375  So-called ―text-based interactivity‖ is a textual message disseminated to a mass 
audience which also facilitates user reaction.  In this regard, text-based interactivity is ―a 
departure from the idea that media must emulate face-to-face conversation in order to be 
considered ‗interactive.‘‖376  Interestingly, however, text-based interactivity often directs readers 
to real world social gatherings and political meet-ups.   
Throughout its virtual life, each of the selected organizations has used text-based 
interactivity as a campaign tool.  In the case of Renewal, participants have been encouraged to 
partake in numerous activities across a wide variety of Internet platforms, ranging from their 
own hosted websites to social networking sites such as Facebook and MySpace.  The following 
call for involvement from the Renewal website helps to illustrate the features of text-based 
interactivity while blending other web-involving practices.  Take for instance this example: 
 
On October 29th 2008, join Christians around North America as we stand 
together and pray for the renewal of God‘s creation! 
                                                 
374
 Foot and Schneider, Web Campaigning, 71-72. 
375
 See Danielle Enders and Barbara Warnick, ―Text-based Interactivity in Candidate Campaign Web Sites: A Case 
Study form the 2002 Election,‖ Western Journal of Communication 68, no. 3 (2004): 322-342. 
376
 Barbara Warnick, Michael Xenos, Danielle Endres, and John Gastil, ―Effects of Campaign-to-User and Text-
Based Interactivity in Political Candidate Campaign Web Sites,‖ Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 10, 
no. 3 (2005).  Found online at: <http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol10/issue3/warnick.html>   (Accessed August 24, 2009). 
 
192 
 
 
Whether you pray in the morning by yourself or organize a campus chapel to 
focus on creation care – you‘re part of Renewal and the growing movement of 
Christians caring for creation. 
 
And whether you gather with friends mid-day at the center of campus to pray or 
your church has a small group meeting that studies the Bible and prays - you‘re 
part of Renewal and the growing movement of Christians caring for God‘s 
creation. 
 
Need help organizing your Day of Prayer for Creation Care event? Click here for 
ideas to organize your day of prayer event. 
 
We do have three requests for you – you knew it was coming! 
 
First, please let us know about your event before it happens. As a community, it is 
wonderful to have a sense of the fullness of these days. Especially, let us know if 
it is an event that others can participate in. If so, we will post it on Renewal's web 
page so that those interested can join you.  
 
Second, if you would like to share your prayer requests or prayer petitions with 
others, please let us know so that we can post them on the Renewal website. For 
sample prayers to use during your prayer event, please click here.  
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Lastly, tell us about your event after it happens. Share stories with us, share a 
photo or two. Share a poem or share the prayer itself. By sharing your stories 
you‘ll provide examples, inspiration and hope to many other Christians engaged 
in creation care.  
 
For questions or more information email Renewal Coordinator, Anna Jane Joyner 
at ajjoyner@renewingcreation.org.
377
 
 
The above statements incorporate several aspects of the previously mentioned campaign web 
practices.  For example, by directing readers to partake in a day of prayer using little more than 
text, Renewal is demonstrating how online calls to action can easily converge with offline 
activity.  Furthermore, by encouraging readers to invite friends to join them in this day of prayer, 
Renewal is insuring that their call to action is heard by many more than just the readers of their 
website.  By the fourth paragraph Renewal is incorporating links that move us beyond text-based 
interactivity.  And each one of these features is but another example of the growing 
sophistication and inter-activity of the online environment. 
 
Involving:  Transaction 
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Information is an invaluable commodity for any campaign.  Without reliable information, 
such as contact details, the obstacles an organization faces in building an efficient campaign are 
nearly insurmountable.  This is why user contact details are so heavily sought by campaigns, as 
such details build lists of sympathetic supporters willing to commit valuable resources such as 
time and money.  In the online environment, where web-based structures have been designed to 
better manage this data, organizations know full well that the acquisition of contact and bank 
details effectively creates a transactional relationship between the organization and site visitors.  
However, establishing and fostering transactional relationships exclusively online often proves a 
daunting task.  This is because transactional relationships differ from real-world relationships in 
significant ways.  For starters, individuals tend to be more sensitive to and have more concerns 
about transactional relationships forged online than those relationships that are not.
378
   In an 
effort to address this online trust deficit, many campaign organizations ―have taken explicit steps 
to articulate boundaries and establish terms to govern that relationship, most commonly by 
posting privacy policies on their web sites.‖379  By taking these actions, online campaigns seek to 
assure potential supporters that they are indeed trustworthy entities. 
In comparison to many secular operations, religious organizations are often viewed by 
their supporters as more trustworthy, an important lubricant in the formation and maintenance of 
social capital.
380
  It is perhaps for this reason that among the selected organizations, EEN and 
Flourish were the only organizations to have a privacy statement available on their website.  
Since Flourish uses Safe Subscribe for managing their email list, a generic private policy 
statement is available by clinking on the Safe Subscribe icon, which among other things, assures 
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individuals that they may opt out of the mailing list anytime they like.  The EEN‘s private policy 
statement appears only after a site visitor decides to give money and has clicked on the ―donate‖ 
button.  Aside from this instance, at no other time did a privacy statement appear; neither before 
nor after the online transaction occurred. 
In an interview with the Reverend Stephanie Spellers, an Episcopal minister active with 
Emergent Village, she spoke about the issue of trust, the nature of the Christian character and the 
Christian community more broadly: 
 
I think people generally assume that churches are less tech savvy and perhaps less 
commercially savvy, that we‘re not going to have partner organizations, because 
that‘s usually when you get into the trouble of, ―you‘re going to sell my 
information,‖ or ―you have a whole partnership of other organizations and you‘re 
going to give my email to them and they‘re going to just bombard me.‖  So I think 
people just assume that churches are what we say we are, and that we are 
representing what they see, and what they see is what they get.  That may not be 
true, but I think we‘re banking on that presumption of trust.381 
 
Yet while the average parishioner may simply presume their privacy is being protected by such 
para-ministries, the managers of these organizations know differently.  As Jonathan Merritt 
notes: 
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I can tell you that some of the creation care organizations in the past have had 
some tensions, some disagreements around lists, names, donor bases, et cetera, so 
my gut tells me that more than likely this might be the case, that people are either 
sharing with some individuals and not others, or because so many individuals in 
the creation care organizations are in bed with, or are funded by other individuals, 
that rather than reveal that financial partnership, which they would have to do 
through a privacy statement, they simply leave that off.  That would be my 
inclination.
382
 
 
Peter Illyn spoke more candidly about the debate surrounding the sharing of email lists and other 
personal online data: 
 
One of the debates is, like with the Renewal crowd, Do they invite Renewal 
people to potentially join the Restoring Eden email list?  I‘m countering, no.  I 
want your [entire] list every year and in every newsletter we give people the right 
to opt out.  If you‘re going to make them take an action, you make them to take 
the action to opt out, not opt in.   One of the reactions is that they don‘t want their 
members to get mad, but that‘s not big, no one is going to get mad in this world of 
email getting newsletters they don‘t need.  They‘re just going to either 
unsubscribe or pay no attention to it.  So we‘re not going to burn any bridges by 
doing this.
383
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And while Illyn may be correct that few individuals are going to be bothered by the addition of 
their name to yet another online newsletter, there are more problematic issues surrounding online 
data sharing which may very well threaten the integrity of online relationships.  For instance, 
Merritt speculates that the EEN, which was born from ESA, may purposely downplay that 
relationship as ESA ―has the perception of being more liberal.‖384  Thus, by disclosing its 
historical connection with ESA, the EEN could potentially turn off supporters who otherwise 
view ESA with suspicion. 
 
Involving: Convergence 
 
Convergence is defined as ―the integration of the offline and online realms.‖385  For 
purposes of involving a participant in the activities of a campaign, websites will employ a variety 
of methods.  One of the simplest ways in which an individual can engage a political campaign is 
by making a financial contribution online.  Yet soliciting online monetary contributions is only 
one way in which campaigns use the Internet in their efforts to elicit greater involvement from 
their activists. 
For instance, some campaign websites encourage supporters to download and print flyers 
and posters.  There are of course several reasons why a campaign might want to encourage 
supporters to print such materials themselves, as it not only requires supporters to make a further 
investment in the campaign, but it also saves the campaign time and money.  Increasingly 
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though, electoral campaigns are shying away from this practice.  Even at the local level, the 
distribution of online material such as printable flyers and posters is a practice some politicians 
have significant misgivings about, as Michael Valanzola, an elected Republican in 
Massachusetts does: 
 
 I'm not sure I see a lot of value in allowing supporters to print off campaign 
material. It certainly would save money, but would it have the same effect?
386
 
He adds: 
A lot of my constituents represent the senior population; they don't have access to 
some of the same technology that you and I use every day. Therefore I could 
potentially isolate them from the campaign, and make them disenfranchised with 
the process. I would rather spend a little more money and make sure my message 
and information gets to them. There is also something to be said for holding a 
card that came in the mail. It adds a personal touch.
387
  
 
In contrast to electoral campaigns, however, where there seems to be some reluctance to 
the practice of online document distribution, several of the studied organizations eagerly 
embraced this technique in their overall campaign strategies, as Renewal did with their ―creation 
day of prayer‖ effort.  In this instance, Renewal provided printable sample prayers that Christian 
campus leaders and other ministers could use during the event.  Similarly, Restoring Eden, which 
engages in public lobbying, provides a downloadable PDF file of The Evangelical Youth Climate 
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Initiative petition.  Signatories of this petition are asked to provide their names, e-mail addresses, 
physical location, the college or church to which they belong, as well as date of birth.  At the 
bottom of this petition sheet is the address for Restoring Eden‘s P.O. Box.  Once completed, 
these forms are of considerable value for Restoring Eden.  Not only are additional names added 
to the email list, but potential points of contact are provided at universities where contacts may 
have been either previously lacking or where a ―back door‖ needs closing.388  Further still, these 
signed petition sheets also provide a useful visual when Restoring Eden conducts its routine 
lobbying efforts on Capitol Hill. 
Another form of convergence occurs when an events calendar is provided.  In these 
instances, campaigns ―enable interested site visitors to learn more about and make plans to attend 
in-person gatherings which may increase their involvement.‖389  Prior to the 2010 website 
rebuilds of the six studied organizations, only half made use of an online calendar.  Those groups 
included Emergent Village, ESA, and Renewal.  Yet among these three groups, the usefulness of 
each online calendar varied significantly. Unquestionably, ESA‘s online calendar proved the 
least effective.  As you can see from the image below, the only events to be publicized on ESA‘s 
calendar were the speaking engagements of Ron Sider, this despite the fact that a number of 
other scholars regularly participate in the Sider Center/ESA speaking circuit.  Furthermore, while 
the topic of each of Sider‘s events is given, as is the date and city location, the time and physical 
address of these events are missing. 
 
                                                 
388
 Social movement organizations where college students account for a significant portion of the membership base 
are presented with the added obstacle of maintaining contact with those students once they graduate and 
subsequently move to new locations and change email addresses.  Maintaining this contact is sometimes referred to 
as ―closing the back door.‖ 
389
 Foot and Schneider, Web Campaigning, 86. 
 
200 
 
Figure 5.4 
 
ESA Events Calendar 
 
 
Public Speaking Schedule for Sider Center Staff 
 
Ron Sider 
Founder/President of Evangelicals for Social Action: 
Date Location Purpose 
September 11 Lancaster, PA Speaking on "Global Poverty" at Church World Service Banquet 
September 13 - 14 Chicago, IL 
Facilitating discussion on "Poverty and Prosperity" for the Faith & Law's "Great 
Objects" gathering for young evangelical leaders 
September 15 - 16 Campbellsville, KY 
Speaking at Campbellsville University at the Roundtable on Christian Public Policy 
Perspectives, sponsored by the Kentucky Heartland Institute on Public Policy 
September 17 Scottsdale, AZ 
Co-leading panel on " Dealing with Violence and Anti-Religious Intimidatiion in a 
Christian Way" at a Gathering Briefing on Marriage 
October 18 Harleysville, PA Preaching on the theme of poverty at Salford Mennonite Church 
October 22 Tipp City, OH 
Speaking on the theme of providing a compassionate call to "serve the least of 
these" at the 2009 Conference of Ginghamsburg United Methodist Church 
December 11 St. Davids, PA 
Speaking at 25th Anniversary Celebration of the Economic Development Program 
of Eastern University 
 
*  Figure 4.3 copied from ESA website.  Data Collected 1/9/2009.  Information available online at: http://www.esa-
online.org/Display.asp?Page=SpeakingSchedule (Accessed ?). 
 
Since their 2010 website rebuild, ESA has made their online calendar more user friendly.  Users 
are now able to export events directly to their personal calendars at the click of a button, though 
ESA continues its practice of not providing street addresses for upcoming events, and instead 
only notes in which city the event is taking place. 
In contrast to ESA, both Renewal and Emergent Village use Google Calendar to 
publicize upcoming events.  The format of Google Calendar is one that many people are familiar 
with and which allows users to click dates for additional information such as local contacts, maps 
of venues, as well as direction.  For purposes of their largely college age audience, Renewal lists 
their events on Google Calendar by university location, while Emergent Village will also 
regularly post blogs alongside their online calendar to better advertise upcoming events on their 
website. 
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Popularized by Howard Dean‘s 2004 Presidential campaign, so-called ―meet-ups‖ are 
another means of convergence, as they allow interested parties to find face-to-face gatherings of 
individuals with shared interests online.  While each of the studied organizations places a 
premium on face-to-face communities, Emergent Village stands alone in its use of the online 
environment to facilitate these meetings.  Jeff Gentry of Emergent Village commented during an 
interview on the rise and importance of Emergent cohorts: 
 
The conversation really got started with Web blogs and early portals.  I think 
those were provocations.  The blog really encouraged people to think differently 
about Christianity and it pointed people towards gatherings like the Young 
Leaders Network.  It encouraged people to meet up.  The development of the 
cohorts was a really strong move by the emergent conversation because it brings 
the conversation to a local level.  So for our cohort, for instance, people are 
reading blogs and conversing all over the place, but our primary connection with 
the emergent conversation is our relationship with one another and they grow out 
of our cohort and our interaction there.  But I think it started on the Internet and 
it‘s fostered by it, but I think the conversation is at its strongest when it‘s at the 
primary level, face-to-face gatherings.
390
 
 
Moreover, while each Emergent Village cohort has its own autonomous online presence, the 
larger collective gathering found online at www.emergentvillage.com, directs interested parties 
to the sites of local cohorts. 
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Connecting and Mobilizing 
 
Web connecting provides bridges between two or more actors and occurs when a website 
facilitates said connections, commonly through the use of links, though other means such as 
document distribution, text-based interactivity and dialoguing can also achieve this end.  Foot 
and Schneider hold that the cultivation of online relationships between site visitors and 
campaigns belongs not to the practice of web connecting, but rather as a practice of web 
involving.
391
   Such a position, however, depends largely upon one‘s view of what it means to be 
connecting.  For instance, while Foot and Schneider seem content in their belief that a political 
campaign is a solitary entity, others, such as Williams Dutton and Wan Yin-Lang would more 
likely view political campaigns as many parts working towards a shared goal; namely the 
mobilization of individuals behind a particular cause or candidate.  In this conceptualization, web 
connecting is much more than a website that facilitates links to outside actors, but rather it is the 
process through which connectivity takes place and relationships formed.  As such, web 
connecting need not necessarily be viewed as a separate practice from that of web involving, but 
rather the practice of web involving ought to be viewed as coming from the practice of web 
connecting.
392
 
 
Internet Connecting, Web Mobilization and the Importance of Peer-to-Peer Influence 
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As we have seen, the Internet ―enhances the potential for its users to interact with each 
other, transcending the time-space barrier at an unprecedented scope and scale.‖393 When 
provided with sufficient time and energy, the Internet can turn weak social ties into more 
meaningful relationships, often resulting in face-to-face meet-ups.
394
  Such relationships, 
campaigns know, are key to voter mobilization efforts.  As Granovetter states, ―one‘s decision to 
vote for a particular candidate may depend heavily on how many others have already decided to 
do so.‖395  In expanding Granovetter‘s thesis, Sunstein demonstrates how the peer groups that an 
individual belongs to can affect one‘s overall attitudes and set of beliefs: 
 
Social networks can operate as polarization machines because they help to 
confirm and thus amplify people‘s antecedent views.  Those who are inclined to 
support a cause or candidate may become quite excited if support is widespread 
on their social network.  In 2008, President Barack Obama greatly benefited from 
this process, in a way that created extreme enthusiasm for his candidacy.  Some of 
this was planned; his campaign self-consciously promoted social networks that 
spread favorable information.  But some of this was spontaneous.  Obama 
supporters, especially young people worked hard on their own to take advantage 
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of existing networks and create new ones that would turn curiosity and tentative 
support into intense enthusiasm and active involvement.
396
 
 
For many people today, particularly younger people, the online environment serves as an 
extension of offline realties.  Our friends, through work and school, even past acquaintances and 
long neglected relationships, find an additional place in our lives through sites such as Facebook 
and MySpace.  Although it could be argued that such activity is leading to the flattening of 
human relationships, online relationships which lack familiarity or which are not regularly 
supplemented with offline engagement are more easily negotiated and may be quickly 
ignored.
397
  Thus, while a Facebook ―friend‖ may express favorable views towards one political 
candidate over another, the impact of those views will largely be determined by a broad range of 
existing social relationships.  For instance, should I repeatedly and enthusiastically engage my 
non-political brother about the importance of electing a certain candidate, it becomes all the 
more likely that my brother, presuming the two of us are on good terms, will adopt a similar 
view, or at the very least vote for that candidate.  Within religious circles, peer influence plays a 
similarly important role.  Take for instance the Loughead‘s. 
In many ways, the Loughead‘s are a typical evangelical family.  Patrick is in his late 
thirties and works as an auto mechanic while his wife, Cheryl, has gone back to school for her 
nursing degree.  Together, Patrick and Cheryl have one child, a small boy named Aaron, and 
raise three others, two boys from Patrick‘s previous marriage, and a daughter from Cheryl‘s 
previous marriage.  These children are home-schooled, as Cheryl is troubled by what she sees as 
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the secularization of public schools.  Each week, the family attends any number of social 
functions at the nearby Church of God church.  These functions vary each week, but typically 
include worship service, Bible study, Sunday school, youth group, and occasionally a more 
relaxed social function, such as a potluck or spaghetti feed dinner.  In true evangelical fashion 
the Loughead‘s have recently begun taking the daughter of one of their neighbors to church with 
them and speak proudly of their evangelism efforts.   
While interviewing Cheryl, we discussed several topics that included her use of the 
Internet and other media sources for information collection, as well as the importance of peers in 
the formation of her values and beliefs.  Our exchange is provided at some length as it touches 
upon several important themes: 
Cheryl: I guess that‘s the first one I‘ve ever been to, even though I don‘t go to 
Christian web sites.   
Interviewer: But we‘re talking about the Laminin Cell. 
Cheryl: It‘s a cell [and] it‘s the glue that holds the body together…You can go on 
the website and I‘m sure it‘s out there, but if you look at this cell that‘s in our 
body, underneath a microscope, and in this cell is the shape of the cross.  And it‘s 
proof that ‗He‘ does exist and a lot of people don‘t see this.  A lot of your 
scientists won‘t speak of it.  It‘s the make-up of our body and it has the cross. 
Interviewer: I‘ll have to look for this. 
Cheryl: And I think in my conversation about people trying to go out and find out 
if ―He‖ existed, its right here in front of us and we keep wanting to make excuses 
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and nit picking at it.  But it‘s amazing—you can just go under ―Laminin Cell,‖ if 
you just Google it, and it will show how the makeup forms the shape of this cross. 
Interviewer: And you heard this from a Christian speaker? 
Cheryl: It‘s on a CD.  I don‘t know his name.  My mom would know it, but I 
wanted to get it so I can show it to the kids. 
Interviewer: And the CDs you get, do you get mostly from the Christian 
bookstore in Eugene? 
Cheryl: Oh yeah. 
Interviewer: And do you swap with family and friends? 
Cheryl: Oh yeah, with family and friends from the church.  If somebody from the 
church has something like this, or music, than it gets passed. 
Interviewer: Then if the minister says this is something that is really good, would 
you go out and purchase it, see if someone has it, listen to it because he said you 
should? 
Cheryl: I‘d be open to it.  Because I believe the things he says, and we all have 
our own opinions, but oh yeah, it‘s a starting point.  I think that‘s how anybody 
starts anywhere, somebody they have faith and trust in, and then they investigate 
it.  Don‘t just leave it as, ―oh this person said this.‖  Look.  Find out.398 
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 Whether or not one finds truth in Cheryl‘s claims about the Laminin Cell is a matter of 
personal faith.  There are, however, many individuals, both religious and not, who would look at 
Cheryl‘s assertion with much skepticism, if not utter bemusement, as to how any rational human 
could possibly believe such a thing.  However, as Cheryl notes, it was her mother who first 
introduced her to the CDs discussing the Laminin Cell.  The fact that Cheryl seems to have a 
strong relationship with her mother helps explain why she might be more inclined to accept the 
Laminin Cell as proof of Christ‘s existence, but this by itself is not a satisfactory answer.  To this 
end, James Surowiecki‘s work on the wisdom of crowds provides further insight.  As Surowiecki 
notes, groups that encompass many different viewpoints tend to make better decisions than those 
that do not.
399
  This is because monolithic groups promote information feedback and similarly 
trigger a convergence of how facts are evaluated.  Thus, when crowds lack a diversity of 
viewpoints, false facts can quickly become accepted truths.  Given the extent to which Cheryl is 
embedded within her religious community, coupled by the rigid theological nature of the Church 
of Christ, it is unsurprising to find that the opinions of her peers, including recommendations 
regarding which media and informational sources to use, should carry considerable weight.  As 
this exchange amply demonstrates, peer-to-peer interactions often play a crucial role in the 
transmission of information and the formation of values, particularly among religious groups.   
The organizations studied here have sought to capitalize on in-person religious meet-ups 
to expand their membership base and to spread their word.  For instance, visitors to the EEN‘s 
website are encouraged to start small creation care groups within their own churches.  To help 
site visitors to do just this, the EEN‘s website provides accessible information online as well as 
startup packets for download.  Similarly, Christian music festivals, like Sunday worship services, 
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are another common evangelical meet-up, and it is at these events that Restoring Eden finds 
considerable success.  As Illyn explains: 
 
The power of Christian Rock festivals is that it may be a Christian organization, 
but it‘s a for-profit Christian organization and its some guy they‘ve hired trying to 
sell vendor booths, and he‘s got a whiteboard and goals for the week, and I call up 
and say, ―hey, we‘re a Christian environmental group and we‘re working at these 
festivals and we‘d like to have a booth at your event.  How much is it?‖ 
―It‘s $600.‖ 
―Great.‖ 
So we in a sense we buy access.  And we might be next door to this Christian 
Radio station, and here‘s this very conservative Christian college right over there, 
but the rock n‘ roll band comes [to us] and says, ―Dude, we love what you‘re all 
about,‖ and we get a shout out from the stage. And that‘s why we‘ve always 
included the culture [venues], because for us, our revenue has always come 
through these cultural venues, which have different barriers of entry than church.  
We haven‘t even tried to do Sunday morning pulpit stuff.  We haven‘t expected 
pastors to be political because we see it as a bottom-up approach.  We want 
Christians to be political in the name of their Christianity, who then invite and 
engage their pastors.
400
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What is unique about the approach taken by both Restoring Eden and the EEN, as 
opposed to that of secular organizations, is that thanks to the community oriented nature of 
religious bodies, they are able to take advantage of real world hubs that already exist.  
Theological outsiders can use these existing hubs as a means of establishing a foothold within 
the broader religious community.   Thus, unlike many secular mass mobilization efforts, which 
rely almost exclusively on media to drive their message, religious groups can take a more 
organic relational approach, with relationships often beginning at in-person gatherings, and later 
nurtured online.  By utilizing online tools, such as organizational websites, and perhaps more 
importantly, social networking sites, individuals are able to more efficiently interact with a larger 
network of acquaintances than they otherwise could.  Moreover, ―the social features of 
networking websites foster an environment that is ideal for virtual communities to expand and 
social capital to develop.‖401  The table below illustrates this point by highlighting the means by 
which respondents to the Internet and Evangelical survey became involved with their respective 
organization: 
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Figure 5.4 
How Members Become Active in the Studied Organizations 
Through a Church 
Related Function 
72 
Through a Friend 285 
Online 277 
Through Print 71 
Through T.V. and 
Radio 
3 
Through College 38 
Did Not Answer 104 
 
*  Data is based on responses from the Internet and Evangelical survey. 
    Table has coded write-in responses into appropriate categories.  Data 
    collected from 12/9/2008 – 2/27/2010. 
 
 What is perhaps most surprising about this data is that the Internet did not play a more 
direct role in introducing supporters to the studied organizations.  Admittedly, the ―Online‖ 
selection was a close second to the ―From a Friend‖ option, however, when the 104 respondents 
who did not answer this question are excluded, the total percentage of individuals who learned 
about one of the studied organizations online stood at only 37%.  However, such a finding does 
not negate the importance of the Internet in growing the creation care and emerging church 
movements, but rather speaks to the communal strength of religious organization.  Thus the 
Internet may be playing more of a ―second-order‖ role in bringing supporters to the studied 
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groups.  For instance, as we know, the EEN encourages supporters to download material online 
which is then used to spread the tenants of evangelical environmentalism at their local church.  
In this regard, it is entirely likely that those who learn of these groups online are subsequently 
telling their friends and spreading the word at church and other offline venues.  This approach 
seems to have significant value for the studied organizations.  For instance while discussing the 
importance of offline proselytizing, author and ESA speaker Al Tizon noted that, ―there‘s no 
substitute for face-to-face,‖ adding that face-to-face interactions ―often result in, ‗Hey how can I 
join ESA, how can I be a part of this? How can I help spread the word?‘‖402  At which point ESA 
refers individuals to their website.  Tizon similarly notes that ESA members who came to the 
groups via this face-to-face route are the ones most likely to ―endure.‖403 
 
Conclusion 
 
At its basic level, the Internet is used to broadcast simple, yet important information, such 
as contact information, historical and biographical information, as well as providing additional 
insight into where a campaign stands on the issues.  In their attempt to persuade others of the 
biblical mandate for environmental protection, several creation care groups use the Internet to 
highlight scriptural passages supporting their cause.  Creation care organizations most heavily 
into virtual bible thumping are those most optimistic about the future of the creation care 
movement.  Another way in which information is shared online is through the use of linking.  
Linking allows users to quickly and easily navigate the online environment, but as this chapter 
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has shown, web architects can greatly affect the linking experience through determining which 
links are made available.  Many secular campaigns avoid using links that navigate the user away 
from the campaign website.  However, this has not been the case with the studied organizations.  
In particular, creation care groups routinely link to outside groups with shared or similar 
interests. In doing so, the evangelical organizations under review are fostering new ties to like-
minded groups, thus expanding the institutional resources available to these groups, while 
simultaneously growing the social networks of participating group members.  As a result both 
strong and weak social ties and strengthened, while requisite pools of social capital are both 
expanded and deepened. 
Like the practice of web informing, web involving is another common feature of online 
campaigns.  One of the earliest forms of web involving was through so-called text-based 
interactivity. While some may view text-based interactivity as a crude and dated method of web 
involving, it remains a practice common among campaigns of all types.  In many instance, text-
based interactivity directs users to face-to-face meet-ups, as is the case with Renewal‘s Day of 
Prayer, which is also a prime example of the web technique known as convergence.  
Convergence, as we have seen, is a unique and powerful tool that allows users and site managers 
the ability to transverse both the online and offline worlds.  Many of the websites of groups 
affiliated with the selected case studies regularly ask their online supporters to encourage their 
friends, family and neighbors to take action in the offline world. 
Another technique for web involving is that of transactions.  Transactions occur when a 
web user makes a commitment of either time or money.  From a monetary perspective, while 
many campaigns often solicit financial support online through an easy-to-use donation interface, 
this is not always the case with the studied organizations.  Emergent Village, for example, has no 
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online donation interface to speak of, nor do they ask for monetary contributions.  Renewal is a 
similarly story, in that while they encourage supporters to give, their website lacks an online 
donation feature. Instead, Renewal asks individuals to send their contributions via traditional 
post to a third party collector, Green Vineyard, with whom Renewal has a strong relationship. 
Finally, the practice of web connecting takes place when the Internet is used to cultivate 
meaningful relationships (the creation of social capital).  As we have seen, the Internet is an ideal 
medium through which dissident religious voices are both empowered and amplified.  In this 
regard, the Internet has played a decisive role in lessening the influence of the old guard 
evangelicals, by bringing to the fore new and previously neglected theological agendas such as 
evangelical environmentalism and the social gospel.  The very fact that the creation and 
emerging church movements have garnered such widespread support serves as an impressive 
testament to the Internet‘s ability to overcome various obstacles, such as geographic space and 
the seemingly monolithic cultural values of a given people.  As once isolated values and groups 
of people gather strength and increasingly challenge the hegemony of established orders, 
inevitably new tensions arise.  As they do, old hierarchies are weakened as the cultural values 
that once defined a certain group of people change.  Within the evangelical community, this 
process is taking place, often in a brutal and public manner.  Like all value shifts, these changes 
are impacting society, and given the relative size and strength of the American evangelical 
community, these changes are similarly impacting the political process.  However, before we can 
began to access the depth of this impact, it is first important to better understand the nature of 
this fragmentation, as well as the issues around which the various factions are dividing.  For that 
we turn to the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE CHANGING BIBLICAL POLITICS OF THE MODERN 
AMERICAN EVANGELICAL TRADITION 
 
 
Whoever is not for us is against us—Mark 9:40 
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 While it is widely known that religious communities play a significant role in the American 
political processes, many observers are acutely unaware of recent changes within the evangelical 
tradition, and have naively continued to operate under the assumption that all, or at least the 
overwhelming majority of, evangelical voters are dependably Republican.  This chapter contests 
this notion by highlighting recent theological and political developments within the evangelical 
community.  It argues that recent changes in the communication landscape have helped shift 
evangelical concerns towards environmental protection and social justice, two causes that favor 
the Democratic Party.  A consequence of this change is that the evangelical tradition is politically 
less unified than it once was.  This is so as while the broadcast media of television and radio 
have had a largely unifying effect on the political and social values of evangelicals, the new 
media environment appears to be having the opposite effect.  Given the Internet‘s ability to 
facilitate dialogue and enable scattered groups of people with shared concerns the means to more 
readily communicate, the Internet is in effect serving as a sort of arena where issue-based politics 
are contesting the preeminence of interest-based group politics.  As a result, evangelical 
Christianity is both polarizing on key issues, while simultaneously becoming more politically 
moderate as a whole.  To illustrate this point, this chapter provides data comparing the value 
preferences of the broader evangelical community against that of the selected case studies and 
their affiliate organizations. 
 
The Mechanical Forces that Shape Our Preferences 
 
In 1969, economist Thomas Schelling was sure of two things:  most Americans were not 
racists and too many American neighborhoods continued to be plagued by persistent racial 
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segregation.  Perplexed by these inconsistencies, Schelling set out to perform a simple 
experiment that he hoped would explain ―the relationship between collective results and 
individual intents.‖404  What Schelling did next was to create virtual communities consisting of 9 
black households, represented by the symbol ―+‖ and 10 white households which were 
represented by the symbol ―0.‖  Schelling then arranged these homes randomly into virtual 
neighborhoods, so that these communities looked something like this: 
 
00+++000+00++0++00+ 
+00++000+0+++000++0 
 
Schelling then postulated that in a fully integrated community, such as those shown 
above, residents would have a natural tendency to want to live near neighbors of their own race.  
Working from this, Schilling began rearranging these neighborhoods along the premise that if 
fewer than half of any resident‘s nearest four neighbors were of the same race, then that resident 
would move to the nearest location consistent with those preferences.  Schelling soon discovered 
that his once racially integrated neighborhoods quickly broke-down and in their place racially 
segregated neighborhoods appeared: 
 
00000+++++++++00000 
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This simple experiment led Schelling to conclude that, ―the interplay of individual choices, 
where unorganized segregation is concerned, is a complex system with collective results that 
bear no close relation to individual intent.‖405 
Years later, Mark Buchanan built upon Schelling‘s discovery using what is known as 
―small-worlds‖ theory, which stipulates that unseen social and mechanical patterns often prove 
pivotal in understanding how information is exchanged within a given network.  Thus, Buchanan 
writes, ―social realities are fashioned not only by the desires of people but also by the action of 
blind and more or less mechanical forces...forces that can amplify slight and seemingly harmless 
personal preferences into dramatic and troubling consequences.‖406  As Buchanan notes, the 
networks to which an individual belongs are ―are perpetually on the very edge of instability and 
tumultuous upheaval.‖407  These very networks exist among the clusters of everyday life, such as 
shared geographic proximity and professional communities.  Thus, in our ever fluid and 
globalized world, individuals will often move, change jobs, and make new acquaintances.  When 
communal life is disrupted, as in the case of a move, we often seek communities of familiarity 
and like-minded individuals.  This is not to say, however, that relationships once made are 
forgotten.  Indeed, in the age of Facebook and Linkedin, it is easy than to stay in touch with old 
friends, acquaintances and professional colleagues.  Moreover, such repositories of social capital 
can similarly be called upon in rough times, for future financial opportunities, or simply when 
life‘s circumstances change.  While Buchanan‘s work on small-worlds theory illustrates the 
interconnectedness of the entire planet, or what Bachman‘s describes as ‗degrees of separation,‘ 
he continually returns to the point that in order for communities to function, there must be 
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sufficient levels of trust and understanding, which to Bachman is the foundation of social capital.  
Drastic differences in values, world-views, ideologies and the like, work to undermine mutual 
trust and understanding.  This is not to say that such differences need necessarily be an 
impediment to a thriving community (as many would argue that the most dynamic and vibrant 
communities are also those rich in diversity and multiculturalism).  But when considered along 
with the literature analyzing the social effects of Internet technologies on communal stocks of 
social capital and other public goods, Buchanan‘s small-worlds theory runs counter to the 
utopian assertions of many early technological populists, such as Michael and Ronda Hauben, 
who write: 
 
We are seeing a revitalization of society.  The frameworks are being redesigned 
from the bottom up.  A new more democratic world is becoming possible...The 
Net seems to open a new lease on life for people, social connections that were 
never before possible, or relatively hard to achieve, are now facilitated by the 
Net.
408
 
 
Or for that matter, past U.S. Presidents, such as Ronald Reagan, who in 1989 famously declared 
that ―the Goliath of totalitarianism will be brought down by the David of the microchip.‖409  Or 
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George W. Bush, who later pondered, ―Imagine if the Internet took hold in China.  Imagine how 
freedom would spread.‖410  
Although populist claims such as those above may in part be true,
411
 Internet technology, 
as we know, is not without its social dark side.  For instance, with the abundance of choice 
afforded by the new media environment, like-minded individuals and groups have quickly 
coalesced into small niche clusters.  This recent social development is the result of a 
technological progression which Nicholas Carr describes as the ―electrification‖ of America‘s 
mass culture, whereby the Internet, with its near endless and ever-expanding content, is steadily 
displacing the unifying effects of popular television shows, radio programs, movies, books, 
newspapers and magazines by affording its audience highly specialized markets which suit deep 
personal desires.
412
  As net users cluster around narrowly focused topics and interests, these 
clusters, if insulated and unexposed to outside views and opinions, have a tendency to create an 
echo-chamber effect, in which agreeable views are reinforced and amplified, the results of which 
can prove disastrous for deliberative democracy.
413
   
As Paul Starr observes, prior to cable television and the Internet, American presidents 
relied on broadcast networks and newsprint to reach the national public.  This dependency gave 
networks and major newspapers considerable power as they controlled access to the channels of 
public persuasion.  This power was, however, balanced by a White House that could ―exercise 
plenty of leverage in its media relations by selectively leaking news and granting exclusive 
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interviews,‖ and a press core that ―operated more or less according to standards of professional 
journalism.‖414   Today, however, traditional media is facing new challenges and a changed 
landscape in which ―neither the broadcast networks nor the newspapers have the reach they once 
did.‖415  As a result, the unified public once assembled by traditional media is rapidly fading.  
And in this new Internet age, a basic rule of communication seems confirmed: abundance brings 
scarcity.  As we have seen, news outlets are increasingly abandoning past standards of 
professional journalism in favor of a new business model, one that helps breed social 
polarization and audience fragmentation.
416
 
Much like political authority, religious authority depends upon a unified audience.  As 
has been previously discussed, broadcast media proved instrumental in unifying a diverse 
evangelical tradition behind core cultural and political values.  This in turn led to a consolidation 
of power and the ability to focus evangelical energies on a narrow set of social priorities.  
However, as media has grown to include abundant communicative platforms, new theological 
movements have taken root within the evangelical community that fray their collective energies 
while challenging traditional power structures. 
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Group Polarization 
 
As we have seen, televangelism, like radio before it, helped bridge long held 
denominational divides, the result of which was the homogenization of American evangelicals. 
This result has been dubbed the mainstreaming effect, whereby regular television viewing works 
to create a confluence of ideas and ―a coming-together of attitudes.‖417  When viewed regularly 
and by divergent groups, what often results is the adoption of more extreme political ideas and 
social values by audience members.  In the case of televangelism, mainstreaming effectively 
brought the values of its viewers into closer political proximity with those of televangelists 
themselves, thereby moving viewers to the more conservative end of the political spectrum.
418
  
Moreover, once an individual is caught up in the mainstreaming effect, there is a natural 
tendency to seek out viewpoints with which they already agree.  This works to further reinforce 
pre-existing biases and often moves both the viewer and broadcaster to ever-greater extremes.
419
  
Thus, by appealing to individuals who felt unnerved by the social upheavals of the 1960s, 
televangelists worked to foster a community of conservative Christians whose numbers grew as 
the public increasingly gained access to cable television.  Meanwhile, as evangelical Christianity 
found itself caught in the mainstreaming effect, both the message of televangelists and the 
viewers themselves gradually crept towards the conservative right.
420
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The Internet does not necessarily negate this mainstreaming effect.  In fact, it could be 
argued that the Internet exacerbates the problem, for when individuals are afforded an abundance 
of choice they often visit sites that appeal to selected interests and which reinforce pre-existing 
bias.  Similarly, the newly actualized transcendence of local space that ICTs afford requires us to 
reconsider political engagement as ―a series of places embodying reconstructed models of 
citizenship and new forms of political activism.‖421  Embedded within this new realm of civic 
activity are networks of wired activists who are rapidly re-writing the rules of civic engagement 
and political activity to include such things as online petitions, virtual boycotts, the development 
of public awareness websites, and to mobilize vast numbers through simple tweets and wall 
posts, to name but a few.
422
  Activities such as these have not only changed the nature of political 
participation, but also demonstrate why a new conceptualization of civic engagement is needed. 
As a growing number of individuals find their way online, and as regular daily habits 
change because of it,
423
 challenging new questions arise concerning the complexities of 
contemporary social relations, civic engagement and contested political activity.  For instance, 
the widely adopted practice of conscience-driven consumption, such as the purchasing of ―fair-
trade‖ goods, certified ―organic‖ produce and ―conflict-free‖ diamonds, illustrates the difficulties 
in measuring contemporary civic engagement, as this sort of activity is nearly impossible to 
quantify.  The Internet aids in this practice by empowering citizens to quickly and easily find 
information that would otherwise require a significant investment of time.  As a result, thresholds 
for civic engagement are lowered and political power is exercised in new and novel ways.
424
  In 
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addition to this, the Internet is similarly fostering new networks and repertoires for citizenship by 
enabling connections between far flung individuals and groups with shared and similar interests. 
Serving as a vehicle through which bottom-up grassroots activity is more easily achieved, the 
Internet has evolved into an effective medium through which the power of individuals is greatly 
enhanced and better positioned to serve larger collective goods.   
As already discussed, Bimber has taken these social implications one step further to 
assert that the Internet has led America down the path of accelerated pluralism,
425
 where interest-
based group politics are shifting towards more fluid issue-based group politics, consequently 
resulting in declining institutional coherence.
426
  In many cases, ―access to the Internet provides 
the opportunity to participate in networks and interest-communities that would be unavailable 
otherwise.‖427  For older, more established regimes such as trade unions, political parties, and 
even religious coalitions, the shift from interest-based group politics in favor of issue-based 
group politics poses serious challenges to consolidated positions of power. 
 
Group Polarization and Creation Care 
 
Although Chapter 8 will explore the political implications of the evangelical 
environmental movement in much greater depth, let us take a moment to consider the polarizing 
force of the creation care movement itself.  The Facebook group, ―Christians and the 
Environment: Stop the Creation Care Agenda!‖ states:  
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Creation Care is a radical new liberal political agenda sweeping through 
America....More importantly, the movement encourages Christians to start voting 
for Democrats who generally favor radical environmental agendas. It also 
supports radical environmental legislation like ―Cap and Trade,‖ which would do 
nothing more than impose a huge carbon tax on Americans in order to redistribute 
wealth to Africa and the United Nations. Imagine the cost of a gallon of gas after 
being taxed an additional 60 cents per gallon because someone wants to send 
American money to the United Nations! 
 
They got popular Ameri[c]an pastors to buy into the Creation Care. These are 
pastors like Rob Bell and Rick Warren who have gone along with this agenda 
without fully knowing the implications. Remember no one wants unclean water, 
but the ―Creation Care‖ movement has nothing to do with helping the 
environment.  
 
In the end, Creation Care is a movement that tries to trick well-intentioned 
Christians into voting for liberal Democrats and their anti-family agendas that 
attack Christianity.
428
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By viewing creation care as a political battle waged by subversive cultural outsiders, rather than 
as a legitimate theological discussion occurring within a larger religious body, important 
communal connections that unify large and diverse communities, such as the American 
evangelical tradition, are lost.  The result of this lost connectivity negatively impacts evangelical 
social capital as it inevitably leads to feelings of distrust, increased animosity and, at an extreme, 
even enmity. 
Yet tensions between conservative evangelicals and the growing creation care movement 
are not limited to a few Facebook groups.  For instance, Barrett Duke, Vice-President of the 
Ethics and Religious Liberty Council, which serves as the political arm of the Southern Baptist 
Convention, offered this comment during an interview: 
 
I don‘t think it‘s the creation care movement that many evangelicals have a 
concern with per-se.  The Bible instructs us to care for the environment and so it 
isn‘t that many evangelicals have objections to the creation care movement.   I 
think many evangelicals are deeply concerned about the ideology that drives some 
of the creation care interests, pantheistic ideologies, and naturalistic ideologies 
that tend to equate all life on the planet, are of great concern to us.  It‘s not the 
creation care movement that concern[s] many evangelicals, it‘s the ideology of 
particular individuals or particular groups, possibly promoting their ideology 
through [the] creation care message.
429
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To be clear, there is no evidence suggesting that evangelical environmentalism is 
anything but a growing religious movement of devoted Christians.  At the same time, however, 
Duke, like the Facebook group Christians and the Environment, is correct in noting that 
evangelical environmentalism is well positioned to siphon support away from the GOP.  This 
concern reflects important new realities for the Christian Right, namely that the social and 
political priorities of a new generation of American evangelicals are dramatically different from 
those of previous generations, and that the growth of the creation care movement (as well as the 
emerging church), stands as a testament to the Christian Right‘s shattered religious monologue. 
Today, the vanguard of the Christian Right finds its historic religious supremacy 
challenged, and predictably, there has been considerable conservative backlash against many of 
these newer evangelical movements. ―Resisting the Green Dragon,‖ a product of the Cornwall 
Alliance, a Christian think-tank whose members include evangelical heavyweights such as James 
Dobson, Tony Perkins, Charles Colson, Michael Farris and D. James Kennedy, is one such 
example. ―Billed as a ‗Biblical response to one of the greatest deceptions of our day,‘‖430 
―Resisting the Green Dragon‖ is a twelve week video series that claims ―[t]he entire climate 
change movement is a ‗false religion,‘ a nefarious conspiracy to empower eugenicists and create 
a ‗global government.‘‖431 Individuals interested in learning more about ―Resisting the Green 
Dragon,‖ can order this ―one-of-a-kind DVD series‖ online, complete with a discussion guide 
and a book ―presenting a Christian response to radical environmentalism.‖432  Online visitors can 
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also view the documentary trailer, which begins amidst the backdrop of ominous music and 
Orwellian imagery, while a narrator speaks: 
 
In what has become one of the greatest deceptions of our day, radical 
environmentalism is striving to put America and the world under its constructive 
control.  This so-called green dragon is seducing your children in our classrooms 
and popular culture.  It‘s lust for political power now extends to the highest global 
levels, and its twisted view of the world elevates nature above the needs of 
people, even the poorest and most helpless.  With millions falling prey to its 
spiritual deception, the time is now to stand and resist.   
 
Around the world, environmentalism has become a radical movement, something 
we call ‗the green dragon,‘ and it is deadly.  Deadly to human prosperity, deadly 
to human life, deadly to human freedom, and deadly to the gospel of Jesus Christ.  
Make no mistake about it, environmentalism is no longer your friend, it is your 
enemy.
433
 
 
At a price of $71.90, the entire Green Dragon DVD series and related printed material is 
prohibitively expensive for many evangelicals.  The Cornwall Alliance likely knows this, and if 
they were so inclined, they could potentially provide this series at a steeply discounted price, 
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having so many financial backers.
434
  Yet the Cornwall Alliance most assuredly knows that the 
―Resisting the Green Dragon‖ series is likely to be seen by many more people than just the 
individuals who buy it.  As we shall see in the following chapter, religious material such as 
printed books, audio books and DVDs are often shared among family and friends, and are 
commonly shown in adult Sunday School classrooms and as part of worship services, a feat 
which could not be achieved absent high levels of social capital. 
In addition to being shown in churches, the Resisting the Green Dragon campaign also 
enjoys considerable buzz on several Christian broadcast outlets, such as talk radio, a medium still 
largely dominated by the Christian Right, and one to which many evangelicals continue to listen.  
For instance, evangelist Jan Markell devoted two days of airtime exclusively to promoting the 
Cornwall Alliance agenda on her radio program, Understanding the Times.  As she notes, ―the 
environmental movement has an agenda…and Christians are playing into it and Christians are 
spreading it.‖435  She goes on to say, ―the place I like to turn to for the truth is the Cornwall 
Alliance.‖436  Even Glenn Beck has gotten in on the act.  In an interview of E. Calvin Beisner, 
founder of the Cornwall Alliance, and David Barton of Wall Builders, an Alliance supporter, on 
his Fox News television show he makes it quite clear where he stands.  In one exchange during a 
discussion of ‗Let There Be Stuff,‘ an environmental publication by the Tides Foundation aimed 
at religious teens, Beisner reads a sentence from his book.  ―When we drink,‖ Beisner reads, ―we 
owe a debt.‖  ―What, to God?‖  Beisner asks.  ―To the earth‘s great water?‖ he concludes.  To 
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which Beck replies, ―That‘s American Native—I guess you could go there.  It‘s paganism!‖437  
And statements such as these are increasingly common rhetorical tools used by the Christian 
Right to depict emerging theological movements, such as evangelical environmentalism, as 
enemies of God. 
 
Beyond the Sterile Polarities of the Christian Right? 
 
In January of 2004, the now late Jerry Falwell authored a much talked about editorial 
entitled “God is pro-war.”438  In this provocative piece, Falwell declares that while Christians are 
called to “be people of peace,”439 there are a number of biblical scriptures that he claims justify 
war.  Extrapolating from these selected passages, Falwell then makes the argument that 
America‘s 2003 invasion of Iraq was not only warranted, but also sanctioned by God.  Falwell 
writes: 
 
Today, America continues to face the horrible realities of our fallen world. 
Suicide bombings and terrorist actions are beamed live into our homes daily. This 
serves as a constant reminder of the frailty of our flesh. 
It is apparent that our God-authored freedoms must be defended. 
                                                 
437
 Glenn Beck and E. Calvin Beisner, ―Glenn Beck,‖ Fox News, October 16, 2010.  Found online at: 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hvctF7qfqB8>  (Accessed January 13, 2011). 
438
 Jerry Falwell, ―God is pro-war,‖ WorldNetDaily, January 31, 2004.  Found online at:  
<http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=36859> (Accessed January 4, 2011).  
439
 Ibid. 
230 
 
Throughout the book of Judges, God calls the Israelites to go to war against the 
Midianites and Philistines. Why? Because these nations were trying to conquer 
Israel, and God's people were called to defend themselves. 
 
President Bush declared war in Iraq to defend innocent people. This is a worthy 
pursuit. In fact, Proverbs 21:15 tells us: ―It is joy to the just to do judgment: but 
destruction shall be to the workers of iniquity.‖ 
One of the primary purposes of the church is to stop the spread of evil, even at the 
cost of human lives. If we do not stop the spread of evil, many innocent lives will 
be lost and the kingdom of God suffers.
440
 
 
For many readers, both secular and religious alike, Falwell‟s piece typifies much of what 
is wrong with religion, namely that it leads believers down the path of violence and vengeance.  
And while many were quick to condemn Falwell‟s editorial, amoung the Christian Right Falwell 
was hardly alone in his vocal support for the invasion of Iraq.  For instance, former Nixon aide 
and founder of the Prison Fellowship, Charles Colson, argued that the “Just War Theory” ought 
to be “stretched” to include pre-emptive strikes against suspected terrorist organizations and 
countries that harbor terrorists.
441
  Similarly, Richard Land, former President of the Southern 
Baptist Convention, came to Bush‟s defense arguing that Saddam Hussein was developing 
weapons of mass destruction at “breakneck speed” which he planned on using against “America 
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and her allies.”442  Land would go on to incorrectly argue that Iraq was directly involved with the 
attacks of September 11, 2001.  Meanwhile, James Dobson asserted that Saddam Hussein was 
but “another brutal tyrant” who, in his words, “must be stopped.”443  For his part, Charles Stanley 
of the First Baptist Church of Atlanta, whose televised sermons are seen by millions of viewers 
each week, preached, “[w]e should offer to serve the war effort in any way possible.”444   
Adding, “God battles with people who oppose him, who fight against him and his followers.”445  
Tim LaHaye similarly welcomed the Iraq war as “a focal point of end-time events.”446  
Unsurprisingly, statements such as these proved pivotal in drumming up evangelical support for 
the Iraq war.  As Charles Marsh reported, “[w]ar sermons rallied evangelical congregations 
behind the invasion of Iraq,” and as a result, “an astonishing 87 percent of white evangelical 
Christians in the United States supported the President‟s decision in April 2003.”447  However, in 
the years that have followed, public support for the Iraq war has fallen considerably and to a 
large extent evangelical support has mirrored this trend, though the war remains more popular 
among evangelicals than with the general American populous.
448
  Jim Rice and Jeannie Choi 
note one reason for this declining support is that many evangelicals, and in particular younger 
evangelicals, are discovering a “deeper understanding of what it means to be pro-life.”449  This 
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new understanding extends the simple abortion debate to include issues of environmental 
protection, poverty relief and even American military engagements.
450
 
As conditions on the ground deteriorated and support for the Iraq war waned, many 
evangelical leaders found themselves in a precarious situation.  As Ed Stoddard noted just days 
before the 2006 mid-term elections, many of these leaders had little choice but to support an 
unpopular war, an unpopular president and an unpopular political party as they had so 
“demonized” the Democrats that they had “nowhere else to go.”451  This sort of politicization 
within the evangelical tradition is nothing new, though increasingly it appears to be driving a 
wedge within the evangelical community.  Take for instance, Justin McMurdie.  McMurdie is a 
self-described conservative evangelical pastor in his mid-thirties who oversees a thriving Church 
of God congregation in rural Oregon.  For McMurdie, “[t]here are whole segments of the 
evangelical world that have become almost completely politicized.  A good example,” 
McMurdie contends, “is Jerry Falwell and the Religious Right—or Ralph Reed,” two whom he 
calls the “starlets of the Religious Right.”  As McMurdie sees it, “Most evangelicals have been 
taught, „Republican is right, Democrat is evil.‟”  McMurdie confessed during his interview that 
 
[f]rom my own personal perspective, I was caught up in that.  I go back to the 
2000 election with Gore and Bush, and the recount and all that mess.  I remember 
listening to talk radio and being very angry.  And you hear all the vehemence on 
the part of the religious right.  After 2004, after Bush won and to see where he 
went with his presidency, I just lost hope in the political process.  I felt that right 
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or left, there‘s a lot of corruption and I don‘t know if, right or left, we are 
accomplishing anything.
452
 
 
Yet despite these feelings, McMurdie believes it is important for evangelicals to remain engaged 
politically, though today he is unwilling to call himself either a Republican or a Democrat.  He 
also admits that in the past, ―evangelicals have gone way too far [in] identifying with the 
Republican Party,‖ an identification McMurdie feels needs to end.453  Fortunately for McMurdie 
and others who share his opinion, the next generation of evangelical leaders is charting a vastly 
different political course than that of the Christian Right.  One such leader is Shane Claiborne. 
 
Ordinary Radicals 
 
With his long dreadlocked hair and his hemp-fibered clothing, Shane Claiborne appears 
to be more of a Berkley hippie than a leader in the evangelical community, yet that is precisely 
what Claiborne is: an evangelical leader, albeit one who in many ways is the antithesis of the old 
Christian Right.  For instance, Claiborne contests the idea that there can be such a thing as a just 
war.  To illustrate his point he draws upon on a popular Gospel account: 
 
Peter had the best case for ―just war‖ there ever was.  As the soldiers are coming 
to get Jesus, and here he is very innocently—just picks up his sword and cuts off 
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one of their ears—first of all, not a great shot—but Jesus looks at him and he 
scolds him and says, ―he who picks up the sword, dies by the sword.  I could have 
called down legions of angels, [but] that‘s not how my revolution happens.‖  And 
after that, he [Jesus] picks up the ear and heals the wounded persecutor.  Right—
and there‘s so much power in that.  And the early Christians said, ―when Jesus 
disarmed Peter, he disarmed every Christian.‖454 
 
And it is a message Claiborne is taking to the people.  In a popular Youtube video clip for the 
award-winning documentary The Ordinary Radicals, Claiborne performs the following liturgy in 
front of thousands of gathered worshipers: 
 
Shane Claiborne: With governments that kill… 
Congregational Response:  We will not comply. 
Shane Claiborne:  With the theology of empire… 
Congregation Response:  We will not comply. 
Shane Claiborne:  With the business of militarism… 
Congregation Response:  We will not comply. 
Shane Claiborne:  With the hording of riches… 
Congregation Response:  We will not comply. 
Shane Claiborne:  With the dissemination of fear… 
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Congregation Response:  We will not comply.
455
 
 
And it is this message of nonviolence and social justice that Claiborne and so many other 
emerging Christians are passionately preaching.  This is also the message that is working to 
redefine evangelical Christianity.  As Jerry Maneker writes on his website, Radical Christianity: 
 
Jesus was a radical and, hence, countercultural and, as Christians, we are to be 
radical and countercultural as well!  We are never to be satisfied with a status quo 
that allows assorted social ills such as poverty, corruption in institutions, 
discrimination of any kind, or the creation of out-groups that are then demonized 
and discriminated against “in the name of God,” to go unchallenged.456 
 
Increasingly, many evangelicals are heeding such messages and are attempting to live their faith 
through action and deeds. 
Often called “radical Christianity,” or “new-monasticism,” the belief that Christians are 
called to rise above patrician squabbles and instead live in service to one another is quickly 
catching on among many younger evangelicals.  Claiborne could be the poster-child of these 
self-described “ordinary radicals.”  He states, ―Young evangelicals have done something really 
dangerous. We picked up our Bibles and we read them. It put us at odds with the evangelical 
establishment,‖ adding, ―when we looked at the Moral Majority [and other groups], we saw the 
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inconsistency of the church.‖457  As Claiborne sees it, past political dichotomies of ―left‖ and 
―right‖ are not all that important to younger evangelicals.  According to Claiborne, for younger 
evangelicals, the distinctions that matters the most are between ―nice‖ and ―mean.‖  
Unsurprisingly, Claiborne sees himself and others like him as ―political misfits,‖ a label he 
eagerly embraces as he continues preaching a message of inclusion and love.
458
 
Ben Corey is another self-described “misfit.” Born and raised a Baptist, Corey found a 
new home among the emergent Christian community in Boston after being “pushed out” of his 
previous church for having expressed favorable views towards the work of Rob Bell, another 
emergent Christian and author of the popular book, Velvet Elvis.
459
  As Corey recounts, “my wife 
and I really became devastated in a way that a whole social network had kind of collapsed 
because people thought I was a messenger of Satan because I like Rob Bell.  The whole thing 
was absurd, but we lost a lot of friends.‖460  Still, Corey and his wife were determined to make 
the best of a bad situation.  Without ties to hold them back, they moved to Boston and began 
graduate school.  That first week in Boston Corey bumped into some fellow evangelicals who, 
like him, were ―disgruntled about the evangelical movement‖ and ―felt like outcasts.‖461  One of 
these individuals told Corey about Emergent Village.  As Corey recalls: 
 
When they described things to me, I was like, ‗Holy shit, I‘m Emergent,‘ and so I 
called Jeff [Gentry], the founder of the Emergent Village cohort, and I had coffee 
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with him and we just started talking and I realized that I wasn‘t an outcast but that 
there was actually a whole movement for people just like me.  And I finally found 
a place where I could be accepted and be myself and not worry about people not 
being your friend because you might have a different theological perspective than 
them.  It was really life changing for me.
462
 
 
For Corey, Emergent Village is much more than a theological home where he can find other 
religious ―misfits‖ like himself.463  Crucially, with its recognition that issues of social and 
economic justice are the core of the Gospel message, it enables him to do the good work he sees 
as defining him as a Christian.  As Corey sees it, the best way to address these issues is by 
―putting your words into action in the here and now, and not just talking about it at church on 
Sunday.‖464  As Corey further states, ―A lot of people I‘ve talked to in the Emergent 
conversation, just didn‘t think evangelicals were doing enough good, and they found other 
people who were far more involved.‖465 
In many ways Corey Beals shares Ben Corey‘s passion for doing more.  Yet Beals is not 
a member of Emergent Village, nor does he describe himself as an emerging Christian.  Instead, 
Beals is a respected advocate for creation care and a board member with Restoring Eden.  As we 
shall see in later chapters, Beals views the creation care movement as much more than 
environmental protection.  It is instead a part of the larger pro-life movement that rests on the 
belief that Christians are called to be in service to one another.  Knowing this helps explain 
Beals‘s passion in tackling issues such as social justice and poverty, a passion he shares with his 
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many students at George Fox University, a prestigious evangelical university located in the 
Pacific Northwest.  As Beals noted one day over coffee: 
 
And I say to my students, the Bible doesn‘t tell us to love everyone, that‘s easy to 
do, ‗cause loving everyone means that I don‘t really have to love anyone.  But the 
Bible tells us to love anyone.  You know, I think the root of the Good Samaritan 
isn‘t ―who is my neighbor;‖ the point is not ―Do I love the whole world?‖  Every 
beauty pageant person loves the whole world and wants world peace, right?  We 
all want that.  But it‘s easy for me to love the whole world; it‘s just particular 
persons I can‘t stand.  So what we‘re trying to do [is love] particular persons.  
That‘s where it becomes hard.  Whether it‘s your roommate, or the person down 
the street who‘s being ignored—it‘s not some glorious poverty like in India, but 
its poverty, and its real needs.   So some of these people we can‘t ignore.  We 
can‘t choose who our neighbors are.466  
 
And it seems Beals‘s message of committing oneself to the less fortunate is having a real impact 
on his students.  As Beals further notes:  
 
I had one student who chose to intentionally live in the poorest part of Newburg, 
[with] neighbors who were fatherless, and just sort of had reached out to them.  
Through their living, they just rented this house in the poorest part of Newburg 
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and were able to love their neighbor.  Part of it is putting yourself in your 
neighbor‘s way, putting yourself with people who have needs.  I get really 
discouraged when I look at a lot of things in this world.  It gets really easy to 
think, ―man, you know, where are we going and why are we in this kind of 
basket?‖  I‘ll look at these students, and they take them and they‘ll go and run 
ahead of me, and in their very doing that, they challenge me with the very things 
I‘ve taught them to go further.  It‘s very inspiring and it‘s in those kinds of people 
where we‘re going to find hope, because they‘re deeply committed, they get it and 
they‘re not caught up in the dichotomous politics.467 
 
And Christian believers such as Beals, whether professed Emergents or not, will come to play an 
ever larger role within the emerging conversation, as Emergent Village has decided to further 
decentralize its operation.  The most evident example of this decentralization was a vote by the 
board of directors to drop its organizational leader.  This move came amid fears that the 
organization of Emergent Village was beginning to too closely resemble an institutional 
hierarchy, and was straying too far from its egalitarian and social networking roots.  Thus, with 
Emergent Village firmly committed to a decentralized, grass roots operation, the need for many 
strong individuals such as Corey to reach out and shape the lives of future generations will 
become all the more important. 
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Changing Political Attitudes 
 
As previous chapters already show, evangelical Christians have been one of the most 
dependable Republican voting blocs in the United States, and among the most socially 
conservative of all Americans.  For instance, when asked to describe their political ideology, 
more than half of all evangelicals (52%) identified as ―conservative,‖ while another 30% 
described themselves as ―moderate.‖  Only 11% of all evangelicals viewed themselves as 
―liberal.‖  On the issue of abortion, some 61% of evangelicals believe abortion should be illegal 
in all or almost all instances, whereas only 33% of evangelicals believe it should be legal in all or 
almost all instances.  Finally on the issue of homosexuality, some 64% of evangelicals hold that 
homosexuality is a way of life that should be discouraged by society, while only 26% hold that 
homosexuality should be accepted by society.  Yet when we examine the political attitudes of 
younger evangelicals, we find a remarkably different story.  As Penning and Corwin note, while 
younger evangelicals are just as theologically conservative as their elders, unlike their parents 
and grandparents, this theological conservatism does not always carry over into the political 
arena.
468
  Gay rights are a prime example. 
While younger evangelicals largely believe homosexuality to be a sin, “a majority of 
young evangelicals support some legal recognition of gay partnerships.”469  For instance, 24% of 
younger evangelicals believe homosexuals should have the legal right to marry (as opposed to 
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10% of older evangelicals) while an additional 32% are supportive of civil unions.
470
  As former 
Vice-president of the National Evangelical Association Richard Cizik notes, younger 
evangelicals “disagree quite strongly with their elders”471 on gay rights.  Cizik further contends 
that, “the influence of their [younger evangelicals] generational peers is clear.  Four in ten young 
evangelicals say they have a close friend or family member who is gay or lesbian.  
Unsurprisingly, more than half of all younger evangelicals are supportive of either same sex 
marriage and/or civil unions.”472 
  Like many of his peers, Shane Claiborne‟s views on homosexuality have been shaped by 
having a gay friend.  As Claiborne recalls: 
 
I had some strong views on abortion, homosexuality, all these things that were 
completely formed by—that conversation for me was completely formed by the 
political culture and what I saw in the news and all that.  And I ripped some 
liberals apart in debates, and I had some serious stuff to say about abortion, but I 
didn‘t know anybody who had had an abortion.  I had some serious stuff to say 
about homosexuality, but I didn‘t know any gay folks.  And it was really in 
college where I got to know someone who was attracted to the same gender, and 
[he] thought God made a mistake in creating him, and he wanted to kill himself.  
And I thought to myself, this is more complicated than anything I‘ve ever thought 
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and all the words I‘ve used.  And I thought, ―if this guy cannot find a safe place in 
the church, then who have we become?‖473 
 
Among emergent Christians, who seek to live out the social gospel, the issue of gay rights ranks 
as a top priority.  As Ben Corey notes, ―There are certainly a growing number of emergents who 
are theologically open to homosexuality.‖474 Yet this openness has Corey concerned.  His worry 
is that the issue of gay rights may soon serve as a sort of litmus test for who is emergent and who 
is not; something which, should it occur, would turn the emerging church into the ―opposite 
extreme.‖475 
For many younger evangelicals, the issue of gay rights is but one of many important 
social and theological issues.  As Dan Harris reports, ―A younger generation of evangelical 
Christians is coming of age—and as they head to the polls, they are breaking from their parents 
and focusing on a broader range of issues than just abortion and gay marriage.‖476  Pam 
Chamberlain has similarly found that younger evangelicals are ―more inclined than their parents 
to support social justice efforts such as environmental stewardship, anti-poverty programs, or 
HIV/AIDS treatment.‖477  Indeed, when ABC news polled a gathering of young evangelicals 
assembled in New York City for a weekend rally and concert, they found that the issues most 
important to these evangelicals were ―Internet pornography, media glamorization of sex and 
drugs, and children orphaned by AIDS.  Abortion and gay marriage were not at the top of their 
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list.‖478  And this political departure from past generations has caught many non-evangelicals by 
surprise.   
Sue Aguiar is no emergent Christian.  Nor is she an evangelical, or, for that matter, even 
a Protestant.  Sue is a practicing Catholic of Portuguese ancestry.  While attending graduate 
school in the nation‟s capital, Sue came across emergent Christianity via her roommate, who was 
active in a local church plant project.  Intrigued by her roommate‟s more liberal and tolerant 
religious views, and determined to expand her religious horizons, Sue began attending weekly 
services with her and became active in the church‟s many community service activities.  
Through this exposure, Sue‟s opinions of evangelical Christianity began to change.  As Sue 
notes, “I had always equated evangelicals with those on the Christian Right, [but] since I‘ve 
found the group I was working with more on the left side of the political spectrum, I found it 
interesting that they also described themselves as evangelicals.‖479  And with regards to hot-
button culture war issues, Sue adds: 
 
From what I‟ve seen, abortion and gay marriage aren‟t brought up a lot.  People 
kind of have their own—I‟ve seen people at church read pro-choice, pro-life stuff, 
but it‟s not an issues that‟s really talked about because there isn‟t a general 
consensus on it like there is on homelessness, which is bad so let‟s all do 
something about it.  I‟m not sure what their reasoning is, but there are some issues 
that don‟t get brought up a lot.480 
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Sue speculates that part of the reason these issues are not mentioned as often as poverty, is 
because emerging Christians are focused on problems they see more frequently.  As Sue 
explains, “living in the Washington D.C. area, you can see homelessness and poverty and lack of 
access of resources by immigrants as opposed to the gay marriage debate, which isn‟t as lively in 
D.C.”481  As we shall see in coming chapters, such a shift in focus can markedly alter the 
American political landscape. 
 
How the Loss of Bridging Capital Affects the Political Attitudes of Evangelicals 
 
In the aftermath of the tragic Tucson shootings, which left six people dead, including 
U.S. District Judge John Roll and 9-year-old Christina Taylor Green, and left 13 others wounded, 
among them Congresswoman Gabby Giffords, who was herself shot in the head, the nation 
paused to reflect on the rancor of its country‘s political discourse.  In writing about this tragedy, 
the online web journal Multimedia Politics observed, ―[w]hile certainly not the only cause, it is 
difficult to deny the impact the Internet, Web, and social media has had on the increase of 
extreme rhetoric in politics.‖482  On this point, former Google CEO, Eric Schmidt was recently 
quoted by the New York Times as saying that in addition to making mindful people more 
thoughtful, the Internet also causes them to become more polarized and extreme, adding that the 
web enables people to ―miscommunicate even louder and feel they‘re correct.‖483  Similarly, 
                                                 
481
 Ibid. 
482
 Multimedia Staff Writer, ―Political Polarization and Social Media,‖ Multimedia Politics, January 16, 2011.  
Found online at:  <http://multimediapolitics.net/2011/01/13/political-polarization-and-social-media/>  (Accessed 
February 8, 2011). 
483
 As quoted by Claire Cain Miller, ―Google‘s Chief on the Web and Political Polarization,‖ The New York Times, 
July 10, 2010.  Found online at: <http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/17/googles-chief-on-the-web-and-political-
polarization/>  (Accessed February 8, 2011). 
245 
 
NPR‘s John McWhorter writes, ―the actual cause of this new national temper is technology and 
its intersection with how language is used.‖  He adds, ―[i]t is no accident that the shrillness of 
political conversation has increased just as broadband and YouTube have become a staple of 
American life.‖484 
Admittedly, extreme political rhetoric is nothing new in American public life.  But what 
makes today different from past years is our saturated media environment with its endless 24/7 
instant news coverage.  In this environment, where audiences are increasingly fragmented and 
attentions spans shortened, often those who espouse the most extreme views get the lion‟s share 
of attention.  Think, for instance, of the media firestorm created when a small Florida church 
with a membership of around 20 announced plans to hold a Qur‟an burning.485  
As we have already seen, the American evangelical community finds itself divided by 
new theological movements and cultural values.  Increasingly, this divide is taking on a more 
contentious tone, as evidenced by the Resisting the Green Dragon campaign and, as we shall see 
later, the contempt many within the Christian Right hold for the emerging church movement.  
Yet, given that these conflicts are religious in nature, the potential for even more extreme 
stratification of polarities increases because opposing sides are convinced as to the righteousness 
and orthodoxy of their given theological position.  
One evangelical group that was a source of considerable tension within the tradition for a 
long time is ESA.  As Al Tizon notes, while many evangelicals have historically treated his 
organization with suspicion, this suspicion has gradually given way, thanks in no small part to 
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ESA‟s outreach efforts.  He says that in the beginning, ESA was branded as a Marxist front 
“disguised in a biblical base.”486  But with time, ESA has been able to show the evangelical 
community (and perhaps more importantly, its leadership) that on core social issues such as 
abortion, ESA remains firmly in the evangelical camp. 
ESA has succeeded in persuading many suspicious evangelicals as to its bona fide 
credentials in large part because it has remained a part of the broader evangelical tradition.  Its 
leadership, for instance, remains active on many evangelical fronts and maintains friendly ties 
with other non-ESA affiliated evangelical organizations and leaders.  As a result of this 
continued engagement, ESA has succeeded in becoming a part of the dense social network that is 
the evangelical community.  Dwight Friesen argues that engagement such as this is important, 
because ―the multiplicity of links bridging beyond an immediate community is what knits the 
members of a local church into the larger fabric of God‘s connective kingdom.  When faith 
communities live into the links beyond their immediate community, they find a type of intrinsic 
accountability stemming from an infinitely larger network.‖487  Given this, Friesen believes that 
it is important for upstart religious organizations and movements to remain in a relationship with 
the dominant religious body if their ultimate goal is mainstream acceptance.  Doing so has two 
important effects.  First, through continued dialogue and ongoing relations, religious upstarts can 
weaken resistance by gradually showing others the validity of their own ideas.  In this, perhaps 
what is more important than making new ideas and beliefs known and understood is that through 
this the larger religious body gets to know and trust those who hold these beliefs.  Second, 
connections with a larger religious body can similarly help moderate fringe elements within 
upstart religious groups.  This is because, ―without connections beyond itself, the rogue faith 
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community could assume a type of totalitarian, heretical, cultish tone, or any manner of other 
idiosyncrasies, further reinforcing its isolation from the rest of the network.‖488  Tizon warns that 
this is a danger of which emergent leaders need to be aware.  As Tizon notes, some of the newer 
stuff coming out of the emerging church movement is ―sounding more and more relativist and 
old liberal as opposed to being biblical.‖489  Thus, while Tizon sees a genuine and passionate 
commitment to the tenets of the social gospel within the emerging church, he cautions that 
groups such as Emergent Village run the risk of becoming ―bleeding hearts‖ not ―rooted in 
biblical faith anymore.‖490  Whether or not one considers Emergent Village a liberal organization 
is largely dependent on one‘s personal views.  However, the more Emergent Village is perceived 
as a liberal organization by more conservative evangelical Christians, the weaker the bonds 
between these two communities become, thus jeopardizing aggregate levels of social capital 
among evangelicals. 
As ESA demonstrates, it is entirely possible for religious organizations once viewed as 
fringe to establish and maintain a valued and trusted kinship with a larger religious body.  The 
result can be a relationship in which more extreme religious views are tempered, thanks to the 
connection with the larger, more dominate religious body, while at the same time, the values of 
the smaller religious upstart are incorporated within that larger faith community.  This appears to 
be the case with the creation care movement, as despite considerable resistance from several 
nationally recognized leaders, polling data shows growing environmental support among 
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American evangelicals.
491
  This attitude, as we shall see in Chapter 8, is a major departure from 
the recent evangelical past, and looks to radically transform environmental politics. 
As we have seen, the issue of environmental protection remains controversial within the 
evangelical community, even while acceptance of the movement continues to grow.  This growth 
will likely continue, as many of the activities of the creation care movement occur within the 
existing evangelical matrix, a point which following chapters will cover in more depth.  
Moreover, on many important cultural fronts, such as the issue of abortion, those affiliated with 
evangelical environmentalism remain largely committed to what Tizon calls ―core‖ evangelical 
values. 
For instance, when we compare the responses from this thesis‘s own Internet and 
Evangelical Survey against that of the Pew Forum, we find that on many issues, respondents 
identifying with creation care organizations are essentially in harmony with the cultural values of 
the broader evangelical church.  On the issue of abortion, for instance, respondents were 
generally unsupportive of reproductive rights, though they are less absolute than the broader 
evangelical community that abortion should be illegal in all instances. 
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Figure 6.1 
A Comparison of Abortion Views 
 
 
*  Graph compares abortion views of studied organizations per the Internet and Evangelicals survey (N=850) 
against that of the Pew Forum‘s 2008 Religious Landscape Survey, online at: http://religions.pewforum.org/.  Data 
collected from January 21, 2009 - February 27, 2010. 
 
As the above graph shows, while respondents from the creation care organizations are less 
willing to support an outright ban on all abortion, they are less supportive of the right to an 
abortion in all or most cases than the broader evangelical community.  Thus, 33% of evangelicals 
polled by Pew believed abortion should be legal in all or most cases, while only 30% of Renewal 
Members and 26% of Restoring Eden and EEN members do.  Moreover, as the organizational 
membership of the selected creation care organizations are younger evangelicals, it is 
unsurprising to find that these individuals are arguably more pro-life than their older evangelical 
counterparts, as many recent polls have shown this to be the case.  However, when we look at 
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this same question with Emergent Village and ESA in the mix, we find a considerably different 
story. 
 
Figure 6.2 
A Further Comparison of Abortion Views 
 
 
*  Graph compares abortion views of studied organizations per this thesis‘s own Internet and Evangelicals survey 
(N=850) against that of the Pew Forum‘s 2008 Religious Landscape Survey, online at: 
http://religions.pewforum.org/.  Data collected from January 21, 2009 - February 27, 2010. 
 
Here again, we see the same pattern emerging with regards to ESA as with the creation 
care organizations; namely a reluctance to embrace abortion rights.  By contrast, however, those 
identifying with Emergent Village are, by a slim majority, supportive of abortion rights, while 
only 4% favor an outright ban.  Such views diverge significantly from the evangelical 
mainstream, and given these statistical differences, it is worth asking why members of Emergent 
Village should hold such drastically different views.  As the next chapter will argue, it is likely 
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that the increased separation of the emerging Church movement from that of the broader 
evangelical community and a commitment on behalf of emergents to offer an alternative 
religious experience has allowed more radical cultural elements to flourish within its ranks.  
Indeed, when multiple issues are examined, we regularly find Emergent Village to be the 
statistical outlier. 
For instance, when asked about their views on evolution, we find that the creation care 
organizations and ESA have no clear opinions.  This however is not the case with Emergent 
Village and the broader evangelical community.  In Pew‘s findings, some 70% either disagree 
entirely that evolution best explains the origins of life on earth, or mostly disagree.  By contrast, 
some 70% of those identifying with Emergent Village either agree entirely or mostly agree. 
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Figure 6.3 
A Comparison of Views on Evolution 
 
 
*  Graph compares evolution views of studied organizations per the Internet and Evangelicals survey (N=850) 
against that of the Pew Forum‘s 2008 Religious Landscape Survey, online at: http://religions.pewforum.org/.  Data 
collected from January 21, 2009 - February 27, 2010. 
 
The same can also be said with regards to one‘s understanding of the Bible.  In this 
instance, while each of the selected organizations were considerably more liberal than the 
evangelical population as a whole, once again Emergent Village stands apart.  When asked if the 
Bible should be taken literally, more than three quarters of those taking the Internet and 
Evanglical survey, or 77 %, answered ‗no,‘ while another 12% believed the Bible was not even 
the Word of God.  By contrast, fully 59% of evangelicals polled by Pew believed the Bible to be 
the Word of God and that it should be taken literally.  Once again, ESA and the creation groups 
were more mixed with their opinions. 
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Figure 6.4 
A Comparison of Views on Biblical Literalism 
 
 
*  Graph compares the biblical literalism of studied organizations per the Internet and Evangelicals survey (N=850) 
against that of the Pew Forum‘s 2008 Religious Landscape Survey, online at: http://religions.pewforum.org/.  Data 
collected from January 21, 2009 - February 27, 2010. 
 
 
 
Finally, on the issue of homosexuality, once again Emergent Village proves itself to be 
considerably more liberal than the rest of the groups; though again, ESA and in particular, the 
creation care groups, show themselves to be more tolerant than the larger evangelical 
community. 
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Figure 6.5 
A Comparison of Views on Homosexuality  
 
 
*  Graph compares views on homosexuality of studied organizations per the Internet and Evangelicals survey 
(N=850) against that of the Pew Forum‘s 2008 Religious Landscape Survey, online at: 
http://religions.pewforum.org/.  Data collected from January 21, 2009 - February 27, 2010. 
 
Yet on many cultural and political issues, we find striking convergence with Emergent 
Village and the other selected organizations.  When asked if it was best for America to remain 
engaged in world affairs, each of the selected case studies was broadly in agreement that further 
engagement was in the country‘s best interest, while the majority of evangelicals disagreed. 
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Figure 6.6 
A Comparison of Views on American Foreign Engagement 
 
 
*  Graph compares American foreign policy views of studied organizations per the Internet and Evangelicals survey 
(N=850) against that of the Pew Forum‘s 2008 Religious Landscape Survey, online at: 
http://religions.pewforum.org/.  Data collected from January 21, 2009 - February 27, 2010. 
 
 
 
At the same time, each of the selected organizations was overwhelmingly supportive of 
diplomacy as a means to ensure peace, as opposed to military force.  A plurality of evangelicals 
similarly adopts this position, though the undecideds keep this plurality from becoming a 
majority. 
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Figure 6.7 
A Comparison of Views on American Militarism and Diplomacy 
 
*  Graph compares militarism and diplomacy views of studied organizations per the Internet and Evangelicals 
survey (N=850) against that of the Pew Forum‘s 2008 Religious Landscape Survey, online at: 
http://religions.pewforum.org/.  Data collected from January 21, 2009 through February 27, 2010. 
 
 
One area where each of the selected orgnizations is in general agreement with the 
majority of evangelicals is on the issue of the environment, as most agree that environmental 
laws and regulations are worth the cost.  However, a far greater number in the selected 
organizations agree than the evangelicals in the Pew Study. 
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Figure 6.8 
A Comparison of Views on Environmental Protection 
 
 
*  Graph compares environmental views of studied organizations per the Internet and Evangelicals survey (N=850) 
against that of the Pew Forum‘s 2008 Religious Landscape Survey, online at: http://religions.pewforum.org/.  Data 
collected from January 21, 2009 - February 27, 2010. 
 
 
When asked to descibe their political views, some 56% of all evangelicals told Pew that 
they were ―conservative,‖ 30% identified as ―moderate‖ and a scant 11% claim to be ―liberal.‖  
By contrast, respondents from the selected organizations were least likely to identify as being 
conservative.  Among these groups, the moderate political affiliation proved quite popular, 
though again, Emergent Village proved to be a slight exception, as 54% of those repondents 
identified as being ―liberal‖ or ―very liberal.‖ 
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Figure 6.9 
A Comparison of Political Indentification 
 
 
*  Graph compares political identifications of studied organizations per the Internet and Evangelicals survey 
(N=850) against that of the Pew Forum‘s 2008 Religious Landscape Survey, online at: 
http://religions.pewforum.org/.  Data collected from January 21, 2009 - February 27, 2010. 
 
 
Party identification diverged slightly from this trend, as while half of all evangelicals 
identified as ―Republican,‖  the GOP faired much worse among the selected organizations, 
where most identified as politically independent, the only exception being the EEN. 
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Figure 6.10 
A Comparison of Political Party Identification 
 
 
*  Graph compares political party identification of studied organizations per the Internet and Evangelicals survey 
(N=850) against that of the Pew Forum‘s 2008 Religious Landscape Survey, online at: 
http://religions.pewforum.org/.  Data collected from January 21, 2009 through February 27, 2010. 
 
  
 
As the above graphs demonstrate, on most issues, Emergent Village is the group most out 
of sync with the broader evangelical community.  What arguably accounts for this development 
is the extent to which the creation care movement and ESA have purposely sought to embed 
themselves within the larger evangelical community.  For instance, when the EEN looks to 
expand its base, it does so not by starting new eco-friendly churches, but rather by working 
within the existing evangelical matrix.  As a result, it is not at all uncommon to find small EEN 
groups and other related environmental groups meeting in church basements or in Sunday school 
classrooms.  In this regard, creation care organizations are making the most of the social capital 
already in existence within evangelical congregations, thus constructing bridges between 
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traditional evangelical theological interests and newer environmental ministries.   Similarly, 
Restoring Eden connects with its core demographic by hosting events at evangelical colleges and 
attending evangelical rock concerts and youth festivals, an approach that has been subsequently 
mimicked by Renewal and other Creation Care organizations. 
In contrast to these ―insider‖ operations, Emergent Village and the larger emerging 
church movement clearly operate outside the establishment.  In fact, in many instances the 
established evangelical infrastructure has shown itself to be hostile to the aspirations of the 
emerging church.  As Tony Jones explains, ―So here‘s the rub:  the Emergents practice their faith 
like liberals (they‘re activists), but they believe like evangelicals (they‘re biblically orthodox).  
Mainliners become uncomfortable with all of the Jesus talk around the emergent movement, and 
conservatives don‘t like the politics.  If both sides are frustrated, then the Emergents are 
happy.‖492  Yet in frustrating both mainline and evangelical communities, emerging Christians 
often find themselves without a church in which to meet.  As a result, many emergent groups 
have been forced to get creative with their meet-ups, congregating in coffee shops, bars, or as is 
so often the case, the homes of fellow emergents.  And this literally outside position further 
isolates the emerging church from the broader evangelical community. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In 1969, economist Thomas Schelling demonstrated that despite the fact that Americans 
were largely supportive of the civil rights movement, most would prefer to live in neighborhoods 
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where racial integration was limited.  In analyzing his findings, Schelling concluded that 
unorganized segregation often bears no close relation to individual intent, but is rather the result 
of a complex system of collective activity.  In later years, Mark Buchanan, building upon 
Thomas Schelling‘s thesis on systems of collective activity, argued that social realities are often 
fashioned not by individual desire, but rather by blind and mechanical forces.  Like other forms 
of media, it is important to view the Internet as one of these forces and that despite early claims 
from technological utopists, it has help to lead many like-minded individuals and organizations 
to converge into increasingly specialized niche clusters.  As the Internet continues to reorient 
society away from large collective gatherings, it is, as Nicholas Carr notes, steadily displacing 
the unifying effects of broadcast media by offering audiences specially tailored markets that 
often appeal to deep personal desires.  
Evangelical Christianity has shown little immunity to the social effects of the new media 
environment.  Indeed, over the past few years, the creation care movement, which has flourished 
in the Internet age, has incurred considerable scorn from several evangelical leaders and 
organizations, many of whom view evangelical environmentalism as a subversive liberal plot 
aimed to undermine the cultural values and political hegemony of the Christian Right, a fact 
which erodes trust and social capital.  As attacks on creation care groups and individuals have 
intensified, the evangelical community has witnessed a deterioration of important collective 
bonds, which allows internal feelings distrust and animosity to fester.   
A similarly story has unfolded on the emerging church front.  However unlike the 
creation care movement, which continues to enjoy considerable support within the evangelical 
mainstream, the emerging church movement increasingly finds itself operating outside the 
broader evangelical apparatus.  Not only do many emergent gatherings take place in non-
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traditional places of worship, such as cafes, bars and even private residence, but the cultural 
orientation of the emerging church places it in direct conflict with the values of the Christian 
Right.  This is because many emerging Christians view past political conflicts which pitted 
liberal against conservative, left versus right, as overly simplistic and missing the bigger biblical 
message; namely that Christians are called to be in service to one another.  In another respect, 
emerging Christianity has little choice but to serve as the religious refuge for disgruntled and/or 
excommunicated evangelicals.  Ben Corey‘s statements attesting to his own excommunication 
experience stands as a testament to the appeal an organization such as Emergent Village holds, 
particularly to individuals whose probing of deep theological and philosophical questions can be 
unwelcome by more conservative churches.  In such situations, the rejection from one religious 
community opens the door to acceptance with another, albeit one that seemingly has fewer and 
fewer reasons to remain connected to the old evangelical order. 
The loss of this connectivity, coupled with a reorientation of social and cultural values, is 
dramatically reshaping the evangelical political agenda.  Undoubtedly, much of this cultural 
reorientation can be attributed to changing times and demographics.   For instance, many 
younger evangelicals are significantly more likely to have an openly gay friend than their parents 
or grandparents and this makes them more likely to be empathetic to the struggles of the gay 
rights movement.  At the same time, a growing awareness of environmental concerns among 
respected evangelical organizations and church leaders, as well as the influence of dissident 
religious elements stressing the social gospel message of economic justice and opposition to war 
and militarism, is working to moderate many evangelical political views. The Internet and 
Evangelicals survey has shown in particular that individuals aligned with the affiliate 
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organizations of the selected case studies are more politically moderate than that of the broader 
evangelical community.     
Already, the acceptance of the creation care and emerging church movement by many 
evangelicals has had profound repercussions for America‘s religious and political landscape.  
Among these repercussions is a change in cultural attitudes, which is significantly expanding the 
political and social concerns of American evangelicals.  By embracing such issues as 
environmental protection, economic justice, and human trafficking, coupled with a growing 
propensity to vote for Democratic candidates, recent changes in the evangelical community 
demand a recalculation of the American political landscape.  The chapter that follows begins this 
exploration by continuing the theme of a broken evangelical monologue, with specific regard to 
the rejuvenation of America‘s religious market place, as well as its political impact. 
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While some might consider the recent breakdown of the religious monologue in the 
American evangelical community to be a negative development for the health of religion in 
America, this chapter argues the opposite.  Specifically, this chapter explores the impact of a 
fragmented evangelical body from a religious market perspective.  It asserts that recent declines 
in evangelical church membership are largely due to the over-generality of its message, which in 
and of itself is a byproduct of the broadcast age.  Predictably, this over-generality has failed to 
cater to the diverse theological and spiritual needs of American churchgoers.  However, with the 
rapid proliferation of Internet technologies, new religious frontiers and expressions of faith are 
being explored.  This process further reinforces the fragmentation of the evangelical body.  This 
chapter considers how with the growth of new and divergent religious movements, such as 
creation care and the emerging church, new religious leaders are finding their voice and 
preaching a message that diverges significantly from the old evangelical vanguard.  While some 
might be tempted to view these developments in purely theological terms, the cultural 
fragmentation of the American evangelical community is not just a religious issue.  A vibrant 
religious marketplace threatens the religious monopoly of the Christian Right, and by extension, 
the articulation of social conservatism and Republican politics.  As new religious movements 
grow, so too do new conceptualizations and understandings of what it means to be a Christian 
and to hold Christian values.  In facilitating the breakdown of the religious monologue of the 
Christian Right, the Internet is working to unsettle long established political coalitions and 
helping to give rise to new political realities.  To support these claims, this chapter relies on the 
combination of previous academic works, the reporting of recent religious and political 
developments, as well as personal interviews.  The aim of this chapter is to provide a rich textual 
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account of the state of evangelical Christianity as it is lived and experienced in a new media 
saturated environment. 
 
Evangelism in Decline 
 
In the spring of 2009, Michael Spencer, also known as the ‗Internet Monk,‘ sparked 
considerable public debate when he wrote for The Christian Science Monitor, ―We are on the 
verge – within 10 years – of a major collapse of evangelical Christianity. This breakdown will 
follow the deterioration of the mainline Protestant world and it will fundamentally alter the 
religious and cultural environment in the West.‖ 493  Spencer continued by asserting that ―within 
two generations, evangelicalism will be a house deserted of half its occupants‖ 494 and that while 
evangelicals flourished in what Spencer dubbed the ―Protestant‖ twentieth century, they would 
soon be ―living in a very secular and religiously antagonistic 21st Century.‖495 
These claims are bold, particularly when one considers the historical significance many 
Americans have placed (and continue to place) on the importance of religion in their personal 
lives: a fact that has long distinguished Americans from citizens of other post-industrial nations.  
And yet, the Internet Monk is rarely one to sensationalize unfounded claims for publicity.  
Indeed, Spencer‘s claims echo those of a growing number of academics, social observers and 
religious leaders, all of whom have arrived at a similar conclusion.  For example, Christine 
Wicker makes this pronouncement: 
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Evangelical Christianity in America is dying.  The great evangelical movements 
of today are not a vanguard.  They are a remnant, unraveling at every edge.  Look 
at it any way you like:  Conversions.  Baptisms.  Membership.  Retention.  
Participation.  Giving.  Attendance.  Religious literacy.  Effect on the culture.  All 
are down and dropping.  It‘s not secret.  Even as evangelical forces trumpet their 
purported political and social victories, insiders are anguishing about their great 
losses, fearing what the future holds.
496
 
 
 
Ed Stetzer, President of LifeWay Research, the leading think-tank for the SBC bluntly 
admits, ―[w]e (the SBC) are a denomination in decline.‖497 And there is empirical evidence 
supporting the premise that evangelical Christianity is on the wane in America.  When for 
instance Bill Leonard, a Baptist historian at Wake Forest University examined comparative rates 
of SBC Sunday school attendance among children ages 6-11, he discovered that in 1971 there 
were 1,434,892 children in Southern Baptist Sunday schools. However, by 2007, this number 
had dropped by almost half a million, to 979,429, while at the same time the U.S. population 
grew by more than 46%.  Moreover, in 1978, the SBC was baptizing one new member for every 
36 members on the rolls.  By 2007, this ratio has dropped to one baptism for every 47 
members.
498
  Further still, in 2007, ―more than 9,000 congregations, or almost a quarter of all 
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Southern Baptist churches, reported no baptisms‖ at all.499  Compounding matters even further 
are declining membership rates at SBC churches.  For instance, in the 2009 Yearbook of 
American and Canadian Churches, U.S. membership in the SBC reportedly fell by nearly 40,000 
individuals, to 16,266,920, down from 16,306,246 the year before.  Indeed, when membership 
trends are compared across the board, we find that few evangelical denominations have enjoyed 
positive growth over the last few years, and those that have are typically smaller Pentecostal 
denominations representing only a tiny fraction of the American religious body.  Moreover, these 
small pockets of growth have been too insignificant to counter recent waves of religious 
disengagement and abandonment.
500
 
While it is easy to bog oneself down in examining the minutiae of baptism and 
denominational membership rates, arguably the most telling statistics come from the American 
Religious Identification Survey (ARIS), which found a significant decline in the number of 
Americans identifying as Christians over the course of the last two decades.  In 1990, for 
instance, 86.2% of the American population identified as some sort of ―Christian.‖  By 2008, 
however, this number had fallen more than ten points, to 76%, and the bulk of these losses came 
among Protestant traditions.  At the same time, the number of Americans who identify as having 
no religion has nearly doubled; from 8.2% in 1990, to 15% in 2008.
501
  Armed with this 
evidence, there is but one conclusion to draw; namely that America is today a less religious 
nation than it was just one generation ago. 
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Accounting for the Decline of American Evangelical Christianity  
 
 
One of the more popular explanations for why mainline protestant churches experienced 
precipitous membership losses throughout the second half of the last century points to a 
perceived theological and politically liberal drift within this body.  As Thomas Reeves argues, 
―[mainline] Churches today are all too often, very predictable, very liberal, very permissive, and 
without any sort of demands being made on the people.  And for millions of Americans there 
seems to be, simply, no reason to go.‖502  Reeves‘s argument follows that of Dean Kelley, whose 
1972 book, Why Conservative Churches Are Growing, argued that mainline denominations were 
losing members because on the whole these churches had become what he calls a ―weak‖ 
religion.
503
  According to Kelley, weak religions fail to provide simple and easily accessible 
answers to questions of profound theological and philosophical meaning.  At the same time, 
weak religions are also more accommodating of diverse theological viewpoints.  However, such 
diversity, Kelley believes, regularly creates tensions within religious communities, which 
dampens religious commitment and impedes the ability of religious bodies to repel outside 
influences and recruitment efforts from so-called ―strong‖ religions, where tradition and 
orthodoxy are more rigorously followed. 
As we have seen, however, recent data demonstrates that American evangelical 
Christianity—―strong‖ religion within this framework—appears to be following its mainline 
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brethren down the path of declining church membership. This development could well prove 
disastrous for the overall health of these faith communities.  The prospect of regaining lost 
ground (i.e. winning new religious converts, which theoretically would simply replace those who 
have already left the faith) becomes all the more challenging as shrinking membership rolls 
affect overall offertory giving, which in turn negatively impacts upon church budgets and more 
importantly, outreach ministries and evangelism. Numerous individuals have offered their own 
explanations as to why this once prosperous religious body has begun losing members.  For 
instance, Curt Watke, who serves as the executive director of the Intercultural Institute for 
Contextual Ministry, identifies four benchmarks that he believes accounts for the recent decline 
of American evangelicals.  These benchmarks include an increase in immigration rates (which 
disproportionally favours growth in the Catholic Church), a decline in Anglo growth (fewer 
evangelical babies), the ―graying‖ of current believers, and the failures of evangelical churches 
to replace ―grayers‖ with fresh blood (new converts).504  Like Watke, Wicker similarly contends 
that no one answer can adequately account for the recent troubles facing the American 
evangelical church.  For Wicker, declining memberships can be attributed to multiple factors, 
included sizable institutional debt, the retirement/death of charismatic megachuch leaders and 
builders, aging suburbs, a shift in the broader American culture towards more open and tolerant 
values, and further erosion of biblical literalism: caused in large part by continued advances in 
science.
505
  Yet as thoughtful as these and other accounts are in explaining the decline of 
American evangelical Christianity, the role of religious market forces is one aspect that remains 
underdeveloped. 
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For those unfamiliar with the term, the ―religious marketplace,‖ or ―religious economics‖ 
as it is sometimes called, refers to a sociological perspective that contends that religious bodies 
are similar to commercial actors.  In a religious economy, religious groups must compete against 
rivals as they seek to expand their share of the market (congregants). As we shall see, many 
scholars believe that religion flourishes best when competition is strong, though such a view is 
far from universal.  For instance, Emile Durkheim strongly condemned urban pluralism, which 
he saw as ―both the cause and breakdown of moral integration.‖506  For Durkheim, included in 
this urban pluralism was the segmentation of religious bodies, which he believed posed 
significant social dangers.  As he stated, ―where multiple religious groups compete, each 
discredits the other and encourages the view that religion per se is open to question, dispute, and 
doubt.‖507  Such doubts, in Durkheim‘s view, serve only to fragment society while robbing it of 
an important rallying point.  Seventy years later, Peter Berger argued that religious pluralism 
destroyed what he called ―the sacred canopy,‖ which ensures social order and stability by 
bringing nearly all individuals under the proxy of ‗One True God.‖508  In 1979, Berger expanded 
upon his sacred canopy thesis with the publication of The Heretical Imperative, in which he 
states, ―modernity has plunged religion into a very specific crisis, characterized by secularity, to 
be sure, but characterized more importantly by plurality.‖509  Under pluralistic conditions, Berger 
continues, ―the authority of all religious traditions tend to be undermined.‖510  And like 
Durkheim before him, Berger strongly subscribed to the notion that society needs grand 
institutions and/or beliefs with which to identify. 
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In contrast to the opinions of Durkheim and Berger are those of Rodney Stark, Roger 
Finke, Laurence Iannoccone and others like them.  For these later scholars, religious 
competition, far from undermining the plausibility of the Divine—and by extension the 
Church—instead creates a competitive marketplace, where society‘s many religious and spiritual 
needs can be efficiently met in an environment flush with religious options.  This is so, as in 
more religiously heterogeneous societies, new religious movements, denominations and 
organizations will inevitably take advantage of the marketplace, identify potential areas for 
growth, and will, as Kent Miller asserts, ―fill market niches abandoned by older religious 
organizations.‖511  To the degree religious markets remain unregulated and competitive, Finke 
and Starke maintain that, ―overall levels of religious commitment will be higher.‖512 As 
competition fosters an environment where diverse theological and spiritual needs are more 
capable of finding a home greater innovation among church bodies and religious organizations is 
required.  When religious competition is lacking overall, or is absent altogether, religious 
commitment tends to wane as a single, homogenous belief system is unable to meet the plethora 
of society‘s religious needs. 
In the United States, evangelicals have emerged as the loudest and most visible 
articulation of Protestant Christianity.  Until recently, evangelicals have seemed immune from 
the marked declines and waning social influence mainline Protestant denominations have 
suffered for much of the last half century.  Moreover, in recognizing the political significance of 
a consolidated evangelical voting bloc, Republicans aggressively courted these voters by 
amending policy positions and political platforms.  This action has in effect established 
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conservative Christianity as the proxy faith of the GOP, and by extension, the proxy faith of the 
American government when Republicans are in power.  As will be discussed in what follows, in 
the absence of a strong Christian alternative, this articulation of the Christian faith becomes 
representative as Christendom more generally, a development that does more harm than good.  
But before this point is explored, it is important to bear in mind that evangelical Christianity, as 
the name suggests, is a faith based on growth.  In an effort to spread the Good News, many 
evangelical leaders have adopted a business-like model aimed at appealing to as broad an 
audience as possible.  The effects of this endeavour are discussed more thoroughly below. 
 
Christianity-Lite 
 
 
Sitting atop 40 acres of carefully manicured land in California‘s affluent Orange County 
is Crystal Cathedral, named after the 10,664 large rectangular windows that largely comprise the 
edifice.  Considered to be America‘s first modern megachurch,513 its sanctuary is capable of 
seating some 2,736 worshipers;
514
 though in recent years many of these seats have sat empty as 
average weekly worship service attendance has dipped to below 1,000.
515
  Despite the decline in 
church membership, as well as a rating slump for its famed Hour of Power television broadcast, 
Crystal Cathedral has undertaken a number of large construction projects throughout the past 
decade, which have left the church $55 million dollars in debt.  In October of 2010, Crystal 
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Cathedral admitted that it would be unable to pay its creditors and filed for bankruptcy 
protection.
516
   
News of the bankruptcy took the evangelical community by storm as many pondered how 
such troubles could befall what was once viewed as the iconic example of successful church 
growth.  Indeed, Crystal Cathedral‘s founding pastor, Robert Schuller, helped make popular the 
controversial ―church growth movement,‖ a movement which aims to maximize church 
attendance by ―using proven business marketing strategies.‖517  Indeed, many churches, inspired 
by the early success of Crystal Cathedral, took the church growth movement and adopted it for 
their own ministries.  For instance, when Bill Hybels started his own church, he wanted to be 
sure that his ministries would be geared to the desires of the worshiping public.  To ensure this, 
Hybels ―went door-to-door asking residents what they disliked about church and what they 
would want in a church.‖ Armed with the data from his neighbourhood surveys, Hybels then 
―constructed a ‗user friendly‘ worship service with sermons oriented to practical life and devoid 
of appeals for money, religious jargon and ‗heavy guilt trips.‘‖518  Today, Hybels‘s Willow 
Creek Community Church, with its laid-back worship style, its conservative Christian message, 
along with its bookstore, food court and coffee shop, is one America‘s largest churches. 
Over the years, other religious leaders and church congregations have joined the church 
growth movement, and many have seen rising church attendance as a result.  Yet as successful as 
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the church growth movement has proven to be, it is not without considerable detractors.  Some, 
such as Columbia University‘s Randall Balmer liken megachurches to large retail chains such as 
Walmart and Target, complete with the effect of putting smaller churches out of business.
 519
  At 
the same time, significant criticism, from both the evangelical left and right, holds that in its 
attempt to reach the masses, megachurch Christianity has in effect lost its very soul.  As The 
Sometimes Preacher blogs: 
 
We Christians are, in large part, intellectually and artistically vacuous because we 
have followed popular culture down the spiralling whirlpool of eros-replacing-
agape, emotional sentimentalism, self-defining reality, and the victory of style 
over substance. We have elevated product over process and justified the means by 
the ends, which we have devastatingly misinterpreted. Though we set out to 
transform popular culture, we have been transformed by it. We have turned our 
pastors into celebrities, elevating them to god-like status while they produce to 
our liking, but then discarding them with the Paris Hiltons and Brittany Spearses 
of the popular culture machine when we are done with them. We have exchanged 
discipleship for consumerism, true community for celebrity-association, and 
transformation for trendsetting. We have turned the deep and vibrant faith of 
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Augustine and Aquinas and Luther and Lewis into mindless, soulless, spiritually 
delusional entertainment.
520
 
 
Yet one need not troll the blogs of devout religious practitioners to find concern over the 
watering-down of the Christian gospel.  All one really has to do is step into any evangelical 
church and odds are someone in the congregation will have an opinion on the matter.  The 
Sellwood Baptist Church, on the corner of 11
th
 and Spokane, in Portland‘s quiet Westmoreland 
neighbourhood, is such a church. 
As a conservative evangelical church, Sellwood Baptist is in many ways an oddity in one 
of Portland‘s most liberal boroughs.  The congregation, which has been meeting for almost a 
century, does so in an unremarkable building across the street from the popular New Seasons 
grocery market.  The building itself is a large complex that could easily accommodate, as it once 
did, many hundreds of worshipers.  Today though, weekly attendance hovers around 40 regular 
attendees.  Like many evangelical churches, the worship hall of Sellwood Baptist looks to make 
good use of multimedia, though as the church‘s pastor (Pastor Mike as he is known to his 
congregation) admits, incorporating new technologies, such as a video projector and projection 
screen, can often be difficult in churches built before such technology existed.  Still, at the front 
of the sanctuary, suspended high from the rafters, is a projection screen larger than most living 
room walls.   
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When visitors arrive, the church usher, a middle-aged man who speaks with a thick 
eastern European accent, greets them.  Indeed, many of the congregants at Sellwood Baptist are 
recent immigrants.  After an exchange of pleasantries, visitors are led to the sanctuary where 
they inevitably have choice seating among the churches many empty pews.  Before the service, 
and occasionally during it, the projection screen is used.  Images of the English countryside and 
other nature scenes can often been seen flashing across it, while a narrator recites familiar 
scripture accompanied by soothing hymns.  In the front of the sanctuary is an American flag, 
displayed almost as prominently as the cross itself. 
In the weeks leading up to the 2010 midterm elections, the back page of the Sellwood 
church bulletin, where one usually finds weekly announcements for events such as bake-sales 
and potlucks, had a large section with the headline, ―Are You Registered to Vote?‖ in bold 
lettering.  Below it, the text read: 
 
As Christian citizens it is our privilege and duty to vote—to vote wisely, 
prayerfully, and biblically.  Today is your opportunity to register, or to re-register 
if you have recently moved or changed your name.  The election is just around the 
corner and we need to let our voices and votes be heard.  Voter Registration cards 
are on the Red Carpet table in the foyer and someone will be there to assist you.  
We will even send it in for you!  Please get signed up today.  ―Render unto Caesar 
the things that are Caesar‘s and unto God the things that are God‘s.‖521 
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Announcements such as these are commonplace in evangelical churches.  They strongly 
encourage political involvement but fall short of officially endorsing a particular candidate or 
issue, which by law churches as non-profits are prohibited from doing.  By extension, preachers 
are similarly banned from making political endorsements at the pulpit, unless of course they 
want to lose their church‘s tax-exempt status.  As private citizens, however, they are free to 
speak as much politics as they like. 
Pastor Mike steers clear of overt political rhetoric while at the pulpit or on official church 
business, but this does not mean that he is without strong opinions on matters of politics and 
other pressing issues.  Indeed, one of the more important issues for Pastor Mike, and a theme 
touched upon regularly in his sermons, is the need to rescue Christianity from what he sees as its 
watering-down.  As Pastor Mike sees it, the term ―evangelical Christianity‖ has: 
 
Become a catch-all for a lot of groups that, at one time, did not consider 
themselves evangelical, but the term has been eroded somewhat so that you can 
just about be anything and call yourself an evangelical.  That‘s one of the issues, 
you know, what are we talking about, because this is now a very large arc, and 
there are a whole lot of weird beasts in it.  At one time, the term really meant 
those who emphasize the message of personal salvation in Christ through faith 
alone, apart from works.  It was a narrower definition.  And now, the term seems 
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to have embraced a lot of things and a lot of movements that I‘m not comfortable 
with personally.
522
 
 
Consequently, Pastor Mike admits he rarely if ever identifies with the evangelical label, 
preferring instead to be known as a ―conservative Christian‖ who happens to come from a 
Baptist tradition.  When asked what he means when he says Christianity has ―become a catch-
all‖ umbrella, he responds by asserting that there a lot of evangelicals or born-again Christians, 
as many of them like to be called, who simply do not follow the literal word of the Bible.  As he 
says: 
 
You can believe virtually anything and call yourself a born-again Christian, but 
surveys that have been done of the population from one coast to the other, you 
find people who call themselves born-again evangelical Christians.  They don‘t 
believe in the existence of Satan, for instance.  They say, ―Oh no, that‘s a 
construct of evil, but there is no personal devil.‖  They‘ll say they don‘t believe in 
a literal hell.…People who call themselves evangelicals have moved toward 
annihilationism.  That, for years, has been considered a heresy in Christianity.  
That‘s not orthodox Christianity.523 
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And when asked what accounts for the broadening of the evangelical label, Pastor Mike 
responds: 
 
Cause you can be anything, just about, and believe just about anything, and 
there‘s a lot of warm fuzzy.  What you have are some churches that have grown 
up—and there‘s some very large ones—Lakewood church, where Joel Osteen is 
the pastor, would be a good example of a church where you can believe just about 
anything, and the music is just killer good.
524
 
 
But this ―warm fuzzy‖ Christianity is in his opinion little more than ―cultural Christianity,‖ 
because in America individuals are expected to be Christian. Yet as Pastor Mike argues, it is one 
thing to claim the faith and quite another to practice it. 
Not all, however, are in agreement with Pastor Mike‘s assessment that evangelical 
Christianity has been watered down in order to make it less abrasive to the American religious 
consumer.  Janessa for instance, is a young seminarian studying to be an ordained minister at 
Drew University.  She is unabashedly proud of her mainline roots, its progressive theology and 
its commitment to the social gospel.  Yet Janessa contends that far from a watered down 
theology, evangelicals have simply gotten better at repackaging it.  As Janessa admits, ―I want to 
say they‘re becoming better in doing the same things, so I think they‘re less obviously 
evangelical sometimes; they‘re less obviously conservative, they‘re less obviously exclusive, 
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they‘re less obviously racist.  But when you‘re actually in those churches, I think they‘re saying 
a lot of the same things.‖ Instead, Janessa asserts that the ―propaganda‘s getting better.‖525 
Whether Janessa is correct in her assessment that the evangelical message remains as 
intolerant today as it once was is a question of personal opinion.  What is less ambivalent, 
however, is the fact that the consumer driven approach adopted by many evangelical churches 
and ministries has shown itself to be widely successful.  Yet this success has not prevented 
critics from labeling it as little more than vanilla Christianity.  As Russ Breimeier writes: 
 
This brand of faith tastes great but is less filling, and wherever it prevails, it is a 
source of impoverishment of faith and culture. Christianity, when it takes on these 
characteristics, is an impostor. People are seeking the way home to God, but pop 
Christianity cannot provide it. Yet for many today, Christianity-Lite is all they 
know, and the consequences are serious for both the religious and the 
irreligious.
526
 
 
However, many within the evangelical tradition are perfectly content with this type of 
religious experience.  Yet given the recent declines experienced by many evangelical churches, it 
would appear as if consumer tastes are changing.  Perhaps the American religious buyer has 
simply grown tired of their religious Olive Garden staple and is instead seeking more authentic 
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nourishment.  The rise of the emerging church and the renewed emphasis of the social gospel 
would suggest as much.  Yet these movements are only beginning to register with the American 
mainstream and many in the public remain unaware of their very existence.  The evidence 
suggests that religion as a whole would benefit if such religious alternatives were more widely 
known and available. 
 
No Faith but the Patriotized Faith 
 
When ―Sam‖ was 18 she left the small rural town where she had spent much of her life to 
attend college in a large metropolitan city.  The fact that Sam even attended college sets her apart 
from most her peers, as of the 24 students in Sam‘s graduating class, only four attended college 
of any sort, and only two did so at a four year university.  Eight years after first coming to attend 
school, Sam continues to live and work in the same city as her alma mater.  About once a month, 
she makes the three-hour drive home to see her family and to occasionally visit with high school 
friends.  But back in her childhood home, Sam has become a sort of cultural outsider—the small 
town girl who has swapped her conservative upbringing in favor of cosmopolitan values.  
Like many of her childhood peers, Sam grew up as an evangelical.  Today, when Sam 
speaks of her experience in both the Pentecostal and Baptist church, there is a clear disdain in her 
voice.  When asked why she left the evangelical church, Sam responds with a laugh, ―Because 
they‘re crazy.‖527  When probed more deeply, she begins to open up.  ―It was church all the 
time,‖ Sam claims.  ―When we were on road trips with my grandparents, my grandmother would 
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read the Bible out loud.  When we went to bed, she was reading us Bible stories about Moses and 
Jesus.‖528  Yet it was not the religious overkill that eventually led Sam away from the faith of her 
elders.  As she claims, conservative Christianity was ―the only thing I ever knew, so I thought 
that all Christians felt the same way that evangelicals felt.‖ And this troubled Sam, because for 
her, evangelicals were ―kind of about themselves,‖ and evangelical Christianity about living your 
life in accordance with the Bible; which, in Sam‘s experience meant, ―gays were wrong, and that 
as a woman you had to listen to your husband—and not just listen to your husband, but obey 
him.‖ And as if the theology were not problematic enough for Sam, she admits to being further 
disturbed by what she sees as an overly politicized evangelical body.  As a child, for instance, 
Sam can recall hearing many sermons where the minister would say, ―Hey, this is who I‘m 
voting for because he believes Jesus Christ is their personal saviour, and I want you—God wants 
you—to vote for him.‖ And so today, whenever Sam hears a minister saying anything that even 
approaches a political endorsement, she admits she‘s all the more inclined to vote for the other 
guy, even if, as she says, they like to ―bite the heads [off] of bats or worship Satan.‖ Because as 
Sam sees it, there are a lot of socially acceptable practices within the evangelical community that 
are otherwise completely repugnant.  To illustrate, Sam ponders, ―if it were socially acceptable 
to kill puppies, would people still be like, ‗oh, he‘s a God fearing puppy killer.‘‖ And this really 
worries Sam, because in her view, ―as long you put God behind it, you can do whatever you 
want.‖529 
The fact that as a child Sam was unaware of more progressive forms of Christianity 
should come as little surprise, as conservative evangelical churches dominate many of America‘s 
small rural towns.  As detailed in Chapter 3, the theological tensions that engulfed mainline 
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Protestantism throughout the 60s, 70s and early 80s were purposely exploited by various 
evangelical leaders in order to swell the ranks of their own church.  By all reasonable 
measurements these efforts largely succeeded, as during this time many mainline Protestants 
found their way into evangelical pews; and much of this growth occurred in more conservative 
communities, such as small rural towns.
530
  To say, however, that evangelical leaders simply 
exploited theological tensions within mainline Protestantism and leave it at that neglects some of 
the more nuanced details that made this development possible.   For instance, in framing their 
agenda for the American people, Christian Right leaders used rhetoric aimed at drawing broad 
public support, which helped to broaden their religious appeal as well. ―Christian values,‖ 
―national conscience,‖ ―patriotism,‖ ―morality,‖ ―safe- neighbourhoods,‖ ―strong families,‖ 
―tradition,‖ and ―individual responsibility,‖ were regularly identified as core values. This rhetoric 
was quickly adopted by community preachers and disseminated to their congregants.  It 
continued to pour out from there.  Men spoke at their men‘s groups, women at their Bible 
studies, friends-to-friends, neighbors-to-neighbors, and colleagues-to-colleagues.  In reporting on 
the Christian Right, media outlets and scholars alike similarly picked-up these terms and 
repeated them in telling their story.  Far too few, however, ever contested the meanings behind 
these terms.  In failing to do so, both pundits and scholars alike helped legitimize the Christian 
Right‘s perceived ownership over these important cultural issues.531   
As Hopson and Smith observe, by the end of the twentieth century it was clear that the 
Christian Right had ―achieved an important degree of authority in the struggle over 
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proprietorship of important symbols within American culture.‖532  Among these, was ownership 
of what it meant to be a Christian in America.  In claiming ownership over this terrain, Hopson 
and Smith further note, the Christian Right was then well positioned to advance its own 
―unambiguous responses‖533 to what were otherwise ―highly complex social issues.‖534 This in 
turn led to a ―manageable system of explanations, beliefs and actions,‖535 where right is right, 
wrong is wrong, and where ultimately, there is little room for shades of grey.  In offering simple, 
and what often seemed like pragmatic solutions to America‘s social ills, the Christian Right, and 
the narrow interpretation of the Christian gospel that it represents, succeeded in capturing the 
loyalty of many millions of Americans.  At the same time, however, its insistence on legislating 
morality and other matters of personal conduct similarly succeeded in securing the scorn of many 
millions of Americans.  Among those who have grown to detest much of what the evangelical 
church represents is Layne. 
Like Sam, Layne Berg also grew up attending a conservative evangelical church, though 
his experience differs in some ways.  As Layne recalls: 
 
I started going to that church when I was six, it started as an outreach for that 
church into my neighborhood.
536
  Neither of my parents were religious, my mom 
thought that I should be exposed to religion, so I started going at 6 and went every 
weekend, or almost every weekend until I was 15.  As my brothers came of age 
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they joined me as well, so three of us were going every week to that church, and 
that particular church used a system of a bus where they would go around and 
pick up your kids to attend Sunday school and then drop you off, so it made it 
very convenient to parents who want to send their children. 
 
Layne admits to really enjoying his experience with church for much of this time.  Yet as 
he grew, and as he moved beyond what he describes as the ―superficial‖ nature of his Sunday 
school education, he began critically evaluating the message of the church.  By the age of fifteen, 
Layne began to ―vilely disagree‖537 with many of the church‘s messages.  These messages, he 
believed were ―very conservative and very centered on a closed-mindedness to what Christianity 
was.‖ And this, Layne admits, led him to be ―very angry with religion in general and Christianity 
specifically, just because I felt a sense of betrayal—I don‘t know if that‘s the right way of 
framing it—but a sense of being used and not really being able to critically ask questions.‖ 
Although Layne cannot recall specific examples today, he does remember asking questions about 
how certain subjects where taught as well as the framing of various social issues.  But these 
questions did not sit well with church leaders, who, as Layne says, reacted as though ―I was 
betraying their gift of religion to me.‖  This reaction turned Layne off from religion for many 
years. 
Since leaving the evangelical church Layne has relocated to Washington State.  He is 
married and is the father of a small boy.  He admits that he would very much like to expose his 
son to religion, and has even sampled various churches in his area, but so far he has not found 
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any Christian tradition he is comfortable enough with.  And while Layne is open to trying 
different religious traditions, he sees American evangelicalism as having become more 
conservative than it was even when he was a child.  For this reason a return to the evangelical 
church seems unlikely.  But just because the conservative drift has turned him off (and Layne 
suspects, many others like him), he understands how this development is appealing to others.  ―I 
think for a certain subset of people this actually has quite a bit of an appeal.‖ Namely, ―for those 
individuals who want to be a part of a larger group, who want that safety that they feel a big 
group provides, it works very well for them.‖ But in order for religion to work, Layne concedes 
it needs to reach more than just conservative individuals.  ―I think there is a large portion of the 
American populous, who, if given the right setting would very much like to have their 
spirituality represented.‖ But unlike Sam, who would like to see a complete decoupling of 
religion and politics, Layne is not of the opinion that religion necessarily needs to exclude any 
mention of politics; instead, he thinks churches, particularly those on the left, need to get more 
vocal about their politics: 
 
There‘s essentially a lot of folks who have grown up in a Christian institution, but 
the problem is that all and all, really there are only moderate political groups from 
a church perspective, and there aren‘t really any far left leaning groups and I think 
that‘s a real problem because there‘s no ability to merge the political with the 
religious [for these people].  And I know that a lot of people feel that those are 
strictly separated, but throughout our history there has always been an 
intermingling of religion and politics, and evangelicals and the right wing are very 
288 
 
good at drawing from that base; but I don‘t feel that on the whole folks on the left 
side of the spectrum are as good at getting that synergy going—they feel that 
there needs to be a real divide and I think that‘s exactly the wrong strategy.  I 
think they would actually draw more people in who are more independent and 
liberal if they could get that message together.
538
 
 
It is possible, particularly given the success of the Christian Right, that a renewed 
political focus by mainline Protestants could rejuvenate their otherwise dwindling and aging 
churches.  Indeed, there are few ways by which the public face of Christianity could be better 
altered than with the emergence of strong religious left. 
 
A Return to Innovation and Niche-Oriented Religious Marketing 
 
Lou is a successful small business owner from Yuba City, California.  On most Sundays 
Lou can be found faithfully attending service at a local evangelical megachurch, something he 
has done for most of his adult life.  Recently, however, Lou came to the conclusion that while his 
attendance at the megachurch met many of his spiritual needs, it did not wholly satisfy them.  As 
Lou notes, ―sometimes the words that you get at the service are right out of the Bible,‖539 but the 
problem with this format is that in preaching to the congregation, the preacher is often ―not 
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feeding you…to where you can open up a discussion about what you just read in the Bible.‖ 
This, Lou claims, is one of the reasons why he has recently begun supplementing his religious 
experience with additional forms of devotion.  ―[S]ometimes,‖ as Lou says, ―if your church is not 
feeding you and you‘re still hungry for spiritual learning, and you‘re getting just milk from one, 
then possibly there‘s is another church that you find that is close by, that gives you a little bit of 
feeding at other times.‖ One of the ways Lou obtains this additional feeding is by travelling more 
than an hour out of town to worship at a church were the message is slightly different, though 
Lou admits this is done only on occasion.  Instead, much of Lou supplemental religious 
experience comes by way of the house church, a growing religious movement where worship is 
confined to a small group, usually no more of eight to ten couples, who typically meet in the 
privacy of an adherent‘s home.  At the moment, Lou belongs to two house churches, one that 
operates out of his own home and another that meets at a friend‘s.  According to Lou, one of the 
primary purposes for these house churches is to foster a deeper relationship ―with the people that 
you want to be within Christianity,‖ as well as to have more intimate discussions and a ―better 
learning of the Bible.‖540 
Though Lou remains active in two megachurches and two home churches, his 
commitment to these faith communities means that his energies are divided.  This suggests a 
particular problem facing the evangelical community, because as Wicker explains: 
 
A new, fast-growing group of committed evangelicals, exactly that core group of 
20 percent that mega-churches rely so much on, wants deeper commitment to a 
                                                 
540
 Ibid. 
290 
 
faith that transcends church walls. They want to live their faith in everything they 
do. They‘re bringing it into business and recreation. They‘re seeking the best 
books on faith and following the most exciting leaders. With the ease of travel 
and the speed of the Internet, they have greater access to more and more resources 
and to people like themselves. With so many options for spiritual growth, they 
could soon be leaving the institutional church behind. Some are forming house 
churches or participating in Internet churches. But others have a new option, 
weaving together their own churches of the individual. They do that by attending 
independent Bible studies, joining groups that sponsor short-term missions trips, 
participating in Christian business groups, gathering with workshop leaders for 
intense weekend experiences, and participating in Internet groups of like-minded 
people. Sometimes they stay in these groups for a long time; sometimes they 
participate for a short time and move on. Their spiritual lives are developed 
through a highly fluid mixture of activities and relationships that may penetrate 
their everyday lives. They get their primary spiritual experience through activities, 
through relationships, and through media. They may not attend church and feel no 
need for it.
541
 
 
Moreover, the rate at which evangelicals will follow Lou‘s footsteps is likely to hasten.  George 
Barna estimates that by 2025, only 30% to 35% of all Christians in the United States will attend 
a traditional house of worship.  The other 65% to 70% will likely worship in high-commitment, 
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close-friendship networks of believers, a group Barna calls ―Revolutionaries.‖542 Barna believes 
this will strengthen Christianity, as these revolutionaries will help move church venues towards 
more intimate settings and will provide Christians with a more meaningful worship 
experience.
543
  Already, the house church movement enjoys considerable popularity in the 
United States, with roughly 10% of the adult population attending a house church in a recent 
pole.
544
  And many of those who have found a home in a house church come from the 
burgeoning emerging church. 
As we know, emerging Christians are not easily defined.  While many in the movement 
would describe themselves as evangelical or post-evangelical, emergents tend to be younger 
evangelicals who find themselves ―dissatisfied with the dominant expression of ‗contemporary‘ 
church.‖545  As such, these Christians are not seeking a simple change in worship style, such as 
the addition of electric guitars to the church band, or pastors with soul patches.  They are instead 
calling for a radical re-conceptualization of the evangelical project, one that focuses specific 
attention on mission work, particularly as it applies to the ―post-modern world.‖  As religious 
scholar Amy Green explains, emerging Christians are: 
 
Drawing less from traditional sources such as Sunday services and turning instead 
to friends, online social sites, celebrity pop culture, and podcasts for their 
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spirituality.  Often they are cynical of today‘s church leaders but eager to probe, 
discuss, and learn from their teachings.  Politically, they are less motivated by 
issues such as abortion and homosexuality and moved instead by 
environmentalism, genocide in Africa, and poverty.
546
 
 
Thus, in placing significant new emphasis on causes such as poverty, social justice, and 
the environment—areas more traditionally aligned with mainline Protestantism, and areas that 
have either been largely neglected by the established evangelical leadership or outright opposed 
by them—emergents are working to fundamentally reshape the church.  In this, they seek to 
remove the ―sterile polarities that have defined the church in the modern era: liberal vs. 
conservative, traditional vs. contemporary, reason vs. experience, faith vs. science, mega church 
vs. maintenance church.‖547 
Predictably, Pastor Mike is unhappy by what he sees in the emerging church, yet he 
admits emergents represent an outlet for many frustrated evangelicals.  But as he sees it, 
emerging Christianity is little more than a ―manipulation of emotions,‖ ―smoke and mirrors‖ 
which in attempting to reclaim lost symbolism and sacraments succeeds in feeding one 
emotionally, but ultimately does little to nourish the soul.  Like Pastor Mike, emerging 
Christianity also troubles Janessa, though her concerns differ considerably.  ―I think a lot of the 
people that are prominent in the emerging church are coming from conservative backgrounds, 
but do, very much, preach the social gospel.‖  Indeed, Janessa admits many conservative 
religious leaders unaffiliated with the emerging church have found renewed interest in the social 
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gospel.  The concern, for Janessa, however, is that with the emerging church adopting the social 
gospel, the social gospel runs the risk of becoming more conservative.  In this, issues such as gay 
rights and women‘s rights will take a backseat to issues of poverty relief; which Janessa admits is 
also of extreme importance.  To help illustrate her concern, Janessa spoke of a recent encounter 
she had with Adam Hamilton, a prominent emerging church leader who had been invited to 
speak at an Annual Conference for the United Methodist Church.  As Janessa recalls, Hamilton 
was talking about a program in his own church where youth who show strong leadership and an 
aptitude for the ministry are invited to join an internship-like program.  The program teaches 
them everything from how to plan an effective worship service, to how to meet the needs of the 
sick and dying. The program has been quite successful, and a number of its graduates have gone 
on to seminary themselves.   
After his talk, Janessa approached Hamilton to ask what happens to those kids who in the 
course of discovering their own sexual identity realize that they are gay and thus cannot be 
ordained in the United Methodist Church. Janessa says Hamilton‘s run-around answer compelled 
her to read some of his books.  While reading, Janessa realized that Hamilton was ―very much of 
the belief that homosexuality is a choice and that those kids can just be changed if they pray for 
it.‖548  This revelation greatly shocked Janessa since just by listening to Hamilton‘s talk, she 
would have never guessed he held such conservative views. ―[H]e talked so much about the need 
to be authentic and really reach the community and the needs of the community, and to really 
reach out to the impoverished and the downtrodden.‖549  This experience has taught Janessa that 
mainline Protestantism needs to be careful with how it engages the emerging church, as while 
much of the language sounds great, the openness is sometimes simply not there. 
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Conclusion:  Religion and Politics in America’s Near Future 
 
When the Reverend James Dobson stepped down as the head of Focus on the Family in 
the spring of 2009, he took the occasion to evaluate the social and political successes of the 
evangelical movement.  He began by asserting that although evangelicals enjoyed many political 
victories throughout the 1980s, he now sees those victories as little more than a ―holding action.‖  
Dobson noted, ―[w]e made a lot of progress through the eighties, but then we turned into the 
nineties and then the Internet came along and a new president came along and all of that went 
away and now we are absolutely awash in evil.‖550  He continued by saying, ―we are right now in 
the most discouraging period of that long conflict and humanly speaking, we can say that we 
have lost all those battles.‖551 The battles to which Dobson was referring concerned the culture 
war issues that greatly defined the American political landscape in the 80s, 90s, as well as the 
early part of this last decade. 
It is of course Dobson‘s profound hope that America will one day reject secularism and 
political liberalism and instead embrace the virtues of conservative evangelicalism.  But as we 
have already seen, fewer Americans are identifying as evangelical, or for that matter, Christian at 
all.  And while it is likely that no single factor can sufficiently explain this downward trend, this 
chapter has proposed that a lack of religious competition, which helped propel evangelical 
Christianity to emerge as the single most important religious force in the United States, as well 
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as overt political activity on the part of many evangelical Christians and Christian Right leaders, 
are both contributing factors. 
From a political perspective, more recent social developments have similarly placed 
considerable strain on the political aspirations of the evangelical project.  Timothy Shah places 
the scope of the crisis into greater relief: 
 
Evangelical Christians in the United States now find themselves in the political 
wilderness after one of their own—George W. Bush—left the White House with 
one of the lowest presidential approval ratings in U.S. history. Many of the most 
politically powerful evangelical leaders of the last two generations, such as Jerry 
Falwell, James Dobson, and D. James Kennedy, have either died or retired, 
passing their organizations on to younger and less influential successors. Obama, 
the man almost all evangelical leaders vociferously opposed during the 2008 
campaign, was elected president. And the trends they have fought, such as the 
rising acceptance of same-sex marriage and abortion, are increasingly entrenched 
in the country's laws and social mores.
552
 
 
Admittedly, it is tempting to look at the 2010 midterm elections as evidence of a resurgent 
evangelical comeback.  Yet drawing such conclusions would be simplistic as it overlooks 
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important electoral developments, particularly the growing strength of libertarianism within the 
Republican Party.   
To be certain, evangelicals and the evangelical community continue to hold immense 
sway in the American political landscape.  This influence, while waning, will remain a key 
feature in American politics for at least another generation, as social change is often a long and 
laborious endeavour.  Increasingly, however, evangelicals are finding themselves flanked within 
the Republican Party by a growing TEA Party movement,
553
 some of which is deeply religious, 
and some of which is not.  As Ben Smith writes, ―[t]he rise of a new conservative grass roots 
fuelled by a secular revulsion at government spending is stirring fears among leaders of the old 
conservative grass roots, the evangelical Christian right.‖554 For evidence of this tension, Smith 
offers the TEA Party‘s ―Contract from America‖ in which supporters where invited to vote for 
10 agenda items from a possible list of 21.  As expected, congressional Republicans adopted this 
list with little modification and used it as an electoral platform upon which the party ran and 
won.  Curiously absent from either of these lists was any mention of gay marriage or abortion. 
This fact has not sat well with many evangelical leaders, but Republicans know that the 
demographics of the American public are changing and that as younger generations increase 
their share of the electoral pie, past strategies to galvanize voters on divisive social issues are 
likely to prove ineffective and counterproductive.   
From a religious perspective, changing demographics coupled with a shift in social 
attitudes may similarly push American Christianity into an altogether different direction.  For 
instance, as Oliver Thomas notes, going forward, the more liberal protestant churches may have 
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an important advantage that is not shared by most of their evangelical brethren.  This advantage, 
Thomas contends, comes from their identity, which ―jibes with what matters to young people.‖  
Take for instance the issue of gay rights.  Thomas notes: 
 
Lutherans, Episcopalians and the United Church of Christ have broken down the 
barriers for openly gay and lesbian clergy. Presbyterians and Methodists are likely 
to follow suit. This willingness to reject the authority of biblical passages 
condemning homosexuality—as Protestant churches did with similar passages on 
slavery and the role of women—will appeal to a younger generation who see gay 
marriage as a non-issue and accept their gay and lesbian classmates for who they 
are—not what some Christians want them to be.555 
 
As this and other chapters have already demonstrated, the new media environment has 
plunged evangelical Christianity into uncharted waters by aiding the growth of new religious 
movements and by providing a forum through which important theological debates can be had.  
As a result of the Internet, the evangelical community today is a less cohesive and monolithic 
body than it once was.  This newly actualized religious pluralism should serve as an effective 
check against the less innovative and more indolent religious manifestations created during 
periods of religious monopolization.  The Internet is similarly providing new political 
opportunities and forcing important political reconsiderations.  Take for instance the rise of 
evangelical environmentalism, which due to the severity of the ecological crisis is arguably the 
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most important social development brought on by the religious fragmentation of the American 
evangelicals.  This is so, as in order for meaningful environmental legislation to pass in the 
United States Republican political support will inevitably be needed.  For their part, Republicans 
have shown themselves to be quite hostile to the aspirations of the environmental movement.  
Undoubtedly, much of this past hostility had much to do with the composition of their 
constituencies and the relative low importance placed on environmental preservation.  However, 
with an increase in the number of evangelical Christians adopting creation care as a biblical 
mandate, many Republican leaders and elected officials are feeling fresh pressure to take a more 
assertive stance on the protection of the environment.  The chapter that follows explores this 
issue in greater depth and provides empirical contextualization of the effects of the new media 
environment on both the evangelical church and society at-large. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
EVANGELICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM  
AND THE POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
But ask the animals, and they will teach you; or birds of the air and they will tell you; or speak to 
the earth and it will teach you; or let the fish of the sea inform you. Which of all these does not 
know that the hand of the lord has done this. In His hand is the life of every creature and the 
breath of all mankind.  Job 12:7-10  
 
As for you, my flock... Is it not enough for you to feed on good pasture? Must you also trample 
the rest of your pasture with your feet? Is it not enough for you to drink clear water? Must you 
also muddy the rest with your feet?  Ezekiel 34:17-18  
 
I brought you into a fertile land to eat its fruit and rich produce. But you came and defiled my 
land and made my inheritance detestable.  Jeremiah 2:7   
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Previous chapters have shown how the Internet is transforming the nature of civic 
engagement in the United States and helping give rise to new political movements and interest 
groups. This chapter examines how the shifting cultural values of American evangelicals are 
impacting society more broadly.   It does this from the perspective of environmental politics.  It 
begins by providing a review of the current political landscape with regards to the environmental 
lobby and argues that continued neglect by Republicans on issues of environmental protection 
could well be a serious political miscalculation given the growing creation care movement.  It 
similarly argues that recent academic work studying the evangelical environmental movement 
has been both scant and ill informed.  Yet despite these deficiencies, this chapter works from the 
overall contention of past authors, namely that evangelical environmentalism matters politically 
and that additional attention ought to be given to it.  In doing so, it takes a more constructive 
approach to the issue by treating evangelical environmentalism as the object of primary 
importance. It is a fact that the issue of climate change cannot be adequately addressed without 
the commitment of the United States, and in order for the United States to be able to show such 
commitment, President Obama needs the support of conservative constituencies—areas of the 
United States in which traditional forms of environmental activism have failed. It is within these 
districts and states that evangelicals are uniquely positioned to demand Republican‘s support for 
initiatives aimed at combating climate change, and as such, an examination of this matter is of 
ample importance. This chapter therefore provides an in-depth account of the American creation 
care movement. To assess the impact of this movement, it draws on historical narratives, polling 
data, personal interviews, and also provides an analysis of the activities of relevant interest 
groups, religious leaders, and politicians. 
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The Current State of Environmental Politics 
 
The past several years have been tough for environmentalists, and tougher still for a wide 
range of plant and animal life. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, humanity has been 
responsible for the extinction of such species as the Baiji Dolphin, the West African Black 
Rhino, and the Golden Toad. In addition to the loss of these animals, the accumulation of carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere has continued at an alarming rate, resulting in increased arctic ice 
melt, which in 2007 led to the opening of the Northwest Passage for the first time in recorded 
history.
556
 
Given the present state of our planet, the historic election of Barack Obama should have 
given environmentalists much to cheer about.  Indeed, throughout his bid for the White House, 
President Obama made environmental protection a key priority of his campaign. Since entering 
office he has championed a number of environmental measures, including a cap-and-trade 
emissions scheme similar to the one found in Europe, and he has even gone so far as to link 
environmental protection to the rehabilitation of America‘s economy, stating: ―My presidency 
will mark a new chapter in America‘s leadership on climate change that will strengthen our 
security and create millions of new jobs in the process.‖557 
  Yet despite such lofty promises, stricter environmental regulations remain an uncertain 
aspiration for several reasons.  Most recently, President Obama suffered a major political set-
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back when Republicans recaptured the United State House of Representatives in fall of 2010.  
Yet even before these losses, Obama was forced to contend with significant internal division, 
which came primarily from the so-called ―Blue Dog‖ Democrats.  As fiscal conservatives, many 
―Blue Dog‖ Democrats hail from the industrial Midwest, a region with a history of electing 
Republicans, and where the economy remains heavily dependent upon the coal and automotive 
industries.  For workers in these districts and states, the phrase ―environmental protection‖ is 
often synonymous with job losses.  Thus, while the financial meltdown of 2008 cost several 
incumbent Republicans their jobs, it could only take the environmental lobby so far.  
Complicating matters even further is the fact that Obama is now responsible for the American 
economy and the longer the United States remains in a recession, the more vulnerable he 
becomes at the polls.  To counter this obstacle, President Obama is banking on two 
developments: first, that the American economy will rebound; and second, that so-called ―green 
jobs‖ will be in large part responsible for this recovery. The problem, however, is that 
transforming a nation‘s economy is a cost-intensive process and one which is best undertaken 
during good economic times. Thus, to the detriment of ―the young and growing renewable 
energy industry, the timing of the global downturn could not be worse. Bank credit has dried up 
just as the sector is most in need of money to build expensive wind farms and solar arrays.‖558 To 
help offset this effect, the US government has provided some assistance, yet federal financing 
cannot entirely replace the disappearing private investments.
559
 Furthermore, such government 
investments, as economist Ben Lieberman argues, are at best a ―zero-sum game,‖ as the federal 
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dollars required to kick-start such an industry must either be borrowed or redirected from other 
government works, thereby placing in jeopardy jobs and programs unrelated to green energy.
560
  
Given these realities, environmentalists know that the passage of meaningful legislation 
to mitigate climate change remains anything but certain in the United States. Complicating 
matters even further is a Republican Party that is increasingly driven by the more extreme 
elements of its political base.  These supporters have forced many congressional Republicans to 
oppose nearly any initiative coming out of the White House or sponsored by their Democratic 
colleagues.  As a result of these actions, Republicans have garnered a reputation for being 
legislative obstructionists.  This may score them points with the TEA Party crowd, but, 
particularly on matters of environmental protection, it poses significant political dangers for 
Republicans.  As we shall see, opposition to environmental protection threatens to tear the Party 
in two. This is so as evangelical Christians, who for the better part of the past three decades have 
served as the most expansive and reliable base of the Republican Party, are adopting the 
environment as a matter of theological importance.  As this base increases its support for greater 
environmental protection, or as evangelicals like to call it, ―creation care,‖ Republicans will have 
either to adopt environmental protection as a platform within their own party, or risk giving the 
Democrats an opening to this all important slice of the American electorate. 
For many, the news that American evangelical Christians are embracing environmental 
protection might come as a surprise. Such a move seems to run counter to the staunchly 
conservative political and social positions with which this group is associated. Even in the 
broader academic discourse, where scholarly work is expected to identify such social movements 
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early on, little attention has been paid to evangelical environmentalism. Moreover, the work that 
does identify this trend tends to treat it as a curious twist in a much larger story, rather than a 
story in its own right. Matthew Nisbet typifies this approach when he provides only two 
paragraphs on the rise of evangelical environmentalism in an article on public engagement and 
communicating climate change.
561
 Even those scholars, such as Lawrence Prelli and Terri 
Winters, who take evangelical environmentalism as their focus tend to view the environmental 
and evangelical camps as two distinct sides, incapable of working together without significant 
coaching and mediation. While many of Prelli‘s and Winters‘s arguments in ―Rhetorical Features 
of Green Evangelicalism‖ are true—such as the fact that environmental scholars would do well 
to attend to the emerging evangelical environmental discourse as it promises to open new 
possibilities for ―building political coalitions and alliances on issues of common concern to 
environmentalists and Christian evangelicals‖562—their treatment of the subject leaves the reader 
with the feeling that evangelicals and environmentalists are two groups who inherently hold the 
other in opposition. While such a view might accurately reflect some extreme cases, there is little 
evidence it does so generally.  Moreover, the authors‘ approach could prove additionally 
counter-productive if it is adopted by the broader academic discipline, since it plays to outdated 
stereotypes in which the burden of evangelical ignorance must be shouldered by the more astute 
secular environmentalist. 
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Understanding Evangelical Environmental Resistance  
 
Unlike Catholics, whose theology has for centuries been profoundly influenced by 
environmentalists such as Saint Francis of Assisi (the patron saint of animals and the 
environment), and mainline Protestants, who for a variety of reasons have been more willing to 
embrace the discoveries of modern environmental science, evangelicals are relative newcomers 
to environmental activism. Several factors account for this delay. Part of it has to do with a 
general mistrust of science engrained in the evangelical psyche following the infamous Scopes 
Monkey Trial, while other reasons relate more directly to their literal interpretations of scripture 
and eschatological beliefs themselves.
563
 For instance, the most dire warnings issued by 
climatologists often deal with the flooding of coastal cities and regions. For many of us such 
warnings are perfectly logical, as the water from melting arctic ice has to go somewhere. Yet the 
evangelical mindset is steeped in foundationalism, according to which the Bible is the ultimate 
source of authority and truth. Thus, when this perspective is combined with a working 
knowledge of biblical scripture, it becomes easier to understand why such large parts of the 
evangelical population would remain skeptical of scientists who claim that flood or drought will 
soon be upon us.  In the eighth chapter of the Book of Genesis, after the flood God promises 
Noah that humanity will never again know such a terrible fate.  The rainbow is to act as a 
continued reminder of this covenant. 
Similarly, many American evangelicals subscribe to ―premillennial dispensationalism,‖ a 
strand of end-times eschatology that found its way into the evangelical mainstream thanks to the 
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published works of Hal Lindsey and Tim LaHaye.
564
 For pre-millennial dispensationalists, 
environmental matters have historically been of little concern, as the effects of ecological 
destruction are not expected to be felt until after the second coming of Christ. Armed with this 
understanding, evangelicals have taken Christ‘s imminent return as a cue to focus on issues more 
pressing than the environment and have accordingly devoted themselves to the moral and 
spiritual purification of one‘s soul and society at large.565 
The media environment of the 1970s and 1980s, the period in which evangelicals first 
rose to political prominence, contributed even further to the historic neglect of the environment 
by evangelicals. In this environment, multi-directional conversation was not easily achieved and, 
as a result, agendas were often set by those in control of the microphone. Because evangelical 
leaders such as Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson were busy fighting the culture wars, concern 
about environmental degradation was either put on the back burner or framed as further troubling 
evidence of the secularization of American society.  
Furthermore, it was only in 1967 that environmentalism even began to register in the 
evangelical movement, and not in a positive way.  Environmentalism was introduced to 
evangelicals via the publication of Lynn White Jr.‘s essay ―The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic 
Crisis.‖566 White made a simple yet effective argument, proposing that although it was the 
industrial revolution of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that gave humanity the 
means to destroy nature on a large scale, the mentality which permitted such destruction was set 
in place centuries before, thanks to Christianity‘s emphasis on so-called ―dominion theology.‖ In 
short, dominion theology is the belief that God gave humans dominion over all manner of life on 
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earth, and that while ―man‖ may be made of clay (earth), ―he‖ is not simply a part of nature, but 
rather made in the image of God. Such a belief, White argued, ―not only established a dualism of 
man and nature but also insisted that it is God‘s will that man exploit nature for his proper 
ends.‖567  White‘s analysis, of course, was seen by evangelicals as an attack on the faith, and it 
therefore served to further increase the distrust of science which many evangelicals already held. 
For the next three decades, insofar as evangelicals were concerned, environmental matters were 
largely seen as the prerogative of the political and secular left.  
 
The Historical Roots of Evangelical Environmental Activism  
 
In 1996, however, a remarkable and quite unexpected shift began to occur in the 
evangelical body, which was evidenced when congressional Republicans opposed the 
Endangered Species Act. Leading the campaign against the act was Representative Richard 
Pombo, a California Republican who was also Chair of the House Resource Committee. From 
the onset he expected a fight from America‘s many environmental groups, but did not expect to 
be ―damned by a group of self-styled conservative Christians‖ who viewed his efforts as an 
affront to God‘s creation.568 One group of evangelicals supporting the Endangered Species Act 
was the Evangelical Environmental Network (EEN). In response, a spokesman from Pombo‘s 
office released a statement asserting that the environmental Christians who were opposing his 
efforts were in reality ―a front group for Clinton/Gore,‖ and that ―[t]he Evangelical 
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Environmental Network [was] directly linked to the Environmental Information Center, which is 
staffed by Democrats and funded by some of the largest left-wing foundations in the country.‖569  
Yet Pombo‘s attacks only added to the determination of the EEN and other evangelical 
environmentalists. As a result, media buys and lobbying efforts by evangelicals were stepped up. 
In a recent interview, Peter Illyn, formerly of the EEN and now president of Restoring Eden, 
recalled his own encounter with Pombo: 
 
I went by his office and I told his staff, that I just wanted the congressman to know 
that I‘m one of those Christian environmentalists, and I‘m a Four Square pastor, and I 
certainly hope the congressman doesn‘t think the Four Square church is liberal, 
because we‘re not, we‘re conservative. And then I left and was out the door and not 
more than ten feet down the hall when I hear, ―Sir. Sir, the congressman would like to 
meet with you.‖  And I went in and met with the congressman, and the congressman 
is sitting there and trying to explain to me why the endangered species list isn‘t really 
working. And I remember looking at him and saying, ―but congressman, driving 
species to extinction is sin.‖  And I watched him, not blanch, but not know how to 
respond to this message. And it was very emboldening for me to realize that you 
could make a difference politically. That sure money was involved; but that at the end 
of the day, money doesn‘t mean a thing if they don‘t have the support of the voters.570 
 
Faced with a growing and increasingly public dispute with evangelicals, coupled with 
low public support, congressional Republicans had few options but to abandon their opposition 
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to the Endangered Species Act. In doing so, Republicans handed a significant victory to 
environmentalists and, more importantly, ceded important political ground to an upstart 
evangelical movement that did not conform to the established contours of America‘s religious 
body. In the years that followed, the EEN built on these efforts, which some openly referred to as 
the saving of humanity‘s modern day Noah‘s Ark, and went on to establish creation care as a 
legitimate concern of the evangelical project.
571
  
By 2002 the EEN conducted the ―What Would Jesus Drive?‖ campaign for more fuel-
efficient cars. Armed with fact sheets, bumper stickers and a pool of eager volunteers, the EEN 
published books and took the message on the road.  While traveling the country, EEN members 
took full advantage of the dense religious networks of the evangelical community and sought to 
leverage this social capital to further their religious and political ends.  While speaking before 
their fellow evangelicals, the EEN sought to educate these congregations on what they believed 
to be the Bible‘s mandated stewardship of God‘s creation. In 2006, the EEN was a major 
supporter of the Evangelical Climate Initiative (ECI), a statement which called for ―federal 
legislation that would require reductions in carbon dioxide emissions.‖572 Among the eighty-six 
evangelical leaders who signed the ECI, thirty-nine were presidents from evangelical colleges, 
while several others were pastors at some of the largest churches in the country, including Rick 
Warren of Saddleback, the author of The Purpose-Driven Life, one of America‘s all-time best-
selling books, which to date has sold in access of 30 million copies.  While it is difficult to 
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quantify the effects that of the ECI, it is important to bear in mind that evangelicals have 
historically been greatly influenced by trusted religious leaders and opinion makers.
 573 
 
Creation Care and Evangelical Tensions 
 
Yet as a result of these highly publicized campaigns, the EEN found itself under 
considerable attack from influential evangelical leaders, with both Pat Robertson and Terry 
Watkins crying ―blasphemy.‖  In a more focused effort to curb what they saw as evangelical 
environmentalism gone too far, Charles Colson, with the help of Richard Land (president of the 
Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission, which serves as the political arm of America‘s largest 
protestant denomination), James Dobson (founder of Focus on the Family), and the Southern 
Baptist Convention, launched the Interfaith Stewardship Alliance and the We Get It! campaign. 
Together, these efforts sought to restrain the creation care movement by portraying it as harmful 
to those living in the developing world, as well as to the broader ambitions of the evangelical 
community.  
Although the Interfaith Stewardship Alliance and the We Get It! campaign remain 
actively engaged in the evangelical environmental debate, creation care proponents are, however, 
skeptical that either effort will find much favor among younger evangelicals. This is because 
such efforts rely on a dualism which younger evangelicals are quick to reject. As Corey Beals, 
professor of Philosophy and Religion at evangelical George Fox University, explains: 
 
[The environmental question has] been framed in a very dualistic way in terms of 
pitting humans versus animals, or humans versus the earth. So evangelicals have 
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answered that question the best they know how: ―If I have to choose between a 
whale and a baby, I‘m going to choose a baby.‖ And so, because the question has 
been framed that way, evangelicals have been thinking they‘ve been choosing life 
by defending humans over nature. Today‘s students reject that dualism; they see it 
as a false dichotomy. You‘ll say ―babies or whales?‖ and they‘ll say ―yes!‖574 
 
Thus by reframing the issue as a matter of theological importance, the creation care movement 
has largely been successful in unloading environmental activism of much of its political baggage. 
When otherwise conservative leaders such as Rick Warren champion environmental causes, they 
are tearing down the political dichotomies of the left and right and instead making the matter of 
protecting the environment an issue of doing God‘s will. As a result, the voices of evangelical 
opposition to creation care are beginning to thin as increasing numbers are joining the ranks of 
Cizik and Illyn. For instance, just two years after the success of the What Would Jesus Drive? 
campaign, a poll commissioned for PBS‘s ―Religion and Ethics Newsweekly‖ found that 45% of 
evangelicals believed that combating the effects of climate change was an extremely or very 
important issue,
575
 while a more recent 2009 poll conducted by Pew Forum found that 58% of 
white evangelicals believed there to be solid evidence that the earth is indeed warming.
576
  
Those who remain skeptical that evangelicals are warming to environmental protection 
often cite a 2007 poll commissioned by The Barna Group, which found American evangelicals to 
be the religious group least concerned about the effects of climate change. That poll found: 
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[The] nation‘s born again population is divided into two groups, evangelical 
Christians (who represent about 18 million adults) and non-evangelical born again 
Christians (who are about 77 million adults). Evangelicals perceive global 
warming very differently than any other slice of the population—and they view 
the issue with significant skepticism. Among evangelicals, just 33% say that the 
issue is a major challenge, compared with 55% of non-evangelical born again 
Christians. That qualifies evangelicals as the least concerned segment among 
more than 50 population groups studied.
577
  
 
The shortcoming of the Barna poll, however, is that evangelicals are viewed not as a Christian 
sect in their own right, but as a subset of so-called ―born again‖ Christians. In distinguishing 
between these groups Barna provides the following definitions:  
 
―Born again Christians‖ are defined as people who said they have made a 
personal commitment to Jesus Christ that is still important in their life today and 
who also indicated they believe that when they die they will go to Heaven because 
they had confessed their sins and had accepted Jesus Christ as their savior.
578
  
 
Evangelicals by contrast are defined as meeting: 
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[t]he born again criteria, plus seven other conditions. Those include saying their 
faith is very important in their life today; believing they have a personal 
responsibility to share their religious beliefs about Christ with non-Christians; 
believing in Satan; believing that eternal salvation is possible only through grace, 
not works; believing that Jesus Christ lived a sinless life on earth; asserting that 
the Bible is accurate in all that it teaches; and describing God as the all-knowing, 
all-powerful perfect deity who created the universe and still rules it today.
579
  
 
Exactly why Barna decides to use this more complex and narrowed definition of ―evangelical‖ is 
not known. Nevertheless, the definition runs counter to most scholarly work.
580
 Furthermore, 
despite the claims of this rather nuanced poll, there remains ample evidence that suggests a 
thawing of evangelical environmental attitudes. For example, the once hostile Pat Robertson now 
regularly discusses the importance of environmental stewardship on his Christian Broadcasting 
Network show The 700 Club and has made an appearance in a national environmental 
advertising campaign with the decidedly liberal Al Sharpton.  
Moreover, when one considers the demographics of American evangelicals, as well as 
on-going shifts in the evangelical body, it should come as little surprise that efforts such as the 
We Get It! campaign likely pose little threat to the creation care movement. Peter Illyn remarks 
that such attacks fail ―because it [is] the far right yelling things to the far right.‖581 And while 
admittedly men such as Colson and Dobson have historically garnered tremendous social and 
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political clout, and for that matter continue to do so today, followers of their ministries, like the 
men themselves, are aging. While more than two thousand stations nationwide carry Dobson‘s 
daily radio message, it is difficult to imagine many college-age evangelicals tuning in to hear the 
thoughts and views of the seventy-three-year-old Dobson. Today‘s reality is that the evangelical 
vanguard that came to define the culture wars of the 1980s and 1990s is being culturally 
displaced by younger, more politically-open evangelical leaders.  These new leaders have 
increasingly taken the reins of the evangelical project and are refocusing evangelical priorities on 
what many view to be the Bible‘s social gospel. 
 
The Political Sophistication of Evangelical Environmentalism 
 
In an effort to convert this growing theological support for environmental protection into 
public policy, some creation care organizations are becoming more assertive in their activism 
and are showing signs of greater political sophistication. For example, although Restoring Eden 
has an established history of campaigning against mountain-top mining—whereby the summits 
of mountains are removed in order to gain access to the deposits inside (usually coal)—they have 
found past efforts, which typically involved lobbying members of Congress and sending small 
groups of activists to protest at the mining sites themselves, to be insufficient. Recently, 
therefore, Restoring Eden has been inviting church leaders and youth groups from influential 
churches in key congressional districts across the country to join them in ―camping expeditions‖ 
in the Appalachian region where most US coal deposits are located. While there, these church 
goers witness firsthand the environmental impact of mountain-top mining and are encouraged to 
spread the word to their own families, congregations, and local communities, as well as to 
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petition their members of Congress and to contact local media outlets.
582
 In adopting this 
approach, Restoring Eden is not only helping to ensure that future evangelical generations grow 
up with strong environmental values, but they are also engaging in more effective and calculated 
political actions by building important bridges between their organization and members of the 
evangelical community who might otherwise never be exposed to the creation care message.  In 
this way, Restoring Eden is quite cleverly strengthening the values of their organization by 
leveraging the social capital of influential church leaders from geographically and politically 
significant areas. 
Similarly, Renewal, arguably the nation‘s largest gathering of college-age evangelical 
environmentalists, not so long ago concluded their 2009 ―Green Awakening Campus Tour,‖ 
which took Renewal speakers and activists to forty-six university campuses, where local 
environmental issues were highlighted and students afforded the opportunity to engage in the 
political process at the local level. In addition to reaching tens of thousands of college-age 
evangelicals, Renewal‘s ―Green Awakening Campus Tour‖ also garnered the attention of several 
of the most prominent evangelical media outlets, including ―Christianity Today,‖ the Christian 
Broadcasting Network, Crosswalk.com and the ―Prime Time America‖ radio address of the 
Moody Bible Institute.
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Likewise, secular environmental groups have added a further dynamic to the creation 
care movement, as some are now reaching out to form important working relationships with their 
Christian counterparts. Sustain Lane, a popular online environmental community, recognized the 
importance of having evangelicals on the side of the environment after the election of President 
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Obama.  Cris Bisch, who manages the creation care forum for sustainlane.com, says the 
following about the origins of this partnership: 
 
So when James [the Sustainlane.com Managing Director] contacted me, he said, 
―You know, we‘ve got a new [US] president coming in. He‘s opening the doors to 
environmental change in our country. There‘s been a lot of division going on in 
our country, and we want to be a place where the left and the right can come 
together and be able to dialogue and be able to hear what each has to say and not 
be fragmented.‖ He [James] had a vision to see where this new president wanted 
to take the country and how important the roles of organizations like Sustain Lane 
are in bringing about this transformation. Because we are in transition in our 
country and hopefully it‘s going to be in the right direction, and when we are 
dialoguing, we are talking together and we are laying down our differences.
584
  
 
Several recent projects focused on climate change have also looked at strengthening 
relations between the scientific and evangelical communities. In 2007, for instance, the 
University of Akron hosted the ―Friendship Project,‖ a gathering of twenty-five scientists and 
evangelical ministers in an effort to ―stop global warming and address other major environmental 
issues such as massive species losses.‖585 Dr. Stephen Weeks, a professor of biology at the 
University‘s Integrated Bioscience Program, spoke to the important role that such forums play in 
bridging social divides, so that scientists and evangelicals can ―band together to stem the loss of 
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‗the creation.‘‖586 Similarly, expeditions that take teams of environmental scientists and 
evangelical leaders to view the effects of climate change, such as melting glaciers, are becoming 
commonplace. Such joint ventures are likely to go a long way in addressing many of the 
historical antagonisms separating science and faith. As Richard Cizik has commented, ―we are 
on the verge of an evangelical awakening to the global environmental crisis. But an even more 
significant accomplishment will occur when the worlds of religion and science come together in 
a spirit of reconciliation.‖587 He adds that while evangelicals and scientists may disagree on how 
the world came into existence, there is ―no disagreement about whether that world deserves 
protection.‖588 
 
From Evangelical Interest Groups to an Evangelical Interest 
 
 To presume that creation care remains a minor theological movement relegated the 
fringes of the evangelical community is to ignore not only polling data illustrating just the 
opposite, but a flood of empirical evidence.  For instance, across the United States, a number of 
evangelical congregations have already emerged around themes of ―creation stewardship‖ or are 
otherwise re-envisioning their mission outreach to include just that.  For evidence of this, one 
need look no further than in the most conservative of conservative states, Idaho, where Boise 
Vineyard not only enjoys a thriving evangelical congregation of several thousand, but also a 
position of prominent leadership within community.  Similarly, Ann Arbor Michigan‘s own 
Vineyard Church has shown itself equally committed to the cause of evangelical 
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environmentalism as that of their Boise brethren.  Yet of all the numerous examples of the 
greening of evangelical denominations, few stories speak as powerfully as the tale of students at 
George Fox University. 
 
The Riverbend Dump Expansion  
 
Nestled in the heart of the Willamette Valley is the bedroom community of Newburg, 
Oregon, home to the state‘s first Quaker community and George Fox University, one of the 
nation‘s more prominent evangelical colleges.  By almost every account, there is little which 
distinguishes Newburg from the thousands of other exurb communities just like it.  In the center 
of town and under the ever-present banner of the Stars and Stripes, small ma and pa shops 
continue to dot Main Street, though more recognizable franchises have begun their 
encroachment.  Clustered around these shops is an eclectic collection of student housing and 
well-to-do craftsmen homes. Further away from town, though still within city limits, one can 
find the hallmarks of the American suburbs, Taco Bell, McDonalds, Fred Meyers.  Beyond this 
point, Newburg quickly disappears and you instead find yourself in a sparsely populated 
landscape used predominantly by poultry farmers and others affiliated with the meat industry. 
Politically speaking, Newburg is a moderately conservative town.  In 2008 the county of 
Yamhill, of which Newburg is the county seat, favored McCain over Obama 50% to 48%.
589
  
Undoubtedly, much of this political conservatism can be directly attributed to the area‘s large 
evangelical population, though Newburg‘s proximity to Portland, one America‘s more liberal 
bastions, does bring some balance.  Yet given Newburg‘s conservative leanings, it was 
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unsurprising when in late 2009 the Yamhill County Commission voted 2-0 in favor of expanding 
the Riverbend Landfill, a move which clearly favored industry over the environment.  Equally 
unsurprising was the reaction from a number of environmentalists and other environmental 
groups, which argued quite correctly that any expansion of the present site, which would 
subsequently receive the bulk of its waste from neighboring Washington County, risked further 
damage to the local environment and more specifically the south fork of the Yamhill River, 
which is already heavily polluted due in part to runoff and seepage from the present Riverbend 
site.
590
  Moreover, as the Commission‘s decision to expand the current dump site required the 
rezoning of land previously designated exclusively for the use of farming, a number of other 
groups unaffiliated with the environmental movement, such as the Yamhill County Farm Bureau 
and the Willamette Valley Wineries Association, joined in opposition.
591
 Any county 
commission could have easily seen these political tensions coming. What few in the community 
saw coming, however, was vocal opposition to the Riverbend expansion from the students of 
George Fox University.  George Fox, after all is an evangelical university with reliably solid 
conservative leanings.   
But for the students at George Fox, environmental protection is not a matter of 
conservative vs. liberal, left vs. right, Republican vs. Democrat.  Instead, environmental 
protection, or ―creation care,‖ is a biblical commandment and thus a matter of theological 
importance.  Their story begins during the 2008/2009 academic school year when George Fox 
philosophy professor Corey Beals, like many local residents of Newburg, became aware of 
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Waste Management‘s desire to expand the existing Riverbend dump site.  Stirred into action, 
Beals invited ―Waste Not‖ a leading opponent of the expansion to speak to his class about the 
landfill and how ―political fights such as this might impact ethics in the context of 
philosophy.‖592 ―Waste Not‖ sent Ramsey Phillips, a local farmer and self-described ―gay, tree-
loving greenie‖ to address the students of George Fox.  In all, Phillips spoke to just two classes, 
but that was more than enough for the Riverbend issue to be taken up at the next meeting of 
―Quaere Verum‖ (Latin for ―seek the truth‖), a student led group at the university. It was at this 
point that Quaere Verum decided to draft a statement opposing the Riverbend expansion. 
Throughout the course of the 13 hour county commission meeting on the Riverbend 
expansion, tempers flared.  Yet when the students of George Fox began addressing the 
assembled crowd, the atmosphere in the room shifted dramatically.  As Beals notes: 
 
The spokesperson for the group (Quaere Verum) went up and read their 
statement, and it was a really contentious environment, everyone was there from 
the trash folks, to those who thought this was going to be threatening jobs, [and 
they] were on one side, and those who were for the environment were on the 
other, and it was an embattled sort of atmosphere.  But they (Quaere Verum) 
came up and said, ―you know, we really think this is a big problem, this trash.  
And we really need to find some solution to it, but we also realize that we are a 
part of that problem, because we all make trash, and probably more than we 
should.  And they were the only people to take any blame for the problem, and it 
sort of changed the whole tone of the discussion and it was beautiful to see it, and 
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some of the folks (environmentalists) who were advocating for this, but who 
weren‘t Christian emailed me afterwards and told me that ―that was the most 
beautiful thing I‘ve ever heard, what your students said.‖  And it was just so 
refreshing because they get it.  They get it in a deep way and were able to come at 
it with an attitude of humility.  There‘s a lot of self righteousness in this 
discussion and I‘ve been guilty of that, but they even challenged me, and 
challenged others by example, saying ―let‘s step-up here.‖  And the conversation 
after that, the testimony started saying, ―you know, however this turns out we 
really should be able to come together and figure out a solution to this, whether 
the commission approves this or not, we need to come up with something better 
than what‘s on the table.‖593 
 
Phillips similarly shared: 
 
I have been devastated by the loss of my family's 150 year old family farm to this 
unnecessary destruction of our resources by the landfill and yet, the one bright 
moment that I always return to is that night, with those kids when they finished 
reading their letter in front of the two Commissioners. You could hear a pin drop. 
One of our group leaned over to me at this moment and said, ―Ramsey, this may 
very well be your highest accomplishment in this fight.‖ I was very, very proud to 
be in their company and was for a fleeting moment, ―born again.‖594 
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For its part, the Quaere Verum statement read: 
 
We are students at George Fox University, committed to growing in word and 
deed. We meet weekly to educate ourselves about life and the challenges it 
contains, striving in all things to seek the Truth. When we became aware of the 
present issue involving the people of Yamhill County, Waste Management, 
Riverbend Landfill and the Yamhill River, we were compelled to become a part 
of this constructive dialogue about our community and the place in which we live. 
 
We hold in high regard God's creation, and are held responsible to cultivate life 
within it, and as young people, we see within ourselves the desire to change our 
lifestyles for the betterment of our environment and our neighbors. With these 
convictions in mind, we are greatly concerned with the plan to expand Waste 
Management‘s facility. Its encroachment upon the banks of the river would only 
encourage our unsustainable life practices that promote a ―throw-away‖ society, 
ignorant of the fundamental connection between the environment and the 
community.  
 
Because of this, we are lead to question its rightness and its efficacy within our 
community in Yamhill County. The local environment should be able to be 
enjoyed for years to come, not used until it loses its intrinsic value. In considering 
the importance of caring for the environment, we understand that the river, the 
sky, and the land have no divisions, and that to be responsible for the environment 
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is also to be responsible for our neighbors who share our resources. To reject this 
idea both devalues the neighbor and their property. 
 
The call to live in community, making peace with our neighbors is equally valued. 
Our politics too often stagnate in pools of apathy and hyper-individualism, 
fostering decisions that are ill-made and further isolating. What excites and draws 
us to this issue is the energized focus of the community. It would be unfortunate 
to suspend this energy by coming too promptly to a conclusion without fully 
engaging the issue and considering all options.  
 
We do not envy the position of Waste Management. Expanding their facility is a 
sure option for the sustained success of their business. But what of the 
sustainability of our community? We have become aware that there are 
alternatives to expanding the Riverbend Landfill, and we can research and support 
companies that are working on lessening our need for landfills in the first place. 
As members of the Yamhill community, and as Oregonians, we are willing to 
share the burden of uncertainty along with Waste Management. We are willing to 
recognize that we who throw away trash are just as responsible for environmental 
damage as those who store it. Above all, we desire to continue learning together 
through dialogue the best way for us to live together. 
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In keeping with this conviction, we advocate for an alternative solution that 
allows for mutual creativity in the future, rather than a hasty and singular decision 
at the present moment.
595
 
 
As has already been argued, creation care is by no means a dissident theological trend 
any more.  Today creation care represents an historic and politically important shift among 
American evangelical Christians and one which in a relatively short period of time, has 
seemingly garnered a majority of support within the evangelical community.
596
  For instance, 
while a number of evangelical environmental groups already exist—groups such as the 
Evangelical Environmental Network, Restoring Eden and Renewal—by its very nature Quaere 
Verum is not one of them.  Instead, the students of Quaere Verum are interested in pressing 
social and religious issues more broadly.  The fact that they would see it fit to include creation 
care as one of these priorities speaks not only to the favored status environmental protection now 
receives among many evangelicals, and in particular younger evangelicals, but it also bodes well 
for future environmental efforts. 
Increasingly, evangelical Christianity is picking up on this change.  At George Fox 
University, for instance, some 7% of the student body is majoring in engineering, where much 
attention is given to sustainable engineering, with courses taught on environmental engineering 
and renewable energy.
597
  Similarly, several seminaries across the United States have likewise 
adopted courses on the environment.  Among these seminaries are Denver Seminary, Mars Hill 
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and a glut of mainline seminaries, such as Duke, Emory, and Boston University, where many 
evangelicals train all the same. 
 
The Political Impacts of Evangelical Environmental Activism 
 
Although there remain Christians who are not at all interested in combating climate 
change, and even some who label the creation care movement as heretical, evangelical 
environmentalism continues to leave its mark on Washington. As recent polls show, evangelicals 
are warming to the idea of environmental ministries, and in the United States, where religion and 
politics so often go hand-in-hand, theological shifts such as this have important political 
ramifications. Meanwhile, there is plentiful evidence to suggest that congressional Republicans 
and even conservative Democrats are waking to this new reality. For instance, one of the most 
vocal congressional opponents of creation care is the Republican Senator James Inhofe from 
Oklahoma, former chair of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, and himself 
an evangelical. When Inhofe was once asked what he thought of Cizik‘s ministry, he replied that 
it was ―something very strange,‖ adding, ―you can always find in Scriptures a passage to 
misquote for almost anything.‖598 Yet more recently Inhofe, who has in the past called global 
warming a hoax and compared the Environmental Protection Agency to the Gestapo, surprised 
many on Capitol Hill by joining the likes of Senators John Kerry and Barbara Boxer, two 
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prominent Democrats, to support legislation requiring the Environmental Protection Agency to 
assess options for cleaning up black carbon emissions.
599
 
Certainly such a move is uncharacteristic for Inhofe, yet, as has been pointed out to the 
Republican Party, ―evangelicals make up a hundred million Americans. They are from forty to 
fifty percent of the conservative base of the GOP‖ and although evangelicals were apparently 
willing to give George W. Bush a pass with regards to the environment, ―a new generation of 
evangelicals may desert the Grand Old Party for its lack of facing up to the environmental 
future.‖600 It is likely for these reasons that Inhofe and other Republican senators have recently 
and quite publicly called for greater environmental protection. For instance, the staunchly 
conservative Senator Sam Brownback of Kansas recently spoke of the role religious leaders are 
playing in forging a middle ground in the environmental debate. Although Brownback is not 
fully convinced that humanity is responsible for climate change, he welcomes ―‗prudent‘ steps 
recommended by some religious leaders to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.‖601 Senator Lindsey 
Graham of South Carolina, another favorite among many evangelicals, went one step further 
when he chose to announce his support for the Senate climate bill he was co-authoring with 
Senator John Kerry by writing an op-ed piece in the New York Times.
602
  
Moreover, Democrats, long concerned by the defection of evangelical voters to the 
Republican Party, have sought to cultivate relationships within the evangelical community and 
have done so quite successfully via creation care.  This is so as on this issue, Democrats are by-
                                                 
599
 Laurie Goodstein, ―Evangelical Leaders Swing Influence Behind Effort to Combat Global Warming,‖ The New 
York Times, March 10, 2005.  Found online at:  <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/10/national/10evangelical.html>  
(Accessed September 6, 2011). 
600
 Cizik, ―Warming Up to Creation Care.‖  
601
 Brian Winter, ―Religious Groups Active in Climate Debate,‖ USA Today, December 15, 2009.  Found online at:  
<http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/2009-12-06-climate_N.htm>  (Accessed January 16, 2010). 
602
 John Kerry and Lindsey Graham, ―Yes We Can (Pass Climate Change Legislation),‖ The New York Times, 
October 10, 2009.  Found online at:  <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/11/opinion/11kerrygraham.html>  
(Accessed July 8, 2011). 
327 
 
and-large in much greater agreement with creation care than are their Republican counterparts.  
It is for this reason that groups such as Restoring Eden and Renewal have found themselves in 
continuous contact with the Obama White House.  And in what appears to be a gesture to their 
creation care allies, the Obama administration has tackled some of these group‘s highest 
environmental priorities, as demonstrated by its recent EPA announcement issuing new 
guidelines to protect Appalachian communities from the harmful effects of mountaintop 
removal.  Furthermore, the budding relationship between evangelical environmentalist and that 
of Democratic Party provides both groups with mutual benefits.  On the creation care front, 
leaders such Peter Illyn and Ben Lowe, who in past years have had their agenda ignored by the 
evangelical community, now find themselves with a seat at the big boys table and, what is more, 
actually influencing public policy.  On the Democrat‘s side, evangelical support provides 
Democrats not only political cover to push through various aspects of their environmental 
agenda, but it also helps to soften conservative opposition to such moves.  All the while, actions 
such as these help illustrate how the political and theological importance that evangelical leaders 
and worshipers are nowadays placing on the issue of climate change is going on to affect 
political leaders and policy makers. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The timing of the present worldwide economic recession has drained much needed 
capital from the pockets of a still budding renewable energy sector, while a number of otherwise 
moderate and fiscally conservative Democrats have so far succeeded in slowing down many of 
President Obama‘s most ambitious environmental projects. Yet a growing choir of evangelical 
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Christians is rallying behind the creation care movement. As they do, they bring with them added 
pressure on more conservative members of Congress, many of whom have previously been 
unaffected by the lobbying efforts of the traditional environmental movement. With this 
theological shift, the potential for meaningful social and political change looks certain.   
If Republicans are to maintain the political allegiance of evangelical voters, simply 
rehashing old culture war issues is unlikely to yield substantial political rewards, particularly in 
the years ahead. The reason for this is that, like all social entities, the evangelical community is 
anything but static.  As we have seen, the new media environment has helped usher in an era in 
which the social and political priorities of evangelicals are rapidly changing while 
simultaneously giving rise to new church leaders.  Many of these leaders are similarly placing 
new emphasis on political concerns outside those traditionally associated with evangelicals.  
New emphasis on the social gospel is one example of this and reflects a general trend among 
younger evangelicals, who in general are more tolerant and open minded than their parents‘ 
generation.  In this same regard, younger evangelicals have also never known an America where 
abortion was not legal.  This is an important fact, as while many younger evangelicals are uneasy 
with America‘s more liberal abortion laws, they are less likely to make abortion the defining 
issue of their generation.  Moreover, having witnessed the culture wars of past decades, younger 
evangelicals may also be of the opinion that there is little to gain by revisiting them.  Instead, the 
evangelical community is increasingly opting for compromises that seek abortion reductions and 
defend the legal rights of homosexuals while preserving the religious sanctity of marriage.  In 
taking these issues in new directions, it would appear that younger evangelicals are unloading 
significant political baggage and are thereby allowing for an expansion of their social and 
political agenda, in which issues of environmental protection will receive significantly more 
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attention. Such a reality will likely be key in combating the effects of climate change, as it is 
difficult to see much meaningful environmental commitment on the part of the United States 
without the help of evangelicals and the Republicans who need their support to win elections.  
In recognizing this changing political landscape, some Democrats have begun courting 
evangelical voters by reaching out to them on environmental issues.  However, despite evidence 
suggesting that this sort of faith outreach is succeeding in bringing evangelical voters back to the 
Democratic fold, many party faithful remain conflicted by such a strategy.  Such hesitation 
usually stems from one of two beliefs; chiefly that evangelical voters are either largely out of 
reach for Democrats, and as a result the party‟s time and money are better spent elsewhere, or, 
and perhaps more poignantly, there is general concern among Democrats that any evangelical 
courtship would force the party to abandon important political principles.  To the first point, this 
thesis has already shown these concerns to be unfounded.  As we have seen, faith outreach by 
Democrats has already succeeded in places like Michigan, Ohio and elsewhere around the 
country.  The second point, however, is perhaps more justifiable as it would seem logical that the 
more Democrats view evangelical voters as a competitive electoral base, the more likely the 
party becomes to acquiesce to evangelical values.  If true, this could cause considerable strife 
among Democrats, as committing to ever-greater faith outreach may jeopardize core political 
values, where for instance the party and evangelicals find themselves at odds.  And nowhere is 
this potential more likely than on the issue of abortion rights. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
WHEN CONSTITUENCIES COLLIDE: 
ABORTION, FAITH OUTREACH AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
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This thesis has sought a better understanding of how the Internet is affecting the interplay 
between religion and politics in the United States.  It began by reviewing relevant academic 
literature exploring the impact of the new media environment on society more broadly.  It then 
set out to determine if the theories discussed in this literature were applicable to the American 
evangelical community.  As has been demonstrated, despite relatively high rates of social capital 
and other defining characteristics, the evangelical tradition has fallen prey to many of the same 
forces affecting secular organizations and interest groups.  In particular, recent years have seen a 
steady fragmentation and polarization of evangelical cultural values, as the Internet increasingly 
problematizes the monologue of past evangelical leaders, thus clearing the way for dissident 
religious elements to reach an ever expanding audience.  Among those to take advantage of this 
changing mediascape are the creation care and emerging church movement.  Yet, in bringing to 
the fore a new found awareness of issues such as environmental protection and social justice, 
these movements are not only causing considerable strife within the evangelical community, but 
they are similarly jeopardizing the once monolithic nature of evangelical voting bloc.  This 
fragmentation is creating new political and religious possibilities.  For instance, not only does 
America appear to be on the cusp of greater religious diversity and a renewed and competitive 
religious marketplace, but an increase in support for evangelical environmentalism is bringing 
additional new pressures on conservative politicians and lawmakers to take serious the many 
environmental issues facing our planet today.  In noting these changes, some Democrats have 
begun active courtship of evangelical voters, and are using their environmental and social justice 
platforms as a means to elicit ever-greater evangelical support.  However, this move has some in 
the party (and their allies) concerned that concerted faith outreach will lead to a compromise on 
key political issues, in particular on the issue of abortion, where there remains considerable 
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differences between the party and evangelicals.  Determining whether concerns such as these are 
warranted is an important consideration, as it serves as a continuation of the discussion exploring 
how the Internet is affecting the interplay between religion and politics.  For instance, knowing 
whether of not recent faith outreach on the part of Democrats, as a means of capitalizing on 
evangelical fragmentation, is indeed forcing the party to the right on an issues such as abortion is 
a crucial question requiring greater exploration.   
To address the above concerns, this chapter proceeds as follows.  First it sets the scene 
for the discussion by giving a brief overview of the historical alignment of Democrat and liberal 
pro-choice politics.  Next it details the changing dynamics of evangelical politics.  It is shown 
that environmental issues have become more salient within the evangelical community, and that 
this has resulted in gains for Democrats.  However, it is shown that abortion rights remain a 
political sticking point on both the Republican right and Democratic left. This chapter then 
addresses predictions that recruiting more socially conservative Democrat candidates will lead to 
the abandonment of the party‘s pro-choice stance.  Formally, it tests the hypothesis that running 
politically viable pro-life Democrats will lead to an erosion of legislative support for pro-choice 
issues.  To do so the chapter draws upon statistical data taken from the National Right to Life 
Committee and assesses the voting records of all congressional Democrats serving in the United 
States House of Representative from the 105
th
 Congress to the present day.  This data shows that 
despite the fact that the Democratic Party views the running of pro-life candidates as a viable 
path to political victory, and that a number of these pro-life candidates are now members of the 
Democratic House caucus, voting records indicate that there has actually been measurable gains 
in favor of abortion rights.  In the final analysis it is argued that counter to fears of a potential 
conservative turn on abortion issues, Democrats seem to have mitigated this risk, as it is 
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demonstrated how the selection of attractive candidates is balanced through agenda setting 
practices that keep divisive votes on abortion at bay.  
 
The Socially Conservative Candidate 
 
In the summer of 2005, the Republican Party, emboldened by impressive political 
victories the year before, suddenly seemed to lose the trust and confidence of the American 
people.  Much of this erosion in political support can be directly attributed to the federal 
government‘s botched handling of the Hurricane Katrina relief effort; but not all.  For instance, 
by 2005 public attitudes had already begun souring over the war in Iraq and the growing fiscal 
deficit.  Hoping to capitalize on this rare political opportunity, House Democrats turned to 
Illinois Congressman Rahm Emanuel to lead the party to victory in the 2006 midterm elections.  
Emanuel, who had previously served as a senior aide to former President Bill Clinton, knew that 
Democrats were likely to gain seats in New England and the rest of the Northeast.  Yet he also 
knew that if the party hoped to wrestle the Speakership away from the GOP, then any path to 
victory required winning Republican held seats throughout the Mid and Intermountain West.  A 
win there, however, required candidates capable not only of running against the failures of the 
Republican Party, but who but also able to avoid the party‘s liberal baggage.603  In essence, what 
Emmanuel needed were moderate to liberal Republicans willing to put ―(D)‖ in front of their 
name.   
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Among the candidates handpicked by Emanuel was a little known sheriff from Indiana‘s 
Vanderbugh County named Brad Ellsworth.  In selecting Ellsworth, Emanuel was taking a 
calculated risk: Ellsworth was largely a political novice with no prior legislative experience and 
thus prone to political mistakes and gaffes.  What Emanuel was banking on, however, was that 
Ellsworth‘s conservative social philosophy (he is a pro-gun, pro-life Catholic) would resonate 
profitably with the heavily religious voters of Indiana‘s Eighth Congressional District.  It was a 
gamble that paid off, as not only was Ellsworth the first of 30 Democratic challengers who 
successfully defeated their Republican opponents on election night, but he did so by the largest 
margin of any freshmen elected to Congress that year, defeating six-term Republican incumbent 
John Hostettler 61% to 39%.   
In many respects, the Ellsworth victory has become symbolic of the aggressive and 
largely populist campaigning approach Democrats have adopted following their political losses 
of 2004.  The strategy is not just to run socially conservative candidates in socially conservative 
districts and states, but also to make real headway among constituencies long supportive of the 
Republican Party.  That is, the objective is not just to win one election, but to win over a 
constituency.  To that end, one of the most ambitious undertakings of the Democratic Party has 
been its extensive faith outreach effort aimed at closing the so-called ‗God Gap.‘  This effort 
makes its appeal to more moderate and younger evangelical Christians.  As described in the 
previous chapters, these efforts have been greatly aided by a recent theological shift within the 
evangelical community, whereby many evangelicals have adopted environmental protection and 
social justice as a matter of religious and biblical importance.  In an attempt to court these 
evangelical voters, Democrats have shown themselves willing to run candidates whose stance on 
other core issues—namely abortion and same sex marriage—are in direct conflict with the 
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party‘s more liberal political base.  This strategy has proven successful in winning elections, but 
is also the source of growing tension and Democratic Party infighting.  Among the fears for 
many Democrats is that by running socially conservative candidates such Brad Ellsworth, the 
party not only angers its base of liberal feminist voters, but also seriously risks its historic 
support of reproductive rights.  To date, however, no evidence has been provided that either 
refutes or confirms such claims.  The sections that follow seek to provide such evidence. 
  
Abortion Politics and the Democratic Base 
 
In May of 1972, a proposal was put before the Democratically controlled Connecticut 
state legislature that, if passed, would have banned abortions except in cases where the mother‘s 
life was endangered.  The legislation had significant support within the Democratic party—
notably the support of John Bailey, the retired chair of the Democratic National Committee who 
had returned to Connecticut to run state party politics
604
--but was ultimately defeated in what 
went down as a political milestone in American politics.
605
  The reason for the bill‘s defeat, 
however, had little to do with internal Connecticut state politics, rather, it was the result of the 
infamous McGovern Commission.   
The McGovern Commission, also known as the McGovern-Fraser Commission (as it was 
actually chaired by Senator George McGovern and Congressman Donald Fraser) was a 
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committee of 28 members handpicked by former Democratic National Committee Chairman, and 
Oklahoma Senator, Fred Harris.  It was created in response to the violence and chaos of the 1968 
Democrat National Convention in Chicago.
606
  Concerned primarily with broadening political 
participation and representing the views of minorities and other underrepresented constituencies 
within the Democratic Party, the McGovern Commission made significant changes to the way in 
which convention delegates were chosen, and ultimately, how candidates were nominated.  In 
this respect, significant political powers were stripped from the likes of Chicago Mayor Robert 
Daley and other party bosses, such as former party chairman John Bailey.  As a result of these 
changes, feminists were greatly empowered.  Their impact was quickly felt and they emerged as 
a leading political force within the Democratic Party.  For instance, by 1976, Women‘s groups 
had successfully outmanoeuvred Carter‘s presidential campaign, when, to the campaign‘s 
displeasure, a plank was inserted into the party‘s political platform opposing a constitutional 
amendment overturning Roe v. Wade.
607
   
Since the adoption of this pro-choice stance, women‘s groups and the abortion rights 
lobby have continued to grow more influential within the Democratic Party.  Among the largest 
and most recognizable of these organizations are the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, 
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which enjoys an operating budget of more than a billion dollars annually;
608
 NARAL Pro-Choice 
America, which Forbes Magazine ranks as one of the ten most effective advocacy groups in the 
United States, and which was ranked by the National Journal as the second most successful 
political organization of 2008;
609
 the National Organization of Women (NOW), which boasts a 
membership of more than half a million; and Emily‘s List, which when it began in 1985 was 
focused was on providing ―seed‖ money to progressive pro-choice women candidates, but whose 
political operation has, according to author Jamie Pimlott, since ―morphed into a multi-pronged 
influence organization that functions as a PAC, an interest group, a party adjunct, and a 
campaign organization.‖610  As Pimlott concludes, there are today ―few political theatres where 
Emily‘s List has not become a major player.‖611 Another indication of the strength of the pro-
choice movement within the Democratic Party is that since 2001, the number of registered 
Democrats self-identifying as ―pro-choice‖ has consistently remained between 58% and 61%, 
while the number of Democrats identifying as ―pro-life‖ rarely tops more than a third.612  Given 
these numbers, it is safe to say that the protection of abortion rights remains a key prerogative 
within the Democratic Party. 
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The Changing Dynamics of the Evangelical Vote 
 
On May 25, 2010, the Reverend Mitch Hescox, President and CEO of the Evangelical 
Environmental Network, in partnership with Christians for the Mountains and Renewal: Students 
Caring for Creation, completed an 18 day spiritual pilgrimage when he arrived in Washington 
D.C. for the National Creation Care Day of Prayer. Hescox, accompanied by 40 fellow 
evangelists, successfully navigated his way by foot over more than 300 miles of mountainous 
Appalachian terrain, stopping daily to spread a message of environmental stewardship at local 
schools and with church congregations.
613
  A month prior to Hescox‘s pilgrimage, the Florida 
based Northland megachurch, home to some 16,000 worshipers, ―hosted the first ever global 
simulcast for a church-based creation care event.‖614  This event was itself attended by more than 
60,000 individuals from more than 30 countries around the world.  According to Joel C. Hunter, 
the senior pastor at Northland, the primary focus was to ―recast the environmental movement 
into its proper perspective as a biblical issue that Christians should care about.‖615 Both of these 
events illustrate how American evangelical Christians are embracing environmental protection 
more and more.
616
  And it is precisely this stake in environmental stewardship that Democrats are 
counting on as they continue their faith outreach efforts. 
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The fact that American evangelicals have begun registering environmental issues on their 
social radar has not been missed by political operatives in Washington and elsewhere around the 
country.  Many Democrats have taken a favorable view of this theological shift; ultimately, 
between the two major political parties Democrats have the most to gain.  The emergence of 
evangelical environmentalism provides Democrats with an important, vote worthy issue on 
which they and evangelical environmentalists are in considerable agreement.  By contrast, 
Republicans are largely viewed as less friendly towards the environment, and are seen by many 
as closely aligned with the oil and coal industries as well as other corporate polluters.  This 
image, whether deserved or not, is one which does not sit well for many in the creation care 
camp and which also appears to be costing Republicans at the ballot box.
617
  The hope for 
Democrats is that by talking with evangelical Christians about matters of environmental 
protection (as well as other selected issues such as poverty and human trafficking), Democrats 
can begin to close the ―God Gap.‖  
Amy Sullivan is among those Democrats who see the most potential in dialoging with the 
evangelical community.  As early as 2003, Sullivan was arguing that the reluctance of many 
Democrats to speak openly about their faith was costing them significantly at the polls.  She 
quite accurately predicted prior to the 2004 election, that if the Democratic presidential nominee 
should fail to connect with voters on a religious level, then the party would likely lose that 
contest.  As Sullivan notes: 
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A president who can talk about his personal faith and explain how it connects to 
his policy initiatives enjoys both the tactical advantage of attracting the "swing 
faithful" and the moral stature to excite and inspire all those, religious or not, who 
are already predisposed to support him on the issues. To become America's 
majority party again, the Democrats will have to get religion.
618
 
 
During the 2008 presidential election, both Hilary Clinton and Barack Obama understood this 
message well and wisely committed considerable time and money to reaching out to religious 
voters.  Once Obama captured his party‘s nomination, his campaign continued its heavy 
courtship of religious voters, and as a result Obama succeeded in reversing more than a decade‘s 
worth of sliding evangelical support for Democratic presidential nominees.  On election night he 
captured the support of 26% of the evangelical, a 5 point gain over Kerry‘s anaemic 2004 
showing.
619
  Moreover, this reversal likely played an important factor in many Democratic 
congressional campaigns.  But to say that Democrats have found a new constituency in 
evangelical voters may be stretching the facts a bit far.  There appears to be much hope and 
optimism within the party that Democrats can expand upon the success of 2006 and 2008 and 
continue to make inroads to what has long been a stronghold of Republican support.  These 
hopes however, are anything but certain and remain a point of considerable debate among both 
parties. 
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For Republican operative ―Josh Brown,‖ the creation care movement is one that 
Republicans should view with some trepidation.  He believes creation care has some political 
pull as the environment is an issue that ―a lot of evangelicals can support.‖620  Ultimately, 
however, Brown feels that environmental concerns will fail to ―override considerations such as 
abortion and gay marriage.‖621  Thus the evangelical camp remains safely in GOP hands.  By 
contrast, however, Idaho Republican, Linda Smith, herself a graduate from the evangelical 
Wheaton College, views the creation care movement with more alarm.  For Smith the knowledge 
that Democrats are now courting evangelical voters is ―troubling,‖ as she believes that the values 
of the Democratic Party are fundamentally out of sync with evangelical Christianity. Yet Smith 
concedes that recent Democratic faith outreach efforts could succeed with even greater effect: 
 
 The one weakness with the evangelical movement is their lack of accountability 
and that is where I see the DNC being successful. What I mean by that is that in 
the evangelical movement, one may say, ―God told me such and such,‖  [and] as 
long as the principle is found in scripture, an evangelical friend or congregation 
would go right along and give an, ―Amen.‖622 
 
The Reverend Justin McMurdie has a different take on the matter. As an evangelical preacher, he 
enters this debate not from professional politics, but rather from the Christian ministry.  For 
McMurdie there is little doubt that today‘s younger evangelicals are more moderate on many 
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social and political issues than their parents and grandparents.  This, McMurdie acknowledges, 
could prove problematic for Republicans in the future (if it has not done so already), yet the real 
political crisis McMurdie sees facing the Republican Party is not the moderation of political and 
social values among a newer generation of potential supporters, but rather the loss of evangelical 
enthusiasm for the party and diminishing sense of political optimism.  Sharing his views on the 
matter, McMurdie notes: 
 
I used to probably think that here was being a Christian and right below that 
here‘s being a Republican, and that they went hand-in-hand, but now I wouldn‘t 
say that at all.  I wouldn‘t say I shifted to a Democrat or a liberal perspective, I‘m 
just disillusioned with the political process in general.  So I‘m not aligning myself 
with the Republicans or the Religious Right, but I‘m also not aligning myself with 
Democrats and the left agenda either.
623
 
 
When pressed on what it was about the Democrats that McMurdie found objectionable, abortion 
and gay rights surfaced.  In general, McMurdie remains convinced that most evangelicals are 
―always going to stand strongly against abortion,‖ and as long as the Democratic Party remains 
supportive of abortion rights, then most Democratic candidates are going to have a difficult time 
appealing to evangelical voters.  Yet if evangelicals have grown frustrated by the failures of 
Republicans in Washington and remain opposed to many of the social and cultural values of the 
Democratic Party; where does that leave the evangelical vote?  For McMurdie, the question is a 
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tough one, but ultimately, he feels evangelicals may be entering a phase of political 
disengagement, inward retreat and political demobilization.
624
 
If correct in his assessments that evangelicals will increasingly steer clear of partisan 
politics, something that has happened before, then the Republican Party will be harmed. Barrett 
Duke, Vice-President of the Ethics and Liberty Commission, an organization that serves as the 
political arm of the Southern Baptist Convention, views such political disengagement as deeply 
worrisome and anti-biblical.  As Duke noted during an interview: 
 
I‘m sure that now as always there are Christians who believe that the church 
should not engage in the political process and there are people today who are 
raising those concerns.  They should feel free to follow the Lord however they 
choose and they should feel free to express their concerns and voice their message 
and call an alarm to the broader church if they choose to do that, but it doesn‘t 
mean that everyone else who is engaging in the political process is out of God‘s 
will.  God certainly has called his prophets in the past to engage with Kings, so it 
would be inappropriate for Christians to say that Christians shouldn‘t speak to 
power and engage in the political process.  We‘d have to eliminate most of the 
pages out of the Bible in order to actually make that case from the full teaching of 
scripture.
625
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Over the years, many have both speculated and warned that evangelicals might not turn out on 
election night.  To date this phenomenon has not occurred.  Should it ever, however, the result 
would likely be ruinous for the GOP.   
As it stands, Democrats are committed to fighting for the evangelical vote.  This 
commitment has been reflected in the party‘s willingness to run high profile conservative 
candidates, such as the pro-life Pennsylvania Senator Bob Casey and Ohio Governor Ted 
Strickland, an ordained United Methodist Minister.  To some political spectators, nominating 
candidates such as Strickland and Casey is a shrewd political move, while others question the 
underlying logic.  Yet for many evangelicals, the electoral viability of the likes of Casey and 
other conservative Democrats, only help to advance conservative Christian values.  Such 
candidates, as the argument goes, help move the Democrat Party away from the party of 
―amnesty, abortion and acid.‖626  In such instances, while Republican candidates might suffer at 
the hands of socially conservative Democrats, social conservatism as such does not.
627
 
 
The “Pro-Life” Politics of Evangelical Environmentalism 
 
As the previous sections have shown, the political dynamics of the American evangelical 
community is experiencing considerable flux.  Although Democrats hope to capitalize on what 
some are arguing is growing moderation on the part of younger evangelicals, the party‘s ongoing 
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support of abortion rights keeps it at odds with the vast majority of evangelicals, both young and 
old alike.
628
  Running pro-life Democrats, particularly candidates with solid environmental 
credentials, will likely aide the party in appealing to a new generation of evangelical voters, as 
this more nuanced approach better reflects the emerging values of younger evangelical voter.  
Such a move, however, is not without its risks.   
For pro-choice Democrats who represent districts with a significant evangelical 
population, the widely accepted strategy of dealing with the abortion issue is to simply pretend it 
does not exist.  Yet attempts to ignore questions of abortion are akin to ignoring the proverbial 
elephant in the room, as for many evangelicals the issue of valuing life and the issue of valuing 
the environment are, in effect, one and the same.  As Restoring Eden argues on their website: 
 
As political and social conservatives, evangelicals tend to lump protection of the 
environment together with the lack of protection for children in the womb; we 
often have the irrational idea that abortion-rights advocacy and the efforts to 
rescue stranded animals or preserve endangered non-human species are parallel 
and equal hallmarks of ―liberal‖ thought.  Most fail to see how illogical it is to 
save the babies and then care less about the health and integrity of the 
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environment upon which their survival depends. We typically fail to see that 
opposing abortion and supporting creation care are both ―pro-life‖ positions.629 
 
For groups such as Restoring Eden, EEN and many others in the creation care camp, the issue of 
valuing life is more complicated than simply protecting the ―unborn.‖  Instead, being pro-life for 
many evangelical environmentalists is a matter of spiritual interconnectedness and dutiful 
servitude for the entirety of life.  For the evangelical environmentalist, it makes no sense to 
promote the values of a pro-life agenda if the life one is fighting to bring into this world is only 
to be subjected to cancer causing chemicals and other life-threatening pollutants once born.  It is 
for this reason that Pastor Hunter views environmental issues as so important for the pro-life 
movement.  As Hunter notes: 
In Genesis 2:15, God gives a simple command to mankind about the earth: 
―Cultivate it and keep it.‖ That is to say, we must be concerned not only with 
production, but also with the protection of God‘s creation.  Dominion is never 
given for the purpose of exploitation. Christians, of all people, should be thankful 
enough for the grace of God and His immeasurable gifts that we would not want 
to pollute such gifts.
630
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For Hunter, the important questions evangelicals must bear in mind on Election Day are: 
―How does this candidate or bill seek to balance production with protection?,‖ and ―How can I 
be a part of preserving the earth for the generations to come?‖631  For pro-life Democratic 
candidates, framing environmental protection as pro-life would undoubtedly be welcomed, as it 
would inevitably attract even larger electoral support.  It‘s quite another story for the liberal core 
of the Democratic Party.  While pro-life congressional Democrats enjoy a sizable caucus in the 
United States House of Representatives (or at least did prior to the 2010 midterm election), they 
remain at odds with many of the party faithful. As the Democratic Party moves forward with the 
political strategy encouraging pro-life candidates to run in more socially conservative districts, 
tensions and frustrations have grown among many women‘s groups and other liberal Democrats 
who view the party‘s historic support of abortion rights as a sacred political value.  It seems that 
Democrats can either accommodate the complexities of a larger, more diversified political 
constituency, which should allow them to win more elections, or they can look to purify their 
party ideologically, which will most certainly reduce their electoral appeal.  Some, however, 
hope to avoid either of these possibilities and are instead seeking a third way. 
 
Can There be an Abortion Compromise? 
 
While recent research and polling data indicates that younger evangelicals are more than 
twice as likely as their parents to support gay marriage and other forms of gay rights, and are 
similarly more inclined than their parents to support government sponsored anti-poverty 
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programs and other social justice related measures, on the question of abortion younger 
evangelicals remain as committed to pro-life values as any generation before them.
632
 This poses 
significant political challenges for the Democratic Party as they continue to press forward with 
their evangelical outreach. As Hillary Clinton‘s former faith outreach director Burns Strider sees 
it, ―nobody loves or wants abortion,‖633 and it is for this reason that Strider is convinced that 
Democrats and evangelicals will eventually find ―common ground policies‖ that respect pro-life 
convictions and work to ―reduce the number of abortions in the county.‖634  Sex education is one 
area where Strider sees common ground being established; another is a possible conscience 
clause that would allow doctors the option of opting out of abortion procedures and would 
likewise allow pharmacists the right to refuse filling ―morning after‖ prescriptions.  Yet it is 
difficult to see how such compromises will appease everyone.  If anything, recent events 
demonstrate the opposite is often the case.  For instance, when Barack Obama asked Rick 
Warren to give the invocation at his presidential inauguration—a move which was supposed to 
be seen extending an olive branch to the evangelical community—many on the left were 
offended that the President would give such an honor to a pro-life, anti-gay rights pastor.  At the 
same time, those on the right were similarly dismayed when Warren accepted such an accolade 
from a decidedly pro-choice, pro-gay rights president.
635
  Thus, even on a symbolic level a 
compromise on abortion is too much for many. 
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When abortion compromises deal specifically with policy matters, public anger is even 
more visceral.  For example, in an effort to reach the 60 votes needed to end debate on healthcare 
reform, the United States Senate considered several measures that would limit insurance 
coverage for abortion.  These measures failed to win broad public support because instead of 
focusing on what was being protected by these compromises, each side of the debate instead 
chose to focus on what they were losing.  When, for instance, the Senate moved to provide two 
separate government subsidized insurance schemes, one with an abortion option and the other 
without it, groups such as Planned Parenthood, the National Organization for Women (NOW) 
and NARAL come out in strong opposition, arguing that such a compromise would fail to 
provide abortion coverage to all women in the country. The United States Conference of 
Catholic Bishops also opposed this proposal, though for decidedly different reasons.  The 
Bishops maintained that, ―this bill should not be supported in its current form because it would 
allow federal money to go to health insurance plans that cover elective abortions.‖  This 
sentiment was shared by the National Right to Life Committee.
636
 
Given the entrenched interests surrounding abortion and the current political climate, the 
probability that either side will easily accept political compromises on this issue seems next to 
nil.  As seen throughout the 2010 midterm elections, politicians that party activists decide are too 
moderate on any number of political issues (abortion included), run the very real risk of losing 
their party‘s nomination.  This fact was famously driven home in the case of Alaska Senator Lisa 
Murkowski.  As National Public Radio‘s Ron Elving summarized: 
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Which kind of Alaska Republican was most motivated for this primary? The 
answer appears to be the populist, evangelical, anti-abortion Republicans who are 
likely to identify with the movement known as the Tea Party. 
Murkowski had a vulnerability within her own party because she was a supporter 
of abortion rights in some cases. While abortion views are divided in Alaska as 
elsewhere, opposition to abortion is more concentrated in the Republican Party. 
And this week's ballot featured a voter measure on requiring parental notification 
prior to an abortion for a minor. Murkowski endorsed the measure, but the anti-
abortion activists who came out to vote for it may well have preferred Miller's 
anti-abortion credentials overall.
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Given losses such as Murkowski and others, it is difficult to see how America‘s current political 
and media environment will reward anything but further ideological polarization.  Should this 
indeed occur, political compromises on abortion, while unlikely today, will be nothing short of 
fanciful in the future. 
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Faith Outreach and Party Tensions 
 
As discussed above, while Democrats and evangelicals are increasingly finding common 
ground on a growing list of issues (the environment being one example), there remain 
considerable differences between the evangelical community and one of the Democrats most 
reliable constituencies: women‘s groups.  As Jim Wallis notes: 
 
There are literally millions of votes at stake...Virtually everywhere I go, I 
encounter moderate and progressive Christians who find it painfully difficult to 
vote Democrat given the party‘s rigid ideological stance on this critical moral 
issue, a stance they regard as ―pro-abortion.‖  Except for this major and, in some 
cases, insurmountable obstacle, these voters would be casting Democratic 
ballots.
638
 
 
As we have seen, Democrats have shown themselves willing to anger women‘s groups by 
running pro-life Democrats in districts and states where a more liberal candidate would likely 
lose.  The risks of such a move, however, are not few.  For one thing, success is not assured.  A 
more conservative candidate could dampen turnout among the Democratic base, or fail to drive 
fundraising. More importantly, by running pro-life candidates the Democratic Party faces the 
very real prospects of fracturing the party core, while also driving the party to the political right.  
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When asked about the possible political ramifications of Democratic faith outreach efforts 
pertaining specifically to the creation of tensions between the Democrat Party and women‘s 
groups, Burns Strider had this to say:    
 
There‘s been friction created there, and right now it requires daily work.  What 
I‘m learning and what I‘m working on is that there are good relationships between 
some of the women‘s group leaders and some of the progressive faith group 
leaders, so there can continue to be dialogue and good conversation there, but 
abortion is going to force the hand on how the Democratic Party lands on its 
intensity of outreach to evangelicals.  On the one hand, it is very possible to reach 
into evangelical communities and create working relationships without really 
having to address abortion.  At the same time, if you are going to truly pull 
evangelicals away from the right and at the very least sit them down in the 
middle, in the swing universe, then abortion does become something that needs to 
be addressed.
639
 
 
Yet among many of the Democratic faithful, abortion is an issue with little to address.  For 
instance, when longtime Democratic activist Ben Calhoun was asked if it was a wise decision for 
Democrats to court evangelical voters by running pro-life Democrats in socially conservative 
states, Ben‘s opinion was decidedly negative.  To Ben, this is a strategy framed by the 
opposition.  He argues that conservatives learned long ago that if something is said enough times 
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then for many people it in effect becomes true.  This he believes has led Democrats to accept as 
true that America is a center-right nation and could never be governed from the left.  As Ben 
notes, ―through repetition, the right wingers in this country have used mainstream media outlets, 
as well as Fox and AM radio to create a narrative that if any politician dares increase social 
services, introduce a progressive tax code, or increase government regulation, they‘ll be 
hurriedly thrown out of office.‖  Ultimately, Ben believes America is much more progressive 
than most realize or want to admit, and it is on this premise that he is against ―running the likes 
of Stupak and his ilk.‖640 
 Ben recognizes that some might challenge him on that point, so he offers another reason 
as to why Democrats should steer clear of running pro-life candidates.  
 The Democratic Party is supposed to be the party that represents women‘s rights, 
and the right to make the difficult choice to have an abortion.  It‘s got to be a 
selling point.  If we‘re willing to endorse candidates who will compromise that 
value, then why should the party even take a stance on it at all?  We might as well 
be saying the party has no official stance on the issue or just give in and let the 
right have what they want!  Because if we run pro-life zealots like Stupak, 1) the 
party betrays itself and its members when those candidates support pro-life 
legislation, 2) it runs the risk that those members will not be on board with the 
most important legislative items when it matters most.
641
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Ben is quick to point out that not only was the Stupak amendment never adopted, but in bringing 
the issue to the floor, Stupak not only angered the party‘s base, but he drew enough attention to 
the issue to anger the pro-life base, while failing to win any Republican support for health care 
reform, nearly derailing the pinnacle of the Democratic legislative agenda.  The lesson, Ben has 
concluded, is that: 
 
The Democratic Party will never gain the support of the religious zealots that 
make up the pro-life crowd no matter how hard we try.  That particular sect of the 
electorate will never settle for a compromise, and will never vote Democratic 
anyway.  We should stop wasting time and money trying to find compromises that 
will never be found.
642
 
 
 Like Ben, Mike Hartley is also a self-described liberal.  When asked how he felt about 
nominating pro-life Democrats, Mike had this to say: 
 
I feel it is a mistake. Abortion rights [are] a key indicator and insight into an 
individual's viewpoint on other civil rights issues. I am generally leery of anybody 
who would force an unwanted child into this already grossly overpopulated 
world…On an issue this pivotal, there should be no such thing as a pro-life 
Democrat. There should be no ―Blue Dog Democrats,‖ no "moderate 
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conservatives" or my personal favorite, ―Reagan Democrats.‖ Politicians should 
not be allowed to hide behind the title of Democrat while behaving like a 
Republican to get elected in a ―red state‖ or conservative district.643 
 
And far from serving as isolated instances, the concerns raised by both Calhoun and 
Heartly only echo past unease raised by liberal political activists and observers who similarly 
argue that by recruiting pro-life candidates, the Democratic Party runs the risk of moving to the 
right.  For instance, former NARAL president Kate Michaelman is on record as saying, ―It is a 
problem when leading Democrats publicly recruit candidates who do not share the core values of 
the party,‖ adding ―I don‘t think you ever win in the long term by sacrificing core principles.  
The right wing has never done that.‖644  While Ruth Marcus wrote in the buildup to the 2006 
midterm elections: 
 
The risk is that, in the process of maneuvering, Democrats' reframing and 
rebranding could edge into retreating on core principles. 
It's fine for Hillary Clinton to talk about the ―tragedy‖ of abortion, or for 
Democrats to emphasize the importance of reducing the number of unwanted 
pregnancies.  But I get awfully nervous when Redeem the Vote's Brinson says of 
abortion, ―As long as the national Democratic Party makes that a centerpiece of 
their platform or something they're advocating, as long as that's front and center 
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and they're saying women have a right to do this, it's going to turn off religious 
voters.‖ 
So, by all means, let Democrats woo evangelicals and cast the message in a way 
that speaks to religious voters.  But in doing so, keep in mind: What does it profit 
a party to gain a demographic but lose its soul?
645
 
 
In evaluating these concerns, it is worth asking:  Has this really been the case?  Has the party as a 
whole really veered to the right on issues of reproductive rights just to gain some headway with 
evangelical voters?  To answer this question, it is helpful to turn to the congressional voting 
records. 
 
Have Congressional Democrats Moved to the Right on Abortion? 
 
Founded in 1973 as a response to that year‘s Supreme Court ruling, Roe v. Wade, which 
legalized abortion in America, the National Right to Life Committee is today the largest pro-life 
organization in the United States with more than 3,000 chapters in all fifty states and the District 
of Columbia.  Its monthly news letter is read by more than 400,000 activists, and Forbes 
Magazine has listed the NRLC as the eighth most influential lobbying group in Washington 
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D.C.
646
 Every year, the NRLC releases a congressional scorecard, in which members of congress 
are graded based upon the votes they cast for specific pieces of legislation in which the NRLC 
has a particular interest.  At the end of each Congress a complete congressional scorecard is 
released. 
As the NRLC is opposed to all abortions, including in cases of rape, incest and physical 
harm to the mother, their congressional scorecards serve as an ideal barometer against which 
congressional voting patterns can be better evaluated.  If for instance progressive critics such as 
Ruth Marcus are correct, then we should see an increase in the number of Democrats who 
regularly vote in accordance with the NRLC from the 110
th
 Congress and on.
647
   This chapter 
draws on every NRLC congressional score card since the 105
th
 Congress (the earliest available 
score card made available by the NRLC online).
648
  It has reviewed the votes of every Democrat 
in the United States House of Representatives for the past 14 years and has noted any Democrat 
receiving an NRLC score of 50% or more.  In each Congress, the total number of Democrats 
receiving a score of 50% or more has been added up and subsequently compared against that of 
other Congresses.  Moreover, as the number of Democrats varies with each Congress, a 
percentage figure has been similarly provided. 
Contrary to the warnings of Marcus and others, evidence at this time seemingly negates 
the premise that running socially moderate and pro-life Democrats in competitive congressional 
districts is otherwise forcing the party to the abandon reproductive rights.  Indeed, as the graph 
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below demonstrates, the propensity by which House Democrats have cast pro-life votes has 
consistently fallen since the 105 Congress, with the most dramatic decline coming between the 
109
th
 and 110
th
 Congress, the very years in which Democrats sought to broaden their appeal to 
evangelical voters. 
Figure 9.1 
A Comperative NRLC Scorecard of House Democrats:  
The 105
th
 Congress through the 111
th
 Congress 
 
 
Another interesting finding is the percentage of House Democrats receiving a score of 50% or 
more from the NRLC.  While this figure usually trends with the overall NRLC House 
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Democratic average, we see a remarkable break when freshman House Democrats of the 110
th
 
and 111
th
 Congresses are singled out.  In these instances, while freshman House Democrats did 
cast more pro-life votes in the 111
th
 Congress than they did in the 110
th
 Congress, the overall 
percentage of freshman House Democrats who received a NRLC score of 50% or more not only 
fell when compared against the 110
th
 Congress, but similarly fell below the average for the entire 
House caucus.  This evidence suggests that while it may be accurate to describe many newer 
House Democrats as more socially moderate, they are far from being solidly pro-life.  Instead, 
these Democrats may be seeking to find some sort of middle ground, whereby they can pacify a 
more conservative constituency back home while also appeasing the more liberal elements of 
their political base.  In these instances, we often find that many of newer House Democrats, 
while ultimately supportive of a woman‘s right to chose in many, if not all cases, offer such 
support conditionally and are unwilling to provide federal funds to subsidize abortions.  Along 
these lines, we would also presume that many of these newer, more socially conservative 
Democrats would also be less supportive of abortions occurring later in the pregnancy.  
However, since Democrats have assumed control of the House in 2006, such a vote has never 
occurred, which raises another important point, namely the importance of congressional agenda 
control. 
 
Explanation of Findings: The Importance of Congressional Agenda Control 
 
Congressional agenda control is a major political advantage for any governing party.  By 
controlling which pieces of legislation receive a floor vote and which do not; congressional 
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leaders have at their disposal a major public relations weapon.  As Gary Cox and Matthew 
McCubbins argue, by controlling floor votes, congressional leaders can exercise their agenda 
control in either a ―positive‖ or ―negative‖ manner.  Negative agenda control is exercised by 
keeping ―issues off the floor agenda that would foreseeably displease significant portions of the 
party.‖649  As such, negative agenda control is a common legislative strategy pursued when 
significant disagreement is had on various policy issues.  By contrast, positive agenda control 
manifests around issues of considerable political agreement, though as Cox and McCubbins also 
point out, it ―varies with the degree to which the party membership agrees on what the party‘s 
collective reputation should be.‖650  Meaning that the more polarizing an issue is, the less likely 
it is to receive a floor vote. 
On the issue of abortion, while in control of the House leadership, Democrats routinely 
exercised considerable political discretion, or rather, a ―negative‖ agenda strategy, when in it 
came to pursuing their legislative goals.  This was likely due to the fact that abortion laws in 
America are among the least restrictive in the world and as such, many congressional Democrats 
may simply be happy with the status quo and thus feel little need to push for any further legal 
protections.  However, such reasoning fails to take into account the United States prohibition 
banning federal subsidization of abortion procedures, and numerous other state laws, such as 
parental notification laws and mandatory counseling and waiting periods, all of which groups 
such as NOW, NARAL and Planned Parenthood would love to see gone.  As such, it is much 
more likely that the reason why Democrats have pursued a negative agenda strategy on this 
particular issue is because by doing otherwise, they would raise significant public attention to a 
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deeply polarizing issue, thereby placing many of their caucus members and political allies in 
politically precarious positions.  As such, in choosing which abortion issues to address, 
Democrats have chosen a more benign legislative strategy, focusing on issues of stem cell 
research and the lifting of the global gag rule;
651
 issues that not only pleased their base but which 
received little public outcry. 
By contrast, Republicans, when they were in the majority, regularly made use of their 
legislative agenda control to bring forward issues that not only divide congressional Democrats 
internally, but which placed their political rivals at odds with the broader America electorate.  As 
the graph below demonstrates, Republican leadership is much more likely to bring abortion 
legislation to a floor vote than their political counterparts, as shown by the below graph: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
651
 The ―Global Gag Rule,‖ also known as the ―Mexico City Rule‖ is an intermittent American policy that prohibits 
International NGOs receiving federal funds from providing abortion services or discussing abortion options.  
362 
 
Figure 9.2 
Number of Abortion Votes by Congress 
 
At first glance these findings suggest that Republicans are a more homogenous body than 
their Democratic opponents, at least on matters of abortion.  Yet figures can be deceiving.  
When, for instance, we examine the various pieces of legislation that the Republican leadership 
brought to a floor vote, never do we find a bill banning abortion outright, as this in itself would 
be greatly controversial within Republican ranks.  Instead, abortion votes under the Republican 
leadership where on issues selected to place Democrats at odds with American public opinion.  
For example, bills criminalizing third trimester abortions, commonly referred to as ―partial birth 
abortions,‖ were regularly brought to floor votes, as such legislation was introduced no fewer 
than nine times throughout the 105
th
, 106
th
, 107
th
 and 108
th
 Congresses.
652
  By contrast, when 
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Democrats were in power during the 110
th
 and 111
th
 Congresses, Speaker Pelosi never allowed 
any bill addressing third trimester abortions to have a floor debate.  Such a move is perfectly 
logical when one considers the political realties facing Pelosi.  For starters, unrestricted access to 
third trimester abortions is largely opposed by the majority of the American public and similarly, 
by many House Democrats.  Moreover, as the status quo currently protects a woman‘s right to 
have a third trimester abortion regardless of her rationale, there is no political upside in bringing 
this issue to the floor.  Instead, Pelosi, like her Republican counterparts before her, focused on 
reproductive issues that her party was in considerable agreement on, and which cast Democrats 
in a more positive light, while at the same time vilifying Republicans. 
 
Conclusion 
 
By enabling dissident religious elements such as creation care and the emerging church 
movement the means to reach a broader audience, the Internet has ushered in an era of new 
religious and theological possibilities.  In so doing, it has similarly challenged the hegemony of 
the old evangelical vanguard and the politics of the Christian Right by providing worshipers 
alternative Christian messages and different religious expressions and experiences.  Moreover, in 
shifting the focus of the evangelical conversation towards issues such as environmental 
stewardship and the social gospel, these new religious movements have positively demonstrated 
that many evangelicals have indeed moved beyond the sterile culture war politics of the 1980s 
and 1990s and are embracing a broader social platform.   
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Yet far from being a mere theological development, the evolving nature of the 
evangelical tradition demands political scientists to reconsider long held notions about politics in 
America.  In particular, given the historically entwined nature of the evangelical community and 
the Republican Party, and given the continued resistance of many Republican legislators on 
issues such as environmental protection and economic fairness, a growing number of 
evangelicals have found themselves yearning for a political alternative.  More recently, 
Democrats have attempted to be that alternative and have made significant investments in faith 
outreach initiatives.  Yet despite these initiatives, many evangelicals, even those of a more 
moderate and liberal political persuasion, remain troubled by the Democrat‘s support of abortion 
rights.  In an effort to nullify these concerns, Democratic leaders have recently begun recruiting 
and running pro-life candidates in more socially conservative districts and states.  And although 
this strategy has paid early electoral dividends, it is not without its opponents.   
In particular, many liberal supporters and activists fear that the running of pro-life 
Democrats weakens the party‘s stance on reproductive rights and compromises core political 
values.  For instance, as the recent congressional healthcare reform debacle has demonstrated, 
even caucus members of relatively low rank can cause significant legislative headaches, as was 
the case with the Stupak amendment.
653
  Still, as unwelcome as the Stupak saga was, such 
distractions are arguably a small price to pay, especially when one considers the many electoral 
inroads Democrats have made since their disastrous 2004 general election showing.  Moreover, 
and quite contrary to many of the concerns addressed throughout this chapter, evidence has been 
presented, demonstrating that despite a sizable pro-life Democratic caucus, the number of pro-
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life votes cast during the 110
th
 and 111
th
 Congresses was roughly halved.  This reduction is in 
large part to the majority party‘s ability to control the legislative agenda.  And when for instance 
Republicans yield this power, we see an increase in the number of floor votes on abortion related 
matters, many of which are highly divisive in nature, such as outright bans on third trimester 
abortions.  By contrast, when Democrats are the majority party, we see far fewer floor votes on 
abortion related bills, and those that do take place, are generally more benign in nature.  Given 
this, it is safe to presume that so long as the Democratic congressional leadership remains 
staunchly pro-choice, or at the very least, unwilling to subject their party to unnecessary political 
risks, then pursuing an electoral strategy in which pro-life Democrats are tapped to run in more 
socially conservative and heavily evangelical districts and states is a wise political move for 
anyone interested in defending abortion rights in America.  Because at the end of the day, 
abortion rights proponents need to ask themselves: Would they rather have a pro-life Republican 
voting for a pro-life congressional leadership, or a pro-life Democrat voting for a pro-choice 
Democratic congressional leadership? 
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CHAPTER TEN 
THE END IS NEAR 
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At the dawn of the Protestant Reformation, Martin Luther turned to the printing press and 
its mass produced print to help spread his message of sola scriptura.  Luther was a prolific writer 
and as demand for his work increased so did the momentum of the Reformation throughout 
Germany and much of northern Europe. Between the years of 1517 and 1520, Luther authored 
some 30 religious pamphlets, which collectively sold in excess of 300,000 copies.
654
  Up until 
then, no other European author had ever enjoyed such success.  Had it not been for the invention 
of the Guttenberg Press, it is all but certain that far fewer people would have ever been exposed 
to Luther‘s message or for that matter, his religious protest.  On this point Luther himself seems 
to be in agreement.  He once famously described ―the art of book printing‖ as ―God‘s highest and 
extremest act of grace, whereby the business of the Gospel is driven forward.‖655 
Thus from the beginning, Protestants have embraced advances in communication 
technology as nothing short of a gift from God meant for the purpose of spreading His eternal 
word.  The words of Luther are echoed in those of former executive director of the National 
Religious Broadcasters, Ben Armstrong, when he writes:  
  
Starting in the predawn hours of each Sunday morning, the largest religious 
gathering in America takes place, drawing almost 130 million people to their 
radio and television sets.  What happens is both exciting and miraculous.  It 
involves a new approach to the problem as old as the Bible: how to introduce 
struggling, helpless individuals to a loving God who wants them to meet Him and 
be born again.  This amazing event takes place every week, all week, from early 
Sunday morning through the final midnight stroke on Saturday night.  Making 
                                                 
654
 Ricardo Duchesne, ―Asia First?,‖ The Journal of the Historical Society  6, no. 1 (2006): 69-91. 
655
 As quoted by Keith L. Sprunger in Trumpets From the Tower:  English Puritan Printing in The Netherlands 
1600-1640 (Boston:  Brill Academic Publishers, 1994). 
368 
 
this possible is the awesome technology of broadcasting, which many consider to 
be one of the major miracles of modern times; and making it meaningful is the 
overwhelming love of a God who cares passionately about each one of the world's 
four billion people.  I believe that God has raised up this powerful technology 
expressly to reach every man, woman, boy, and girl on earth with the even more 
powerful message of the gospel.
656
 
 
Walter Wilson offers near identical praise when he argues that the Internet provides Christians 
the opportunity to reach every man, woman and child on the face of the earth.
657
  And though it 
is easy to see how broadcast media and the Internet have expanded the reach of Christian 
missionaries and ultimately the Christian faith, this thesis has shown that the social impact of 
these technological media has been vastly different.  The advent of electronic broadcasts played 
a crucial role in uniting what at the start of the twentieth century was a divided evangelical body.  
With the singularity of its message, broadcast media proved to be a crucial tool uniquely suited 
for the expansion of bridging social capital among evangelicals of all stripes.  As this thesis has 
further shown, broadcast media also helped in mobilization of evangelicals behind narrowly 
defined social issues, while similarly increasing aggregate levels of bonding social capital as 
many viewers of religious programs embedded themselves further into the communal life of their 
local congregations. 
Yet at the same time that religious programming was increasing stocks of social capital 
and aiding in the mobilization and political engagement of evangelicals, disseminating one‘s 
message via broadcast media, and television in particular, proved to be an expensive media to 
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tap, and as a result, very few individuals and only a handful of ministries could afford its costs.  
As a result, broadcast media also had the effect of consolidating the evangelical message into the 
hands of a few nationally recognized televangelists and much listened to radio preachers.  By 
contrast the Internet has instead proven itself to be a much more affordable medium in which the 
many are empowered at the expense of the elite.  Moreover, groups such as Restoring Eden, 
EEN, and Emergent Village have positively shown that when the Internet is weaved into the 
broader matrix of social life and serves to complement existing forms of worship and 
community, the consequences of this new medium can have profound impacts not only on 
theology and cultural attitudes, but upon broader society as well.  And this single fact is nearly 
impossible to overstate given the sheer number of Americans who identify with the evangelical 
faith, as well as the religious nature of the American public.  Because as we have seen, recent 
changes in the evangelical community are reverberating throughout the halls of congress and 
forcing political leaders to reconsider long held positions on an array of social, economic and 
environmental issues.  For its part, this thesis has sought a better understanding of how the new 
media environment is affecting the interplay between religion and politics in the United States. 
 
New Media and the Cultural Fragmentation of the Evangelical Tradition 
 
 Although this thesis regularly refers to the ―evangelical community,‖ the use of this term 
would have been inappropriate during much of first half the twentieth century. During that time 
no such community really existed.  Instead, evangelicals were a collection of dispersed 
communities that, in addition to the many institutional and theological differences that persist 
today, had yet to achieve any resemblance of political unity or cultural coherence.  It was not 
370 
 
until the dawn of the broadcast age that this began to change.  As we have seen, broadcast media 
was an invaluable tool that helped bring the many branches of the evangelical family together, as 
it both replicates the pastor/congregant relationship—insomuch as a religious leader preaches a 
message to an assembled audience—and similarly amplifies the reach of this message to include 
far more individuals than could otherwise fit into the pews of a single church.  As previously 
discussed, early concerns that broadcast media would weaken local churches ultimately proved 
unfounded, as the religious programming on radio and television further embedded its audience 
into religious life and consequently spilled over to the halls of worship, thus increasing levels of 
bonded social capital in local congregations.
658
  Moreover, religious programming also had the 
effect of mobilizing evangelicals behind conservative causes, such as the protection of unborn 
life and the defense of traditional understandings of marriage.  Likewise, the sermons preached 
on these broadcasts provided its audience shared mediated experiences, which its audience in-
turn discussed with family and friends, thus turning the somewhat private nature of religious 
broadcasting into a more public activity, while the vast and at times national audience of these 
religious programs afforded strangers a shared connection and sense of identity, thus increasing 
levels of bridging social capital.    
The Internet, as we have seen, works quite differently from the mediums of television and 
radio.  Bruce Bimber describes how by providing a platform from which individuals with similar 
interests can freely engage one another, the Internet is instead propelling society down the path 
of accelerated pluralism.
659
  In an online environment, not only are individuals better able to find 
forums and communities of likeminded individuals, but the inherent interactivity of the World 
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Wide Web allows for deeper and often times more fulfilling forms of engagement.
660
  In this 
regard, the Internet is quite adept at providing its users networks and communities to which 
otherwise could not belong.
661
  In doing so, those with similar backgrounds, common interests 
and/or shared values, irrespective of how niche these interests, values or backgrounds may prove 
to be, can readily congregate and advance the interests of these newly forged groups in ways not 
easily or cheaply achieved with broadcast media.
662
 .   
Indeed, throughout this thesis, numerous examples have been provided illustrating the 
many ways in which the Internet is daily being used to overcome spaced-based limitations, 
strengthen fringe interest groups, forge new communities.  For instance, A.J. Swodoba informed 
us that the Internet has allowed him to expand what he calls his ―eco-theological‖ work by 
placing him in contact with creation care leaders such as Peter Illyn.  Similarly, we also have 
seen how Emergent Village is using the Internet to promote an alternative, and ultimately more 
tolerant and service-centered, interpretation of the Christian Gospel, through the combination of 
a number of online practices that facilitate off-line engagement; most notably the promotion of 
in-person meet-ups, which Emergent Village calls cohorts.  At its most basic level, however, the 
Internet is empowering evangelicals to reconsider their faith and engage in a more authentic 
national religious dialogue, which many had been denied throughout much of the 80s and 90s. 
Cris Bisch of Sustain Lane is a prime example of this.  Bisch lives in Lorane, Oregon; the nearest 
town with a stoplight is some 45 minutes away.  Needless to say, for individuals such as Bisch, 
the Internet serves as connection to the outside world that enables users to belong to, engage 
with, and ultimately change communities beyond their physical location.  It expands for Bisch 
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and people like her, available social networks (bridging social capital), and can similarly serve as 
the foundation for deeper, more enriching personal relationships (bonding social capital). 
 As the Internet has come to occupy an ever-larger portion of the media environment, 
culturally dominate actors and institutions have expanded their presence online in what is 
undoubtedly an attempt to remain relevant in today‘s rapidly changing media landscape.  Yet the 
very nature of the Internet is one in which the many are able to converse directly with the many, 
and its direct appeal to participatory engagement goes against the grain of many institutional 
organization.
663
  Underlying the premise of accelerated pluralism is the understanding that 
society is undergoing a period of significant fragmentation whereby interest-based group politics 
is shifting towards a more fluid issue-based group politics, consequentially resulting in declining 
institutional coherence.
664
 Thus the Internet is an ideal platform for dissident and fringe cultural 
elements as it enables them to amplify their voice and raise their respected concerns.  Within the 
evangelical tradition, those supportive of movements such as creation care and the emerging 
church have historically been cultural outsiders.  As we have seen, however, with the aide of the 
Internet these movements are not only enjoying broader mainstream support within the 
evangelical community, but their embrace of divergent cultural values and theological 
persuasions is slowly, yet steadily, displacing the cultural hegemony of the established Christian 
Right. 
Through its examination of relevant academic and popular literature, on-the-ground 
interviews of religious leaders, church laity and movement activists, a thorough analysis of 
historical developments, polling data and surveys, this thesis has explored the role the Internet 
has played in the fragmentation of the evangelical church, and has done so based primarily on an 
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analysis of social capital, civic engagement and mobilization.  Having conducted this exhaustive 
review, we can confirm the first hypothesis of this thesis, namely that recent evangelical 
fragmentation is to some extent the result of the proliferation of the Internet, whereby dissident 
cultural and theological elements are afforded more efficient means of organization and 
networking, thus enabling them to better challenge the established orthodoxy of the evangelical 
tradition. 
 Similarly, this thesis has also shown that in healthy religious communities where social 
capital is plentiful, the mobilization of believers can be easily achieved.  This is so as such 
communities enjoy key advantages their secular counter-parts do not, such as recognized and 
respected religious leaders perceived by their supporters as conducting God‘s will, a strong 
collective identity and a shared values framework.  From a mobilization and civic engagement 
perspective, the advantages of these institutional mechanisms are difficult to overstate, as not 
only do they enhance and strengthen relative stocks of social capital, but they can similarly be 
leveraged to grow other forms of capital as well, such as human and financial capital, which can 
be used for both individual and collective gains.
665
  Because of this, many individuals find 
considerable inter-personal strength as a result of the religious communities to which they 
belong, while the resulting feelings of trust and comradery to one‘s kin and fellow believer often 
reinforces the importance of these communities.  
666
  Given this, it should come as little surprise 
that many of the organizations affiliated with evangelical environmentalism and the emerging 
church, have sought ways to leverage and/or replicate the strength of existing church 
communities as a means of growing their respected movements.  In particular, Emergent Village 
has gone to considerable lengths to build strong religious communities both online and in the 
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physical world, yet they are hardly alone in these actions.  As this thesis has shown, many of the 
affiliate organizations viewed in-person religious gatherings as an ideal venue to grow their base 
of support.  Peter Illyn, for instance, routinely uses Christian rock festivals as a means of 
growing Restoring Eden and raising new awareness of evangelical environmentalism, while the 
EEN encourages its supporters to establish creation care groups within their own congregations.  
Similarly, Al Tizon of ESA has found that membership in the organization is strongest when 
individuals feel a sense of community and are engaged with one another.  Given this, while start-
up religious organizations are wise to take full advantage of the many possibilities afforded by 
the Internet, they would be foolish to ignore the importance of physical communities and in-
person interactions.  Indeed, one of the key features afforded by the Internet is the ease by which 
online activities can be used to facilitate and sustain physical communities.  Such evidence 
serves to confirm this thesis‘s second hypothesis, which asserts that while the Internet has greatly 
contributed to the success of many newer, theologically divergent evangelical movements and 
organizations, existing church apparatuses which place a premium on in-person meet-ups and 
collective gatherings, have similarly played an important role in the success of the creation care 
and emerging church movements, as such church structures offer an intimate setting more 
suitable for proselytizing and community development. 
 
New Media and the Cultural Polarization of the Evangelical Tradition 
 
 At the same time that new theological movements have begun taking root within the 
broader evangelical tradition, we are witnessing a growing political moderation on the part of 
those individuals identifying with the selected case studies, as well as many younger evangelical 
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Christians.  Polling data from both the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life and the Barna 
Research Group confirm this point, as do a variety of other recent surveys.
667
  Unfortunately, 
polling data examining the cultural values of evangelical environmentalists and emergent 
Christians is non-existent.  To address this shortcoming, this thesis constructed a 45 question 
online survey entitled the Internet and Evangelicals survey, which was completed by 850 
individuals who answered online pleas throughout the creation care and/or emerging church 
webspheres. This survey, as already noted, has shortcomings of its own and is perhaps best 
viewed as the collection of 850 structured interviews.  Yet despite this, the Internet and 
Evangelicals survey offers considerable qualitative evidence suggesting clear cultural and 
political divergence on the part of survey takers from that of the broader evangelical community.  
Given this, I urge scholars to view the Internet and Evangelicals survey as reason enough to 
pursue further statistical exploration into diverging political beliefs of the emergent Christians 
and evangelical environmentalists. 
While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to determine in quantifiable terms the exact 
extent to which the Internet is responsible for the changing cultural values of American 
evangelicals, we can, based on a growing body of anecdotal and circumstantial evidence, as well 
as past historical examples, safely conclude that the Internet is indeed playing some role in both 
the fragmentation and polarization of American evangelicals.  Such a phenomenon, as this thesis 
has shown, is not only the source of considerable unrest within the evangelical tradition, but is 
similarly challenging the cultural hegemony of the Christians Right by offering worshippers an 
alternative Christian narrative and religious experience.  In so doing, movements such as creation 
care and the emerging church are leading many contemporary evangelicals down a more 
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moderate political and religious path than that of previous generations.  The tensions that have 
arisen because of this ought to be viewed as the destruction of social capital in one form (namely 
the cultural unification and political mobilization which was carefully fostered and cultivated by 
the Christian Right), and the creation of new social capital in another (represented by those 
organizations that have developed in response to issues previously neglected and/or opposed to 
the Christian Right).  The articulation of these cultural values as well as the ways in which they 
play out in the larger political landscape are important points of inquiry, as the impacts of these 
developments require scholars to reconsider what were once accepted political truths. 
 
The Pluralization of the Evangelical Tradition and a Return to Religious Competition 
 
With its ability to facilitate the bridging of denominational divides, broadcast media such 
as radio and television helped solidify the evangelical tradition into an identifiable religious 
community and aided in the formation of a formidable electoral constituency.  But the days in 
which the radio and television reign supreme are long over.  As we have seen, the Internet is 
better enabling evangelicals to reorient themselves into ever-smaller niche clusters and is 
similarly aiding in the division this once culturally homogeneous and monolithic voting bloc.
668
  
As a result of the fragmentation, new religious expressions and theological persuasions are 
finding increased acceptability and have helped to break the religious monologue once 
monopolized by the Christian Right.  While many in the Christian Right bemoan this fact, the 
multiplication of faith expressions comes at a particularly crucial time as over the last decade the 
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evangelical tradition, like their mainline brethren before them, has seen a steady decline in 
church membership.
669
   
Arguably, one of the primary reasons for the recent declines in evangelical church 
attendance is due to the generality of the evangelical message, which in its attempts to reach as 
broad a swath of the public as possible, has failed to cater to the diverse spiritual needs of the 
American churchgoer.  However, as the Internet helps pave the way for new religious 
movements and alternative faith experiences to flourish, America is witnessing a return to 
religious market-place competition, which if nothing else, should slow recent religious exodus.  
One of the more common manifestations of an alternative religious experience taking root in 
America is the recent ascent of the so-called house church.  Among the selected case studies of 
the creation care and emerging church movements, house churches have proven particularly 
popular with the latter group.  One reason why emerging Christians have so eagerly embraced 
the house church is undoubtedly due to the hostilities the emerging church has incurred from 
within the established evangelical tradition, as well as for the communal nature the house church 
provides.  However, while emergent Christians may have garnered a particular reputation for 
meeting in house churches, they are far from alone.  Indeed, meeting for religious services in 
private residences has become somewhat of a regular occurrence in the United States.  In 2006, 
for instance, The Barna Group published a survey in which it was found that 1 in 4 Americans 
who attend church service do so at a house church,
670
 meaning that in any given week, some 20 
million American adults can be found attending a house church gathering. Based on their 
research, the Barna group writes that they: 
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Anticipate house church attendance during any given week to double in the 
coming decade, and a growing proportion of house church attendees to adopt the 
house church as their primary faith community. That continued growth and public 
awareness will firmly establish the house church as a significant means of faith 
experience and expression among Americans.
671
 
 
There is concern, however, that as the house church becomes of ever-greater importance to the 
American religious experience, the risk that these congregations will lose ties with larger 
religious matrixes intensifies, thus increasing the potential for isolation and extremism.  While 
troubling, it is important to place this concern in greater relief.  For instance, while Barna 
currently estimates that 1 in 4 church-going Americans attend a house church, he concludes that 
only 1 in 20 do so exclusively.
672
   
Another way to look at this phenomenon is like this: while the house church movement is 
today an important development on the religious scene, it serves primarily, though not 
exclusively, as a supplement to one‘s faith experience.  The overlap which exists between house 
churches and traditional worship venues is likely of crucial importance as it may well serve to 
moderate smaller, would-be dissident religious elements, while simultaneously pushing larger, 
more stagnant religious bodies into new theological territories.  This can be true from both a 
liberal and conservative perspective, but as Chapter 7 has shown, the fragmentation of the 
evangelical tradition, while creating extremes on both ends of the political/religious spectrums, 
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similarly serves to moderate America‘s religious impulse by reinvigorating a religious 
marketplace once dominated by the Christian Right. 
While some might view alternative theological and religious expressions as simply a 
matter of faith, such a perception would indeed be naïve.  For instance, in expanding their social 
concerns beyond the culture war issues of the 1980s and 1990s, many evangelicals are bringing 
considerable new weight to issues such as environmental protection, the eradication of 
HIV/AIDS, the end of poverty and the prevention of human trafficking.  Moreover, this 
expanded list of social concerns is serving to further undermine the historic electoral strategy of 
the Republican Party, as attention to such issues provides Democrats a crucial entry point in their 
courtship of evangelical voters. 
 
The Politics of Evangelical Environmentalism 
 
 Historically, environmental protection has mattered little to American evangelical 
Christians and as a result, Republican lawmakers have had few political incentives to adopt 
environmental protection as a centerpiece of their legislative agenda.  More recently, however, a 
growing number of evangelicals have come to adopt environmental protection as a matter of 
biblical importance.  Their belief that God entrusted humanity to care for, and tend to the 
―Garden,‖ has up-ended established political orders and is arguably the single most significant 
development to occur within the broader environmental movement over the past several decades.  
This is so as in order for meaningful environmental policies to be passed in Washington, some 
measure of bi-partisan support will inevitably be needed.  Yet the impetus for such support has 
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long been lacking, as it has been only recently that evangelical voters have come to view 
environmental degradation as a serious moral and political issue. 
As this thesis has shown, the Internet has played a sizable role in connecting what has at 
times been called the ―diaspora‖ of the creation care movement.  Unsurprisingly, however, 
evangelical environmentalism, with its widespread religious appeal, its nuanced creation 
theology and it transformative cultural and political capabilities, has similarly emerged as one the 
most divisive issues confronting the evangelical community today.  While many religious 
organizations and individuals have spoken out against evangelical environmentalism, few have 
done so with more vitriol than the Cornwall Alliance, which through the Resisting the Green 
Dragon campaign, has had this to say about creation care: 
 
Climate change has split the Evangelical Christian world asunder. On one side, a 
minority say that the biblical edict to look out for the poor and be good stewards 
of God's creation makes them natural allies of those who would limit human 
emissions of greenhouse gases. 
 
On the other, a far larger group argues that climate change is a fairy tale that 
progressives tell their children to scare them into being good little humanists, and 
environmentalism is a ―false gospel‖ that threatens to co-opt the teachings of 
Christ himself.
673
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Undoubtedly, it is the hope of the Cornwall Alliance that campaigns such as Resisting the 
Green Dragon will ultimately prove successful in stemming the rising tide of the creation care 
movement.  It is for this reason why many Alliance members celebrated the findings of an 
October 2010 survey by the Pew Research Center, which showed a mere 16% of regular 
churchgoing evangelicals believed climate change to be a ―very serious‖ problem.674  As 
expected, some observers flagged this poll as evidence that the creation care movement had 
failed to win sizable support within the evangelical community.
675
  Yet in order to arrive at this 
conclusion, one would have to dismiss the poll‘s other findings, such as the number of 
evangelicals who believe climate change to be a ―somewhat serious‖ problem.  When these two 
groups are added together, the number of evangelicals who view climate change as a 
―somewhat‖ or ―serious‖ problem rises to a more respectable 47%.  Similarly, this same survey 
also found that some 42% of evangelicals believe climate change to a problem requiring 
―immediate government action.‖676  Though in fairness to the Cornwall Alliance, when the 
findings of the 2010 Pew Research Center survey are compared against those of the 2008 Pew 
Forum on Religion and Public Life survey, we do find evidence that suggests some waning of 
evangelical environmental support.  With this said, it is important to remember that like all 
public opinions, those of the evangelical community are subject to fluctuations as well as 
periodic mood swings.  Moreover, if there has been a decline in evangelical support for greater 
environmental protection, as there may well indeed be, such a decline would mirror that of the 
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broader American public, which on the whole has become more skeptical of climate change 
science since 2008.
677
   
Yet while polling data may suggest some evangelical retreat from the creation care 
movement, other evidence indicates that the cause of evangelical environmentalism is a strong as 
ever.  For instance, as late as 2004 only a handful of colleges affiliated with the Council for 
Christian Colleges and Universities (CCCU) had any creation care programs on campus.  Today, 
however, a creation care program and/or initiatives can be found on campuses of more than half 
of all affiliate institutions.  During this same period, a number of national evangelical leaders 
have come out in support of creation care, including some who previously railed against it.  Their 
support could well bring others to the cause, while the very fact that the Christian Right now 
feels the need to attack creation care as openly and as hostilely as the Cornwall Alliance does, 
should serve as further evidence to the growing popularity of evangelical environmentalism. 
As the number of evangelicals who view environmental protection as a matter of 
theological importance grows, Republicans, whose electoral success has for decades now have 
been dependent upon the evangelical vote, find themselves under new pressure to adopt greener 
environmental policies.  While many elected Republicans have thus far largely resisted these 
pressures, increasingly, a number of high profile Republicans, such as South Carolina Senator 
Lindsey Graham, are coming out in favor of greater environmental protections.  As Graham 
notes, ―‗I have been to enough college campuses to know if you are 30 or younger this climate 
issue is not a debate…it‘s a value. These young people grew up with recycling and a sensitivity 
to the environment—and the world will be better off for it. They are not brainwashed…From a 
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Republican point of view, we should buy into it and embrace it and not belittle them.‘‖678  Given 
this information, we can confidently affirm the third hypothesis of this thesis:  that with the 
growing popularity of the creation care movement, environmental protection has increasingly 
become an important electoral issue among evangelical Christians, and is putting new pressure 
on Republican politicians to support greener environmental policies.   
If Republicans are wise, they will take Senator Graham‘s advice and begin adopting a 
friendly environmental platform.  If they do not, not only does the party run the risk of alienating 
a future generation of American voters, but they also place into jeopardy the support of 
evangelical environmentalists, whose votes Republicans desperately need to win elections.  
Already, Democrats have attempted to dampen evangelical Republican support by using the 
environment as a decisive electoral wedge issue.  Yet as we have seen, even this strategy is not 
without its political risks, as like the Republicans, Democrats must also navigate a complex 
political coalition, of which many members are uneasy over party‘s recent faith outreach 
endeavors. 
  
Faith Outreach, Abortion Politics and the Democratic Party 
 
 Increasingly, Democrats are viewing the changing cultural landscape of the evangelical 
community as a means of making electoral inroads with religious voters.  Environmental 
protection is one issue Democrats have sought to use as a wedge between evangelicals and the 
Republican Party.  As this thesis has shown, in recent years, a growing number of evangelicals 
have adopted creation care as a matter of theological importance and have even gone so far as to 
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equate environmental protection as part of the broader pro-life agenda.
679
  However, while the 
values of the Democratic Party and evangelical voters are increasingly finding common ground, 
the party‘s historic support of abortion rights keeps it at odds with most evangelicals, even those 
who have become more moderate on several other political issues.
680
 Democrats are well aware 
that the issue of abortion remains a key hurdle in winning additional evangelical votes; they want 
to use the bridge provided by environmental protection, but not if it means compromise on core 
values.  Comparing the abortion voting records of the 105
th
 through 111
th
 Congress, I found that 
despite a growing pro-life Democratic House Caucus, the number of anti-abortion floor votes 
dramatically declined in those congresses where Democrats were the majority party.  Moreover, 
during these same Congresses, similar declines were also noted among all Democrats with 
respect to the propensity of casting pro-life votes.  This decline can be attributed to the power of 
congressional agenda control.  For instance, when Republicans exercise this power, we see a 
dramatic increase in the number of abortion votes more generally, as well as votes on more 
divisive topics specifically, such as third trimester abortion bans.  Given this information, 
Democrats interested in defending abortion rights would be wise to embrace the simple 
compromise of running pro-life candidates in conservative districts and states, as it is a far better 
thing to have a pro-life Democrat voting for a pro-choice congressional leadership, than a pro-
life Republican voting for a pro-life congressional leadership.  As such, we can confirm the final 
hypothesis of this thesis, that despite the growing number of pro-life Democrats in congress, 
abortion rights will remain unaffected at the federal level so long as Democrats retain their 
congressional majorities, as party leaders are unwilling to bring legislation restricting the rights 
of women to a floor vote. 
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Final Remarks 
 
Although there is no dispute that religious communities are politically significant, there 
has been insufficient work probing the relationship between new forms of communication 
technology and evangelical political mobilization.  Academia has similarly failed in addressing 
how these changes are affecting the broader interplay between religion and politics in the United 
States. 
To fill this gap, this thesis has shown that different media have divergent effects on the 
potential for the cultural and political orientation religious communities.  Due to its sheer size 
and its past voting practices, this thesis has paid specific attention to the evangelical community.  
It has shown that while a number of historical events propelled evangelicals to abandon their 
self-imposed political isolationism, which began in the wake of the Scopes Monkey Trail and 
lasted through much of the 1970s, the medium of radio and television helped focus evangelical 
attentions on a narrow set of cultural issues.  As a result, from about the 1980s and on, 
evangelicals have been one of the most monolithic voting blocs in American politics and are 
today an irreplaceable pillar of Republican political support. 
However, recent advances in communication technologies are threatening the established 
political order by ushering in new religious possibilities that are subsequently resulting in the 
cultural fragmentation of American evangelicals, a process that both destroys as well as creates 
social capital.  While such fragmentation may be a relatively new phenomenon, historical 
evidence shows that changing media regimes often have profound and long lasting impacts on 
religious bodies.  In the United States, the Internet has better enabled dissident religious elements 
the means to more easily and efficiently connect and organize, thus allowing for a propagation of 
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their message and for the proselytizing of new adherents.  Among the movements dividing the 
evangelical tradition are evangelical environmentalism and the emerging church, which the 
Christian Right views as both subversive and heretical.  Yet due to their growing popularity, 
these movements are helping to revitalize a stagnant religious marketplace while similarly 
serving as an ever-greater balance to the cultural and religious hegemony of the Christian Right.  
For their part, the Democratic Party has begun taking notice of this phenomenon and is 
attempting to capitalize on what seems to be a moderation of political values among many 
evangelicals.  Indeed, the party‘s historic support of environmental initiatives as well as its 
embrace of social justice has allowed Democrats a crucial entry point into the evangelical 
community.  But while Democrats and evangelicals may find themselves with more and more in 
common, the issue of abortion remains politically problematic.  To better navigate this issue, 
Democrats have recently begun running pro-life candidates in more conservative and heavily 
evangelical districts and states.  Based on the 2006 and 2008 elections, this strategy appears to 
hold some merit, but it is not without its risks.  In particular, the running of pro-life candidates 
has proved to be a source of tension within the party as fears persist that such an electoral 
strategy jeopardizes the party‘s core commitment to the protection of reproductive rights.  As 
this thesis has shown, however, the election of pro-life Democrats actually serves to better 
reinforce the rights of women, insomuch as it denies Republicans a congressional majority, thus 
placing the power of the gavel, and its agenda control, firmly in the hands of the Democratic 
Party. 
Regardless of whether or not Democrats continue to make electoral inroads with religious 
voters, the cultural fragmentation that currently besets the evangelical community will continue 
to weaken the Christian Right and will inevitably lead to a reconfiguration of the Republican 
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political agenda.  Such news should come as welcome relief to anyone troubled by the recent 
wayward drift of the Republican Party or, for that matter, its promotion of policies that reinforce 
the structures of poverty, which plunder our environment, and that rob future generation of 
continued prosperity.  Like the printing press before it, the Internet is radically changing the 
world in which we live and is doing so, at least in part, by affecting the way we worship and 
understand religion at the most fundamental level.  In the United States, this shifting religious 
ground is likewise impacting the nature of political discourse.  As scholars it is crucial that we 
better understand the many cultural, economic and political complexities of a fragmented 
evangelical community.  For this reason, additional inquiry is demanded. 
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